GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f: ZeptoClaw Email Sender Spoofing To Bypass Vulnerability

MODERATE
CVSS 6.5
CWE-345 CWE-306
Published
Advisory Summary

GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f is a MODERATE (CVSS 6.5) email sender spoofing to bypass vulnerability (CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity) affecting ZeptoClaw libraries in the crates.io ecosystem. The issue involves email sender spoofing to bypass header-only from allowlist validation. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.7.6.

GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f at a Glance

CVE Identifier N/A
GHSA Identifier GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 6.5
CWE Classification CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Affected Product ZeptoClaw
Package Ecosystem crates.io
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 6.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity High (AC:H)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected ZeptoClaw dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

zeptoclaw fixed: 0.7.6
Upgrade zeptoclaw to 0.7.6
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for zeptoclaw

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f, inspect your project dependencies for ZeptoClaw:

inspect dependencies for zeptoclaw

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of ZeptoClaw in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.7.6), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity, where the product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data. In ZeptoClaw, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary The email channel authorizes senders based on the parsed `From` header identity only. If upstream email authentication/enforcement is weak (for example, relaxed SPF/DKIM/DMARC handling), an attacker can spoof an allowlisted sender address and have the message treated as trusted input. ### Details Relevant code paths: - `src/channels/email_channel.rs:311` extracts sender identity from parsed message headers: - `let from = parsed.from() ... a.address() ...` - `src/channels/email_channel.rs:328` authorizes using that `from` value: - `if !self.is_sender_allowed(&from) { ... }` - `src/channels/email_channel.rs:87` onward (`is_sender_allowed`) performs allowlist/domain matching against the same header-derived value. - There is no in-channel validation of sender authenticity indicators such as SPF/DKIM/DMARC results before allowlist trust decisions. Result: - Trust decision is based on a potentially spoofable header field unless mailbox/provider-side anti-spoofing controls are strong and enforced. ### PoC 1. Configure email channel with strict sender allowlist: - `channels.email.enabled = true` - `channels.email.allowed_senders = ["ceo@example.com"]` - `channels.email.deny_by_default = true` 2. Ensure the monitored mailbox accepts or forwards a spoofed message (for testing, use a local SMTP path that does not enforce sender authentication strongly). 3. Send an email to the monitored inbox with forged header identity: ```bash python - <<'PY' import smtplib from email.message import EmailMessage msg = EmailMessage() msg["From"] = "ceo@example.com" # forged trusted sender msg["To"] = "bot-inbox@example.net" msg["Subject"] = "forged control message" msg.set_content("FORGED EMAIL CONTENT") # Example test SMTP endpoint with smtplib.SMTP("127.0.0.1", 25) as s: s.send_message(msg) PY ``` 4. Wait for IMAP fetch/IDLE processing. 5. Observe the message is accepted as allowlisted sender `ceo@example.com` and published as inbound channel input. ### Impact - Vulnerability type: sender identity spoofing risk due to header-based authorization. - Affected deployments: those using email channel allowlists where upstream anti-spoof controls are weak, misconfigured, or bypassed. - Security effect: - Spoofed `From` headers may bypass logical sender allowlist. - Malicious content can enter trusted automation/agent flows as if sent by authorized identities. - Risk is reduced in environments with strict SPF/DKIM/DMARC enforcement and strong inbound mail hygiene, but not eliminated at application layer. ### Patch Recommendation Add a sender-authentication gate in `src/channels/email_channel.rs` immediately after parsing `from` (`src/channels/email_channel.rs:311`) and before allowlist enforcement (`src/channels/email_channel.rs:328`). The gate should require trusted SPF/DKIM/DMARC evidence with domain alignment (for example, `DMARC=pass`, or aligned SPF/DKIM pass) before `is_sender_allowed` is evaluated. For backward compatibility, add a configurable mode in `EmailConfig` (for example, `sender_verification_mode`), but recommend hardened settings in production: `dmarc_aligned`, exact-address allowlists, and `deny_by_default=true`.

GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f Affected ZeptoClaw Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.7.6
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
zeptoclaw
crates.io
< 0.7.6
0.7.6

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f?
GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f is a security vulnerability in ZeptoClaw involving Email Sender Spoofing to bypass Header-Only From Allowlist Validation under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity.
Which ZeptoClaw versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.7.6 across affected packages: zeptoclaw.
What version fixes GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f?
Upgrading to 0.7.6 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is zeptoclaw affected?
Yes, zeptoclaw is affected in releases prior to 0.7.6. Upgrade your dependency to 0.7.6 or later.
What is the CVSS score of GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f?
GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.5 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N.
What CWE is associated with GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f?
GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f is classified under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity (The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.).
How can I check crates.io dependencies for GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for zeptoclaw'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f",
  "modified" : "2026-03-12T16:38:22Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-12T16:38:22Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "ZeptoClaw: Email Sender Spoofing to bypass Header-Only From Allowlist Validation",
  "details" : "### Summary\nThe email channel authorizes senders based on the parsed `From` header identity only. If upstream email authentication/enforcement is weak (for example, relaxed SPF/DKIM/DMARC handling), an attacker can spoof an allowlisted sender address and have the message treated as trusted input. \n\n### Details\nRelevant code paths:\n\n- `src/channels/email_channel.rs:311` extracts sender identity from parsed message headers:\n  - `let from = parsed.from() ... a.address() ...`\n- `src/channels/email_channel.rs:328` authorizes using that `from` value:\n  - `if !self.is_sender_allowed(&from) { ... }`\n- `src/channels/email_channel.rs:87` onward (`is_sender_allowed`) performs allowlist/domain matching against the same header-derived value.\n- There is no in-channel validation of sender authenticity indicators such as SPF/DKIM/DMARC results before allowlist trust decisions.\n\nResult:\n- Trust decision is based on a potentially spoofable header field unless mailbox/provider-side anti-spoofing controls are strong and enforced.\n\n### PoC\n1. Configure email channel with strict sender allowlist:\n   - `channels.email.enabled = true`\n   - `channels.email.allowed_senders = [\"ceo@example.com\"]`\n   - `channels.email.deny_by_default = true`\n2. Ensure the monitored mailbox accepts or forwards a spoofed message (for testing, use a local SMTP path that does not enforce sender authentication strongly).\n3. Send an email to the monitored inbox with forged header identity:\n\n```bash\npython - <<'PY'\nimport smtplib\nfrom email.message import EmailMessage\n\nmsg = EmailMessage()\nmsg[\"From\"] = \"ceo@example.com\"   # forged trusted sender\nmsg[\"To\"] = \"bot-inbox@example.net\"\nmsg[\"Subject\"] = \"forged control message\"\nmsg.set_content(\"FORGED EMAIL CONTENT\")\n\n# Example test SMTP endpoint\nwith smtplib.SMTP(\"127.0.0.1\", 25) as s:\n    s.send_message(msg)\nPY\n```\n\n4. Wait for IMAP fetch/IDLE processing.\n5. Observe the message is accepted as allowlisted sender `ceo@example.com` and published as inbound channel input.\n\n### Impact\n- Vulnerability type: sender identity spoofing risk due to header-based authorization.\n- Affected deployments: those using email channel allowlists where upstream anti-spoof controls are weak, misconfigured, or bypassed.\n- Security effect:\n  - Spoofed `From` headers may bypass logical sender allowlist.\n  - Malicious content can enter trusted automation/agent flows as if sent by authorized identities.\n- Risk is reduced in environments with strict SPF/DKIM/DMARC enforcement and strong inbound mail hygiene, but not eliminated at application layer.\n\n### Patch Recommendation\nAdd a sender-authentication gate in `src/channels/email_channel.rs` immediately after parsing `from` (`src/channels/email_channel.rs:311`) and before allowlist enforcement (`src/channels/email_channel.rs:328`). The gate should require trusted SPF/DKIM/DMARC evidence with domain alignment (for example, `DMARC=pass`, or aligned SPF/DKIM pass) before `is_sender_allowed` is evaluated. For backward compatibility, add a configurable mode in `EmailConfig` (for example, `sender_verification_mode`), but recommend hardened settings in production: `dmarc_aligned`, exact-address allowlists, and `deny_by_default=true`.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "crates.io",
      "name" : "zeptoclaw"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.7.6"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 0.7.5"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/releases/tag/v0.7.6"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-306", "CWE-345" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-12T16:38:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}