GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62: Trigger.dev Cross-environment Deployment Cancel Vulnerability

MODERATE
CVSS 5.4
CWE-639
Published
Advisory Summary

GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.4) cross-environment deployment cancel vulnerability (CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key) affecting Trigger.dev libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves cross-environment deployment cancel. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.5.6.

GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62 at a Glance

CVE Identifier N/A
GHSA Identifier GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.4
CWE Classification CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Affected Product Trigger.dev
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 5.4

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability Low (A:L)

How to Fix GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Trigger.dev dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

trigger.dev fixed: 4.5.6
npm install trigger.dev@4.5.6
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls trigger.dev

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls trigger.dev

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Trigger.dev in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.5.6), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls trigger.dev command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, where the system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data. In Trigger.dev, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary Trigger.dev isolates each project into multiple **environments** (`dev`, `staging`, `prod`, and per-PR `preview` branches), each with its **own secret API key** — the environment is a trust boundary (a `dev`/preview/CI key is lower-trust than a `prod` key). Most API routes enforce this by scoping resource lookups to the authenticated key's environment (`where: { friendlyId, runtimeEnvironmentId: auth.environment.id }`). The deployment **cancel** path does not. `DeploymentService.getDeployment()` scopes the lookup by **`projectId` only** — never `environmentId` — so a secret key for *any* environment in a project can cancel a deployment belonging to *any other* environment of the same project, including **production**. The deployment **GET** route, by contrast, *is* env-scoped — so the same key that is **404'd when trying to read** a prod deployment can nonetheless **cancel** it. That asymmetry is the bug. ### Affected `apps/webapp`, HEAD `5d99457` (current `main`). Affects self-hosted and cloud. ### Root cause `apps/webapp/app/routes/api.v1.deployments.$deploymentId.cancel.ts` authenticates to an environment and calls `deploymentService.cancelDeployment(authenticatedEnv, deploymentId, ...)`. `apps/webapp/app/v3/services/deployment.server.ts`: ```ts public cancelDeployment(authenticatedEnv: Pick<AuthenticatedEnvironment,"projectId">, friendlyId, ...) { return this.getDeployment(authenticatedEnv.projectId, friendlyId) // projectId only .andThen(validateDeployment) // rejects only FINAL statuses .andThen(cancelDeployment); // updateMany -> status CANCELED } private getDeployment(projectId: string, friendlyId: string) { return this._prisma.workerDeployment.findFirst({ where: { friendlyId, projectId }, // <-- NO environmentId filter }); } ``` `cancelDeployment` accepts `authenticatedEnv` but its type is literally `Pick<AuthenticatedEnvironment,"projectId">` — it discards the environment identity. `validateDeployment` blocks only `FINAL_DEPLOYMENT_STATUSES`, so any in-progress deployment (`PENDING`/`INSTALLING`/`BUILDING`/`DEPLOYING`) is cancellable. **Contrast — the correctly env-scoped sibling** `api.v1.deployments.$deploymentId.ts` (GET): ```ts const deployment = await prisma.workerDeployment.findFirst({ where: { friendlyId: deploymentId, environmentId: authenticatedEnv.id }, // env-scoped }); ``` Reads are env-scoped; the cancel mutation is not. The same `getDeployment(authenticatedEnv.projectId, …)` helper also backs the deployment *progress* methods (`deployment.server.ts:172,329`), so the projectId-only scope is a small class. ### Runtime PoC (proven on the self-host stack) Seeded one project with a `prod` env (key `tr_prod_…`) and a `dev` env (key `tr_dev_…`) and one `WorkerDeployment` (`deployment_pocvictim`, status `DEPLOYING`) in the **prod** env. As the **dev** key: ``` status BEFORE : DEPLOYING GET /api/v1/deployments/deployment_pocvictim (dev key) -> 404 (env-scoped read DENIES it) POST /api/v1/deployments/deployment_pocvictim/cancel (dev key) -> 204 status AFTER : CANCELED (prod deploy canceled by the dev key) CONTROL: same cancel with a DIFFERENT project's key -> 404 (projectId scope blocks cross-project) ``` The dev key cannot *read* the prod deployment (404) yet *cancels* it (204 → CANCELED); a different project's key is correctly 404'd — so the gap is precisely cross-environment within a project.

GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62 Affected Trigger.dev Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.5.6
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
trigger.dev
npm
< 4.5.6
4.5.6

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62?
GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62 is a security vulnerability in Trigger.dev involving Cross-environment deployment cancel under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key.
Which Trigger.dev versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.5.6 across affected packages: trigger.dev.
What version fixes GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62?
Upgrading to 4.5.6 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is trigger.dev affected?
Yes, trigger.dev is affected in releases prior to 4.5.6. Upgrade your dependency to 4.5.6 or later.
What is the CVSS score of GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62?
GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.4 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L.
What CWE is associated with GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62?
GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62 is classified under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key (The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.).
How can I check npm dependencies for GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls trigger.dev'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62",
  "modified" : "2026-10-02T22:42:40Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-02T22:42:40Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "Trigger.dev: Cross-environment deployment cancel",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nTrigger.dev isolates each project into multiple **environments** (`dev`, `staging`, `prod`, and per-PR `preview` branches), each with its **own secret API key** — the environment is a trust boundary (a `dev`/preview/CI key is lower-trust than a `prod` key). Most API routes enforce this by scoping resource lookups to the authenticated key's environment (`where: { friendlyId, runtimeEnvironmentId: auth.environment.id }`).\n\nThe deployment **cancel** path does not. `DeploymentService.getDeployment()` scopes the lookup by **`projectId` only** — never `environmentId` — so a secret key for *any* environment in a project can cancel a deployment belonging to *any other* environment of the same project, including **production**. The deployment **GET** route, by contrast, *is* env-scoped — so the same key that is **404'd when trying to read** a prod deployment can nonetheless **cancel** it. That asymmetry is the bug.\n\n### Affected\n\n`apps/webapp`, HEAD `5d99457` (current `main`). Affects self-hosted and cloud.\n\n### Root cause\n\n`apps/webapp/app/routes/api.v1.deployments.$deploymentId.cancel.ts` authenticates to an environment and calls `deploymentService.cancelDeployment(authenticatedEnv, deploymentId, ...)`.\n\n`apps/webapp/app/v3/services/deployment.server.ts`:\n```ts\npublic cancelDeployment(authenticatedEnv: Pick<AuthenticatedEnvironment,\"projectId\">, friendlyId, ...) {\n  return this.getDeployment(authenticatedEnv.projectId, friendlyId)   // projectId only\n    .andThen(validateDeployment)                                      // rejects only FINAL statuses\n    .andThen(cancelDeployment);                                       // updateMany -> status CANCELED\n}\nprivate getDeployment(projectId: string, friendlyId: string) {\n  return this._prisma.workerDeployment.findFirst({\n    where: { friendlyId, projectId },        // <-- NO environmentId filter\n  });\n}\n```\n\n`cancelDeployment` accepts `authenticatedEnv` but its type is literally `Pick<AuthenticatedEnvironment,\"projectId\">` — it discards the environment identity. `validateDeployment` blocks only `FINAL_DEPLOYMENT_STATUSES`, so any in-progress deployment (`PENDING`/`INSTALLING`/`BUILDING`/`DEPLOYING`) is cancellable.\n\n**Contrast — the correctly env-scoped sibling** `api.v1.deployments.$deploymentId.ts` (GET):\n```ts\nconst deployment = await prisma.workerDeployment.findFirst({\n  where: { friendlyId: deploymentId, environmentId: authenticatedEnv.id },   // env-scoped\n});\n```\nReads are env-scoped; the cancel mutation is not. The same `getDeployment(authenticatedEnv.projectId, …)` helper also backs the deployment *progress* methods (`deployment.server.ts:172,329`), so the projectId-only scope is a small class.\n\n### Runtime PoC (proven on the self-host stack)\n\nSeeded one project with a `prod` env (key `tr_prod_…`) and a `dev` env (key `tr_dev_…`) and one `WorkerDeployment` (`deployment_pocvictim`, status `DEPLOYING`) in the **prod** env. As the **dev** key:\n\n```\nstatus BEFORE                                                  : DEPLOYING\nGET  /api/v1/deployments/deployment_pocvictim   (dev key)      -> 404   (env-scoped read DENIES it)\nPOST /api/v1/deployments/deployment_pocvictim/cancel (dev key) -> 204\nstatus AFTER                                                   : CANCELED   (prod deploy canceled by the dev key)\nCONTROL: same cancel with a DIFFERENT project's key            -> 404   (projectId scope blocks cross-project)\n```\n\nThe dev key cannot *read* the prod deployment (404) yet *cancels* it (204 → CANCELED); a different project's key is correctly 404'd — so the gap is precisely cross-environment within a project.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "trigger.dev"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.5.6"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 4.5.5"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4316"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/6997aeb05e27d2db47f9eda01fdc8a17c81a1ae0"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.6"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-639" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-02T22:42:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}