CVE-2026-53923: vLLM GGUF Dequantize Kernel Int Truncation Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-5jv2-g5wq-cmr4
CVSS 7.5
CWE-681 CWE-200
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-53923 is a MODERATE (CVSS 7.5) gguf dequantize kernel int truncation vulnerability (CWE-681: Incorrect Conversion between Numeric Types) affecting vLLM libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves gguf dequantize kernel int truncation exposes uninitialized gpu memory in multi-tenant serving. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.24.0.

CVE-2026-53923 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-53923
GHSA Identifier GHSA-5jv2-g5wq-cmr4
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.5
CWE Classification CWE-681: Incorrect Conversion between Numeric Types
Affected Product vLLM
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-53923

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected vLLM dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

vllm fixed: 0.24.0
pip install vllm>=0.24.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show vllm

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-53923, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show vllm

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of vLLM in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.24.0), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show vllm command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-681: Incorrect Conversion between Numeric Types, where when converting from one data type to another, such as long to integer, data can be omitted or translated in a way that produces unexpected values. if the resulting values are used in a sensitive context, then dangerous behaviors may occur. In vLLM, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary Integer truncation of tensor dimensions in vLLM's GGUF dequantize kernels (`csrc/quantization/gguf/gguf_kernel.cu`) causes partial tensor processing. The output tensor is allocated at full size via `torch::empty` (uninitialized memory), but the dequantize CUDA kernel processes only a truncated number of elements. The unfilled portion of the output tensor retains whatever was previously in GPU memory. In multi-tenant inference deployments, this residual GPU memory may contain tensor data from other users' inference requests, constituting information disclosure. ## Root Cause The `to_cuda_ggml_t` function pointer type at `ggml-common.h:1067` declares its element count parameter as `int` (32-bit): ```cpp using to_cuda_ggml_t = void (*)(const void * __restrict__ x, dst_t * __restrict__ y, int k, // 32-bit cudaStream_t stream); ``` All dequantize kernel functions (`dequantize_block_cuda`, `dequantize_row_q2_K_cuda`, etc. in `dequantize.cuh`) inherit this `int k` parameter and use it as the kernel launch grid size: ```cpp static void dequantize_block_cuda(..., const int k, cudaStream_t stream) { const int num_blocks = (k + 2*CUDA_DEQUANTIZE_BLOCK_SIZE - 1) / (2*CUDA_DEQUANTIZE_BLOCK_SIZE); dequantize_block<<<num_blocks, CUDA_DEQUANTIZE_BLOCK_SIZE, 0, stream>>>(vx, y, k); } ``` In `ggml_dequantize()` at `gguf_kernel.cu:85`, the caller passes `m * n` (an `int64_t` product) to this `int k` parameter: ```cpp at::Tensor DW = torch::empty({m, n}, options); // line 80: full-size, UNINITIALIZED // ... to_cuda((void*)W.data_ptr(), (scalar_t*)DW.data_ptr(), m * n, stream); // line 85: m*n truncated to int ``` When `m * n > INT_MAX`, the truncated `k` is smaller than the actual tensor size. The kernel processes `k` elements. The remaining `(m * n) - k` elements in `DW` are never written and contain stale GPU memory. This is a single root cause -- the `int` type on the `k` parameter in `to_cuda_ggml_t` -- with a single fix: change `int k` to `int64_t k`. All dequantize functions inherit this type through the same typedef. ## Affected Functions All in `csrc/quantization/gguf/gguf_kernel.cu`: | Function | Line | Allocation | Info Disclosure? | |----------|------|-----------|-----------------| | `ggml_dequantize` | 74 | `torch::empty({m, n})` at line 80 | Yes -- `m*n` truncated to `int k` at line 85 | | `ggml_mul_mat_vec_a8` | 91 | `torch::empty({vecs, row})` at line 99 | Yes -- `int col = X.sizes()[1]` at line 94 | | `ggml_mul_mat_a8` | 207 | `torch::empty({batch, row})` at line 215 | Yes -- `int col = X.sizes()[1]` at line 210 | | `ggml_moe_a8` | 279 | `torch::empty({tokens*top_k, row})` at line 289 | Yes -- `int col = X.sizes()[1]` at line 285 | All four functions allocate output tensors with `torch::empty` (uninitialized) and then run CUDA kernels that use truncated dimension values as loop bounds. The unfilled portion of each output tensor retains stale GPU memory. `ggml_moe_a8_vec` (line 382) uses `torch::zeros` instead of `torch::empty`, so it is not affected by the info disclosure variant. ## Impact: Information Disclosure in Multi-Tenant Serving vLLM is designed for multi-tenant inference serving. GPU memory is reused across requests from different users. When the dequantize kernel partially fills an output tensor: 1. The output tensor `DW` is allocated with `torch::empty` -- the buffer contains whatever was previously in that GPU memory region 2. The dequantize kernel fills only a truncated portion of the buffer 3. The unfilled portion retains residual data from prior GPU operations, which may include tensor data from other users' inference requests 4. The contaminated tensor proceeds through the model computation 5. No error or warning is generated -- the partial fill is silent This is a confidentiality violation. In shared inference deployments (the primary vLLM use case), one user's inference data can leak into another user's model computation through residual GPU memory. ## Attacker Control The attacker crafts a GGUF model file with weight tensor dimensions whose product exceeds `INT_MAX` (e.g., a matrix with shape `[65536, 65536]` gives `m * n = 4,294,967,296`). The model is hosted on HuggingFace or any model hub. The victim loads the model with vLLM for inference serving. The truncation happens automatically during model weight dequantization. ## Fix A fix for this vulnerability was added here: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/44971

CVE-2026-53923 Affected vLLM Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.24.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
vllm
PyPI
≥ 0.5.5
< 0.24.0
0.24.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-53923?
CVE-2026-53923 is a security vulnerability in vLLM involving GGUF dequantize kernel int truncation exposes uninitialized GPU memory in multi-tenant serving under CWE-681: Incorrect Conversion between Numeric Types.
Which vLLM versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.24.0 across affected packages: vllm.
What version fixes CVE-2026-53923?
Upgrading to 0.24.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is vllm affected?
Yes, vllm is affected in releases prior to 0.24.0. Upgrade your dependency to 0.24.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-53923?
CVE-2026-53923 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-53923?
CVE-2026-53923 is classified under CWE-681: Incorrect Conversion between Numeric Types (When converting from one data type to another, such as long to integer, data can be omitted or translated in a way that produces unexpected values. If the resulting values are used in a sensitive context, then dangerous behaviors may occur.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-53923?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show vllm'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-5jv2-g5wq-cmr4",
  "modified" : "2026-07-17T16:20:57Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-17T14:03:11Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-53923" ],
  "summary" : "vLLM: GGUF dequantize kernel int truncation exposes uninitialized GPU memory in multi-tenant serving",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nInteger truncation of tensor dimensions in vLLM's GGUF dequantize kernels (`csrc/quantization/gguf/gguf_kernel.cu`) causes partial tensor processing. The output tensor is allocated at full size via `torch::empty` (uninitialized memory), but the dequantize CUDA kernel processes only a truncated number of elements. The unfilled portion of the output tensor retains whatever was previously in GPU memory. In multi-tenant inference deployments, this residual GPU memory may contain tensor data from other users' inference requests, constituting information disclosure.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `to_cuda_ggml_t` function pointer type at `ggml-common.h:1067` declares its element count parameter as `int` (32-bit):\n\n```cpp\nusing to_cuda_ggml_t = void (*)(const void * __restrict__ x,\n                                dst_t * __restrict__ y,\n                                int k,              // 32-bit\n                                cudaStream_t stream);\n```\n\nAll dequantize kernel functions (`dequantize_block_cuda`, `dequantize_row_q2_K_cuda`, etc. in `dequantize.cuh`) inherit this `int k` parameter and use it as the kernel launch grid size:\n\n```cpp\nstatic void dequantize_block_cuda(..., const int k, cudaStream_t stream) {\n    const int num_blocks = (k + 2*CUDA_DEQUANTIZE_BLOCK_SIZE - 1) / (2*CUDA_DEQUANTIZE_BLOCK_SIZE);\n    dequantize_block<<<num_blocks, CUDA_DEQUANTIZE_BLOCK_SIZE, 0, stream>>>(vx, y, k);\n}\n```\n\nIn `ggml_dequantize()` at `gguf_kernel.cu:85`, the caller passes `m * n` (an `int64_t` product) to this `int k` parameter:\n\n```cpp\nat::Tensor DW = torch::empty({m, n}, options);    // line 80: full-size, UNINITIALIZED\n// ...\nto_cuda((void*)W.data_ptr(), (scalar_t*)DW.data_ptr(), m * n, stream);  // line 85: m*n truncated to int\n```\n\nWhen `m * n > INT_MAX`, the truncated `k` is smaller than the actual tensor size. The kernel processes `k` elements. The remaining `(m * n) - k` elements in `DW` are never written and contain stale GPU memory.\n\nThis is a single root cause -- the `int` type on the `k` parameter in `to_cuda_ggml_t` -- with a single fix: change `int k` to `int64_t k`. All dequantize functions inherit this type through the same typedef.\n\n## Affected Functions\n\nAll in `csrc/quantization/gguf/gguf_kernel.cu`:\n\n| Function | Line | Allocation | Info Disclosure? |\n|----------|------|-----------|-----------------|\n| `ggml_dequantize` | 74 | `torch::empty({m, n})` at line 80 | Yes -- `m*n` truncated to `int k` at line 85 |\n| `ggml_mul_mat_vec_a8` | 91 | `torch::empty({vecs, row})` at line 99 | Yes -- `int col = X.sizes()[1]` at line 94 |\n| `ggml_mul_mat_a8` | 207 | `torch::empty({batch, row})` at line 215 | Yes -- `int col = X.sizes()[1]` at line 210 |\n| `ggml_moe_a8` | 279 | `torch::empty({tokens*top_k, row})` at line 289 | Yes -- `int col = X.sizes()[1]` at line 285 |\n\nAll four functions allocate output tensors with `torch::empty` (uninitialized) and then run CUDA kernels that use truncated dimension values as loop bounds. The unfilled portion of each output tensor retains stale GPU memory.\n\n`ggml_moe_a8_vec` (line 382) uses `torch::zeros` instead of `torch::empty`, so it is not affected by the info disclosure variant.\n\n## Impact: Information Disclosure in Multi-Tenant Serving\n\nvLLM is designed for multi-tenant inference serving. GPU memory is reused across requests from different users. When the dequantize kernel partially fills an output tensor:\n\n1. The output tensor `DW` is allocated with `torch::empty` -- the buffer contains whatever was previously in that GPU memory region\n2. The dequantize kernel fills only a truncated portion of the buffer\n3. The unfilled portion retains residual data from prior GPU operations, which may include tensor data from other users' inference requests\n4. The contaminated tensor proceeds through the model computation\n5. No error or warning is generated -- the partial fill is silent\n\nThis is a confidentiality violation. In shared inference deployments (the primary vLLM use case), one user's inference data can leak into another user's model computation through residual GPU memory.\n\n## Attacker Control\n\nThe attacker crafts a GGUF model file with weight tensor dimensions whose product exceeds `INT_MAX` (e.g., a matrix with shape `[65536, 65536]` gives `m * n = 4,294,967,296`). The model is hosted on HuggingFace or any model hub. The victim loads the model with vLLM for inference serving. The truncation happens automatically during model weight dequantization.\n\n## Fix\n\nA fix for this vulnerability was added here: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/44971",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"
  }, {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "vllm"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0.5.5"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.24.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-5jv2-g5wq-cmr4"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53923"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/44971"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/f219788f91952827132fa4fdf916427cd20d225e"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5jv2-g5wq-cmr4"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/vllm/PYSEC-2026-3403.yaml"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://pypi.org/project/vllm"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-200", "CWE-681" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-17T14:03:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-22T23:16:30Z"
  }
}