CVE-2026-39306: PraisonAI Path Traversal Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-4rx4-4r3x-6534
CVSS 7.3
CWE-22
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-39306 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.3) path traversal vulnerability (CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')) affecting PraisonAI libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves praisonai recipe registry pull path traversal writes files outside the chosen output directory. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.5.113.

CVE-2026-39306 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-39306
GHSA Identifier GHSA-4rx4-4r3x-6534
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.3
CWE Classification CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Affected Product PraisonAI
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.3

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-39306

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected PraisonAI dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

PraisonAI fixed: 4.5.113
pip install PraisonAI>=4.5.113
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show PraisonAI

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-39306, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show PraisonAI

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of PraisonAI in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.5.113), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show PraisonAI command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'), where the product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory. In PraisonAI, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary PraisonAI's recipe registry pull flow extracts attacker-controlled `.praison` tar archives with `tar.extractall()` and does not validate archive member paths before extraction. A malicious publisher can upload a recipe bundle that contains `../` traversal entries and any user who later pulls that recipe will write files outside the output directory they selected. This is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability on the client side of the recipe registry workflow. It affects both the local registry pull path and the HTTP registry pull path. The checksum verification does not prevent exploitation because the malicious traversal payload is part of the signed bundle itself. ### Details The issue is caused by unsafe extraction of tar archive contents during recipe pull. 1. A malicious publisher creates a valid `.praison` bundle whose `manifest.json` is benign enough to pass publish, but whose tar members include traversal entries such as: ```text ../../escape-http.txt ``` 2. `LocalRegistry.publish()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:214-287` only reads `manifest.json`, calculates a checksum, and stores the uploaded bundle. It does not inspect or sanitize the rest of the tar members before saving the archive. 3. When a victim later pulls the recipe from a local registry, `LocalRegistry.pull()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:289-345` extracts the tarball directly: ```python recipe_dir = output_dir / name recipe_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) with tarfile.open(bundle_path, "r:gz") as tar: tar.extractall(recipe_dir) ``` 4. The HTTP client path is also vulnerable. `HttpRegistry.pull()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:691-739` downloads the bundle and then performs the same unsafe extraction: ```python recipe_dir = output_dir / name recipe_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) with tarfile.open(bundle_path, "r:gz") as tar: tar.extractall(recipe_dir) ``` 5. Because no archive member validation is performed, traversal entries escape `recipe_dir` and create files elsewhere on disk. Verified vulnerable behavior: - Published recipe name: `evil-http` - Victim-selected output directory: `/tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/victim-output` - Artifact created outside that directory: `/tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/escape-http.txt` - Artifact contents: `owned over http` This demonstrates that a remote publisher can cause filesystem writes outside the pull destination chosen by another user. ### PoC Run the single verification script from the checked-out repository: ```bash cd "/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/PraisonAI" python3 tmp/pocs/poc2.py ``` Expected vulnerable output: ```text [+] Publish result: {'ok': True, 'name': 'evil-http', 'version': '1.0.0', ...} [+] Pull result: {'name': 'evil-http', 'version': '1.0.0', ...} [+] Outside artifact exists: True [+] Artifact also inside output dir: False [+] Outside artifact content: 'owned over http\n' [+] RESULT: VULNERABLE - pulling the recipe created a file outside the chosen output directory. ``` Then verify the created file manually: ```bash ls -l /tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/escape-http.txt cat /tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/escape-http.txt find /tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc -maxdepth 3 | sort ``` What the script does internally: 1. Starts a local PraisonAI recipe registry server. 2. Builds a malicious `.praison` bundle containing the tar entry `../../escape-http.txt`. 3. Publishes the malicious bundle to the local HTTP registry. 4. Simulates a victim pulling that recipe into `/tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/victim-output`. 5. Confirms that the file is created outside the chosen output directory. ### Impact This is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability in the recipe pull workflow. Impacted parties: - Users who pull recipes from an untrusted or shared PraisonAI registry. - Teams running internal registries where one publisher can influence what other users pull. - Automated systems or CI jobs that fetch recipes into working directories near sensitive project files. Security impact: - Integrity impact is high because an attacker can create or overwrite files outside the expected extraction directory. - Availability impact is significant if the overwritten target is a config file, project file, startup script, or another operational artifact. - The issue crosses a real security boundary because the attacker only needs to publish a malicious recipe, while the victim triggers the write by pulling it. ### Remediation 1. Replace raw `tar.extractall()` with a safe extraction routine that validates every `TarInfo` member before extraction. Reject absolute paths, `..` segments, and any resolved path that escapes the intended extraction directory. 2. Apply the same archive member validation in both `LocalRegistry.pull()` and `HttpRegistry.pull()` so that local and remote registry clients share the same safety guarantees. 3. Consider validating tar contents during publish as well, so malicious bundles are rejected before they ever enter the registry and cannot be served to downstream users.

CVE-2026-39306 Affected PraisonAI Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.5.113
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
PraisonAI
PyPI
< 4.5.113
4.5.113

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-39306?
CVE-2026-39306 is a security vulnerability in PraisonAI involving PraisonAI recipe registry pull path traversal writes files outside the chosen output directory under CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal').
Which PraisonAI versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.5.113 across affected packages: PraisonAI.
What version fixes CVE-2026-39306?
Upgrading to 4.5.113 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is PraisonAI affected?
Yes, PraisonAI is affected in releases prior to 4.5.113. Upgrade your dependency to 4.5.113 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-39306?
CVE-2026-39306 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.3 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-39306?
CVE-2026-39306 is classified under CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') (The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-39306?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show PraisonAI'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-4rx4-4r3x-6534",
  "modified" : "2026-04-07T22:10:07Z",
  "published" : "2026-04-06T23:09:12Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-39306" ],
  "summary" : "PraisonAI recipe registry pull path traversal writes files outside the chosen output directory",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nPraisonAI's recipe registry pull flow extracts attacker-controlled `.praison` tar archives with `tar.extractall()` and does not validate archive member paths before extraction. A malicious publisher can upload a recipe bundle that contains `../` traversal entries and any user who later pulls that recipe will write files outside the output directory they selected.\n\nThis is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability on the client side of the recipe registry workflow. It affects both the local registry pull path and the HTTP registry pull path. The checksum verification does not prevent exploitation because the malicious traversal payload is part of the signed bundle itself.\n\n### Details\n\nThe issue is caused by unsafe extraction of tar archive contents during recipe pull.\n\n1. A malicious publisher creates a valid `.praison` bundle whose `manifest.json` is benign enough to pass publish, but whose tar members include traversal entries such as:\n\n```text\n../../escape-http.txt\n```\n\n2. `LocalRegistry.publish()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:214-287` only reads `manifest.json`, calculates a checksum, and stores the uploaded bundle. It does not inspect or sanitize the rest of the tar members before saving the archive.\n\n3. When a victim later pulls the recipe from a local registry, `LocalRegistry.pull()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:289-345` extracts the tarball directly:\n\n```python\nrecipe_dir = output_dir / name\nrecipe_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n\nwith tarfile.open(bundle_path, \"r:gz\") as tar:\n    tar.extractall(recipe_dir)\n```\n\n4. The HTTP client path is also vulnerable. `HttpRegistry.pull()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:691-739` downloads the bundle and then performs the same unsafe extraction:\n\n```python\nrecipe_dir = output_dir / name\nrecipe_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n\nwith tarfile.open(bundle_path, \"r:gz\") as tar:\n    tar.extractall(recipe_dir)\n```\n\n5. Because no archive member validation is performed, traversal entries escape `recipe_dir` and create files elsewhere on disk.\n\nVerified vulnerable behavior:\n\n- Published recipe name: `evil-http`\n- Victim-selected output directory: `/tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/victim-output`\n- Artifact created outside that directory: `/tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/escape-http.txt`\n- Artifact contents: `owned over http`\n\nThis demonstrates that a remote publisher can cause filesystem writes outside the pull destination chosen by another user.\n\n### PoC\n\nRun the single verification script from the checked-out repository:\n\n```bash\ncd \"/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/PraisonAI\"\npython3 tmp/pocs/poc2.py\n```\n\nExpected vulnerable output:\n\n```text\n[+] Publish result: {'ok': True, 'name': 'evil-http', 'version': '1.0.0', ...}\n[+] Pull result: {'name': 'evil-http', 'version': '1.0.0', ...}\n[+] Outside artifact exists: True\n[+] Artifact also inside output dir: False\n[+] Outside artifact content: 'owned over http\\n'\n[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE - pulling the recipe created a file outside the chosen output directory.\n```\n\nThen verify the created file manually:\n\n```bash\nls -l /tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/escape-http.txt\ncat /tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/escape-http.txt\nfind /tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc -maxdepth 3 | sort\n```\n\nWhat the script does internally:\n\n1. Starts a local PraisonAI recipe registry server.\n2. Builds a malicious `.praison` bundle containing the tar entry `../../escape-http.txt`.\n3. Publishes the malicious bundle to the local HTTP registry.\n4. Simulates a victim pulling that recipe into `/tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/victim-output`.\n5. Confirms that the file is created outside the chosen output directory.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability in the recipe pull workflow.\n\nImpacted parties:\n\n- Users who pull recipes from an untrusted or shared PraisonAI registry.\n- Teams running internal registries where one publisher can influence what other users pull.\n- Automated systems or CI jobs that fetch recipes into working directories near sensitive project files.\n\nSecurity impact:\n\n- Integrity impact is high because an attacker can create or overwrite files outside the expected extraction directory.\n- Availability impact is significant if the overwritten target is a config file, project file, startup script, or another operational artifact.\n- The issue crosses a real security boundary because the attacker only needs to publish a malicious recipe, while the victim triggers the write by pulling it.\n\n### Remediation\n\n1. Replace raw `tar.extractall()` with a safe extraction routine that validates every `TarInfo` member before extraction. Reject absolute paths, `..` segments, and any resolved path that escapes the intended extraction directory.\n\n2. Apply the same archive member validation in both `LocalRegistry.pull()` and `HttpRegistry.pull()` so that local and remote registry clients share the same safety guarantees.\n\n3. Consider validating tar contents during publish as well, so malicious bundles are rejected before they ever enter the registry and cannot be served to downstream users.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "PraisonAI"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.5.113"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 4.5.112"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-4rx4-4r3x-6534"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39306"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.5.113"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-22" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-06T23:09:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-04-07T17:16:36Z"
  }
}