CVE-2026-42768: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

LOW
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-5m8f-m8jv-3rp3
CVSS 3.7
CWE-514
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-42768 is a LOW (CVSS 3.7) security vulnerability vulnerability (CWE-514: Covert Channel) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. The weakness occurs when a covert channel is a path that can be used to transfer information in a way not intended by the system's designers.. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-42768 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-42768
GHSA Identifier GHSA-5m8f-m8jv-3rp3
Severity LOW
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 3.7
CWE Classification CWE-514: Covert Channel
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 3.7

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity High (AC:H)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-42768

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-42768, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-514: Covert Channel, where a covert channel is a path that can be used to transfer information in a way not intended by the system's designers. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

Issue summary: The CMS_decrypt and PKCS7_decrypt functions are vulnerable to Bleichenbacher-style attack when an attacker is able to provide the CMS or S/MIME messages and observe the error code and/or decryption output. Impact summary: The Bleichenbacher-style attack allows an attacker to use the victim's vulnerable application as a way to decrypt or sign messages with the victim's private RSA key. The attack is possible in 2 variants. 1. The decryption API (CMS_decrypt(), PKCS7_decrypt()) is used without providing the recipient certificate. In this case OpenSSL iterates over every KeyTransRecipientInfo (KTRI) without stopping at the first success. An attacker who authors a message with two KTRI entries — the first one wrapping a real CEK under the victim's public key, the second with an arbitrary probe ciphertext — obtains opportunity to iterate the 2nd KTRI to get a valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding if the error code of the application is available. That is a Bleichenbacher oracle (Bleichenbacher, CRYPTO '98): an adaptive-chosen-ciphertext side channel from which the attacker decrypts any RSA ciphertext to the victim's key or forges any PKCS#1 v1.5 signature under it. 2. When the decryption API (CMS_decrypt(), PKCS7_decrypt()) is provided with the recipient certificate, and the recipient is not found, a random key is substituted. An attacker who authors a message and is able to compare both error code and the result of the decryption, can mount a Bleichenbacher oracle. We are not aware of any applications that provide a remote attacker an opportunity to mount an attack described in these scenarios. We consider the existence of such application very unlikely, and for this reason this CVE has been evaluated as Low severity. To avoid these attacks, when RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Key Transport is in use, the invoked EVP_PKEY_decrypt() will use the implicit rejection mechanism described in draft-irtf-cfrg-rsa-guidance. In previous OpenSSL releases the implicit rejection was explicitly disabled. The implicit rejection mechanism always returns a plaintext value, the symmetric key. This result is deterministic for the ciphertext and the private key. The length of the decryption result can happen to match the length of the key of the symmetric cipher that was used for the content encryption. When a certificate is not provided, the last RecipientInfo producing a key that looks valid will be used. It may cause getting garbage content on decryption. As a proper way to deal with this a recipient certificate has to be provided to identify the particular RecipientInfo for decryption. The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, and 3.4 are not affected by this issue, as CMS and S/MIME processing happens outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-42768?
CVE-2026-42768 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under CWE-514: Covert Channel.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-42768?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-42768?
CVE-2026-42768 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 3.7 (LOW) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-42768?
CVE-2026-42768 is classified under CWE-514: Covert Channel (A covert channel is a path that can be used to transfer information in a way not intended by the system's designers.).
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-42768?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-5m8f-m8jv-3rp3",
  "modified" : "2026-06-10T09:31:57Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-09T18:30:43Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-42768" ],
  "details" : "Issue summary: The CMS_decrypt and PKCS7_decrypt functions are vulnerable to\nBleichenbacher-style attack when an attacker is able to provide the CMS or\nS/MIME messages and observe the error code and/or decryption output.\n\nImpact summary: The Bleichenbacher-style attack allows an attacker to use the\nvictim's vulnerable application as a way to decrypt or sign messages with the\nvictim's private RSA key.\n\nThe attack is possible in 2 variants.\n\n1. The decryption API (CMS_decrypt(), PKCS7_decrypt()) is used without\nproviding the recipient certificate. In this case OpenSSL iterates over every\nKeyTransRecipientInfo (KTRI) without stopping at the first success.\n\nAn attacker who authors a message with two KTRI entries — the first one\nwrapping a real CEK under the victim's public key, the second with an\narbitrary probe ciphertext — obtains opportunity to iterate the 2nd KTRI to\nget a valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding if the error code of the application is\navailable.\n\nThat is a Bleichenbacher oracle (Bleichenbacher, CRYPTO '98): an\nadaptive-chosen-ciphertext side channel from which the attacker decrypts any\nRSA ciphertext to the victim's key or forges any PKCS#1 v1.5 signature under\nit.\n\n2. When the decryption API (CMS_decrypt(), PKCS7_decrypt()) is provided with\nthe recipient certificate, and the recipient is not found, a random\nkey is substituted.\n\nAn attacker who authors a message and is able to compare both error code and\nthe result of the decryption, can mount a Bleichenbacher oracle.\n\nWe are not aware of any applications that provide a remote attacker\nan opportunity to mount an attack described in these scenarios. We consider\nthe existence of such application very unlikely, and for this reason this\nCVE has been evaluated as Low severity.\n\nTo avoid these attacks, when RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Key Transport is in use, the\ninvoked EVP_PKEY_decrypt() will use the implicit rejection mechanism described\nin draft-irtf-cfrg-rsa-guidance. In previous OpenSSL releases the implicit\nrejection was explicitly disabled.\n\nThe implicit rejection mechanism always returns a plaintext value,\nthe symmetric key. This result is deterministic for the ciphertext and the\nprivate key.  The length of the decryption result can happen to match the\nlength of the key of the symmetric cipher that was used for the content\nencryption. When a certificate is not provided, the last RecipientInfo\nproducing a key that looks valid will be used. It may cause getting garbage\ncontent on decryption. As a proper way to deal with this a recipient\ncertificate has to be provided to identify the particular RecipientInfo for\ndecryption.\n\nThe FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, and 3.4 are not affected by this issue, as\nCMS and S/MIME processing happens outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42768"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a2ca7b2d73e0ffc1eae183fe6e1741dac767cb4f"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/bbb151a83041705d9d001ed2f9c12f5523e1b54d"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/dd68364107a58841c0a2546812518b65d3a23abd"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f04b377be3d821741c86d1f4bf84dee09f3d5c3e"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/openssl/security/commit/a2ca7b2d73e0ffc1eae183fe6e1741dac767cb4f"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/openssl/security/commit/bbb151a83041705d9d001ed2f9c12f5523e1b54d"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/openssl/security/commit/dd68364107a58841c0a2546812518b65d3a23abd"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/openssl/security/commit/f04b377be3d821741c86d1f4bf84dee09f3d5c3e"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-514" ],
    "severity" : "LOW",
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-09T17:17:08Z"
  }
}