GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w: GitPython Path Traversal Vulnerability
MODERATEGHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w is a MODERATE path traversal vulnerability (CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path) affecting GitPython libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves gitpython submodule update path traversal can write outside the repository. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3.1.62.
GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w at a Glance
How to Fix GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected GitPython dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
pip install GitPython>=3.1.62
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
pip show GitPython
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Python environment is affected by GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w, inspect your installed packages using pip:
pip show GitPython
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of GitPython in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3.1.62), your application is affected.
Note: The pip show GitPython command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path, where the product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations. In GitPython, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w Affected GitPython Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
GitPython
|
PyPI |
< 3.1.62
|
3.1.62
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w?
Which GitPython versions are affected?
What version fixes GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w?
Is GitPython affected?
What CWE is associated with GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w?
How can I check PyPI dependencies for GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w",
"modified" : "2026-09-30T23:47:12Z",
"published" : "2026-09-30T23:47:12Z",
"aliases" : [ ],
"summary" : "GitPython submodule update path traversal can write outside the repository",
"details" : "**Affected:** `GitPython` **3.1.61** (latest release) and `main` — `git/objects/submodule/base.py`. `git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/` is empty, so both are identical here.\n\n---\n\n## The gap\n\nThe fix for `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` added `Submodule._validated_name()` and wired it into `update()` and five siblings, closing the `.gitmodules` **name** → `.git/modules/<name>` traversal. The other attacker-controlled `.gitmodules` field, **`path`**, is read raw:\n\n```python\n# git/objects/submodule/base.py:172-177\ndef _set_cache_(self, attr):\n if attr in (\"path\", \"_url\", \"_branch_path\"):\n reader = self.config_reader()\n self.path = reader.get(\"path\") # raw .gitmodules value\n```\n\nand GitPython's own containment guard is applied in only two of the places that consume it:\n\n```\n400: def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo, path) # the guard (abspath + commonpath containment)\n542: path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path) # add() — guarded\n1041: module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path) # move() — guarded\n```\n\n`update()` validates only the name and then uses the path-derived absolute location directly:\n\n```\n788: self._validated_name(self.name) # NAME only\n801: checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath # derived from self.path — unguarded\n821: os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True)\n```\n\nSo `path = ../../../tmp/escaped` in an attacker-authored `.gitmodules` selects the directory that gets created and, on the clone path, populated from the submodule URL. The same absolute location is what `force_remove` hands to `shutil.rmtree`.\n\nThe asymmetry is the argument: this is not a missing concept — the project wrote `_to_relative_path()` precisely for this, and `add()`/`move()` use it. `update()` does not.\n\n## Honest limits (please read before rating)\n\n- **The most common flow is not affected.** `Repo.clone_from(...)` → `repo.submodules` → `sm.update(init=True)` re-derives `path` from a canonical tree lookup, and real git refuses to check out a tree containing a `..` component, so an evil `.gitmodules` never lands in the working tree in the first place. A reachable trigger therefore requires the victim's code to name a **non-HEAD commit** (a historical-commit API such as `submodule_update(previous_commit=...)`).\n- **The researcher did not build that end-to-end trigger.** The researcher only verified first-hand the code above: the guard's two call sites, the name-only validation in `update()`, and the unguarded `abspath` → `os.makedirs()` flow at 3.1.61 == `main`.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nApply the guard the project already has, wherever the path is consumed:\n\n```python\n# in update(), before deriving abspath (and in any other consumer of self.path):\ncheckout_rel = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, self.path) # raises if it escapes the working tree\n```\n\nBetter still, validate at the boundary: reject a `.gitmodules` entry whose `path` is absolute or contains a `..` component when the section is first read in `_set_cache_()`/`iter_items()`, so no consumer can be added later without the check. A regression test with `path = ../escaped` alongside the existing `name` test would pin both fields.\n\n## Prior art checked\n\n`GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` (this is a residual of its fix, in the sibling field, not a re-report) plus the repository's 30 published advisories — none mentions the `path` field or `_to_relative_path`. Searched issues and PRs for `_to_relative_path`, `gitmodules path` and `submodule traversal`: no report of this.\n\n## Credit\n\n**kta1kri**.\n\n\n---\n\n## Appendix — `EVIDENCE_gitpython_path_unguarded_20260901.txt` (inlined; advisories accept no attachments)\n\n```text\n=== EVIDENCE: GitPython — the .gitmodules 'path' field reaches os.makedirs()/clone unguarded ===\nMon Aug 31 18:45:22 UTC 2026\n\n--- artifact: tag 3.1.61 (latest release); git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/ is empty ---\n\n--- the containment guard GitPython owns, and its only two call sites ---\n33: _to_relative_path,\n400: def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo: \"Repo\", path: PathLike) -> PathLike:\n407: path = _to_relative_path(parent_repo.working_tree_dir, path)\n542: path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)\n1041: module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path)\n\n--- the parent fix (_validated_name) call sites: it validates the NAME ---\n309: def _validated_name(cls, name: str) -> str:\n321: name = cls._validated_name(name)\n541: cls._validated_name(name)\n788: self._validated_name(self.name)\n1040: self._validated_name(self.name)\n1181: self._validated_name(self.name)\n1439: self._validated_name(self.name)\n1440: self._validated_name(new_name)\n1489: self._validated_name(self.name)\n\n--- update(): name validated, path not; abspath -> os.makedirs ---\n\n try:\n self._validated_name(self.name)\n\n # ENSURE REPO IS PRESENT AND UP-TO-DATE\n # END early abort if init is not allowed\n\n checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath\n module_abspath = self._module_abspath(self.repo, self.path, self.name)\n\n # ``git submodule deinit`` leaves the repository in\n # ``.git/modules`` and empties the checkout. Reconnect that retained\n # repository instead of trying to clone over it.\n if not dry_run and osp.isdir(module_abspath):\n try:\n git.Repo(module_abspath)\n except InvalidGitRepositoryError:\n pass\n else:\n if osp.lexists(checkout_module_abspath) and (\n osp.islink(checkout_module_abspath)\n or not osp.isdir(checkout_module_abspath)\n or os.listdir(checkout_module_abspath)\n ):\n raise OSError(\n \"Module directory at %r does already exist and is non-empty\" % checkout_module_abspath\n )\n os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True)\n self._write_git_file_and_module_config(checkout_module_abspath, module_abspath)\n mrepo = git.Repo(checkout_module_abspath)\n\n--- where self.path comes from (raw .gitmodules value) ---\n def _set_cache_(self, attr: str) -> None:\n if attr in (\"path\", \"_url\", \"_branch_path\"):\n reader: SectionConstraint = self.config_reader()\n # Default submodule values.\n try:\n self.path = reader.get(\"path\")\n except cp.NoSectionError as e:\n```",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V4",
"score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "PyPI",
"name" : "GitPython"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "3.1.62"
} ]
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 3.1.61"
}
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2225"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1ed0ebc2f2e74d979cdc367a4864a7731fdcc093"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.62"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-22", "CWE-73" ],
"severity" : "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-09-30T23:47:12Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}