CVE-2026-52834: Jxl grid Jxl-grid On 32-bit Platforms Has Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-5pmv-rx8r-wmv5",
  "modified" : "2026-07-02T20:45:59Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-02T20:45:59Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-52834" ],
  "summary" : "jxl-grid on 32-bit platforms has an out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nOn 32-bit platforms, decoding a crafted image may lead to out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in length calculation.\n\n### Details & PoC\n\nThe test listed below fail under miri with command `cargo +nightly miri test --release -p jxl-grid`\n\nOr you can use Address Sanitizer, which ignores Rust-specific UB like aliasing but still flags out-of-bounds accesses:\n\n`RUSTFLAGS=-Zsanitizer=address cargo +nightly test -Zbuild-std -p jxl-grid --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu`\n\nThe following tests should be appended to `crates/jxl-grid/src/test/subgrids.rs`:\n\n```rust\nmod miri_ub {\n    use super::*;\n\n    // `AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker` computes `width * height` unchecked. In release, overflow\n    // can create a tiny backing buffer for huge logical dimensions.\n    #[test]\n    fn aligned_grid_dimension_product_overflows() {\n        let width = usize::MAX / 2 + 1;\n        let mut grid = AlignedGrid::<u8>::with_alloc_tracker(width, 2, None).unwrap();\n        let mut subgrid = grid.as_subgrid_mut();\n        *subgrid.get_mut(0, 1) = 1;\n        std::hint::black_box(grid);\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThis issue can be reachable through decoding a crafted image in two ways:\n\n1. **Huge actual frame**\n   A frame such as `65536 x 65536` passes the current frame area limit (`2^32 <= 2^40`) but overflows `usize` element count on 32-bit. Rendering then allocates too-small `AlignedGrid`s in modular/VarDCT/filter paths and later writes through mutable subgrids.\n\n2. **Huge canvas plus tiny cropped frame**\n   This is the more practical “small payload, huge logical output” case. A bitstream-controlled frame crop can be tiny, but if the canvas/default requested region is huge, composition can allocate an output grid sized to the canvas/ROI at crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs. That is bitstream frame cropping, not API crop. With a 32-bit target and a full requested image region whose area overflows, this can happen through ordinary `render_frame()`.\n\n### Impact\n\nOn 32-bit platforms this can cause out-of-bounds writes with attacker-controlled data when decoding a crafted JPEG XL image. This could allow arbitrary code execution.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "crates.io",
      "name" : "jxl-grid"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.6.2"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 0.6.1"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide/security/advisories/GHSA-5pmv-rx8r-wmv5"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0151.html"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-122", "CWE-131", "CWE-190" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-02T20:45:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}