GHSA-647h-p824-99w7: @grackle ai/mcp @grackle-ai/mcp Has A Workspace Authorization Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-647h-p824-99w7",
  "modified" : "2026-03-25T17:23:11Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-25T17:23:11Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "@grackle-ai/mcp has a workspace authorization bypass in its knowledge_search MCP tool",
  "details" : "### Impact\n\nThe `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` MCP tools are included in `SCOPED_TOOLS` (visible to scoped agents) but their handlers do not receive `authContext` and do not enforce workspace scoping. A scoped agent in Workspace A can supply an arbitrary `workspaceId` parameter to search or retrieve knowledge graph nodes from Workspace B, bypassing workspace isolation boundaries.\n\nThis is a **cross-workspace data leakage** vulnerability affecting any deployment where multiple workspaces contain sensitive knowledge graph data and scoped agents are used.\n\n**Affected code:**\n- `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:146-169` (knowledge_search handler)\n- `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:244-283` (knowledge_get_node handler)\n- `packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts:11` (both tools listed in SCOPED_TOOLS)\n\n**Contrast with correct implementation:** `knowledge_create_node` (same file, lines 334-357) properly receives `authContext` and overrides the user-supplied `workspaceId` for scoped callers.\n\n### Design Note\n\nCross-workspace knowledge sharing is a legitimate future feature — agents working across different repos may need to collaborate and share knowledge. However, this access should be **opt-in with explicit grants**, not an implicit bypass. The immediate fix locks scoped agents to their own workspace. A future design could introduce:\n- Workspace-level \"share knowledge with\" settings\n- A `cross_workspace` scope on scoped tokens\n- Explicit `workspaceIds` (plural) in the auth context\n\n### Patches\n\n**Fix:** Add `authContext` parameter to `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` handlers and enforce workspace scoping, matching the pattern in `knowledge_create_node`:\n```typescript\nconst resolvedWorkspaceId =\n  authContext?.type === \"scoped\"\n    ? authContext.workspaceId ?? \"\"\n    : workspaceId ?? \"\";\n```\n\nWhen cross-workspace collaboration is designed, this check can be relaxed intentionally with proper access controls.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDo not use scoped agent tokens in multi-workspace deployments until patched. Alternatively, remove `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` from the `SCOPED_TOOLS` set in `tool-scoping.ts`.\n\n### References\n\n- CWE-284: Improper Access Control\n- File: `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts`\n- File: `packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts`",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "@grackle-ai/mcp"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.70.2"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 0.70.1"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nick-pape/grackle/security/advisories/GHSA-647h-p824-99w7"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nick-pape/grackle"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-284" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-25T17:23:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}