GHSA-3g92-f9ch-qjcm: Plonky3 The Sponge Construction Used To Vulnerability

LOW
CWE-328
Published
Advisory Summary

GHSA-3g92-f9ch-qjcm is a LOW the sponge construction used to vulnerability (CWE-328: Use of Weak Hash) affecting Plonky3 libraries in the crates.io ecosystem. The issue involves the sponge construction used to get a hash function from a cryptographic permutation is not collision resistant for inputs of different lengths. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

GHSA-3g92-f9ch-qjcm at a Glance

CVE Identifier N/A
GHSA Identifier GHSA-3g92-f9ch-qjcm
Severity LOW
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-328: Use of Weak Hash
Affected Product Plonky3
Package Ecosystem crates.io
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix GHSA-3g92-f9ch-qjcm

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Plonky3 dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

p3-symmetric fixed: Latest secure release
Upgrade p3-symmetric to Latest secure release
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for p3-symmetric

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by GHSA-3g92-f9ch-qjcm, inspect your project dependencies for Plonky3:

inspect dependencies for p3-symmetric

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Plonky3 in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-328: Use of Weak Hash, where the product uses an algorithm that produces a digest (output value) that does not meet security expectations for a hash function that allows an adversary to reasonably determine the original input (preimage attack), find another input that can produce the same hash (2nd preimage attack), or find multiple inputs that evaluate to the same hash (birthday attack). In Plonky3, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Vulnerability Currently, when hashing, if the number of elements to hash is not a multiple of the rate, `hash_iter` pads by elements of the current state. This means that it is possible to create iterators of different lengths which lead to an identical hashed state. Given a simple example using a `PaddingFreeSponge` with width 8 and rate 4. Start with the zero state: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] Take the first 4 elements to hash and insert into the first 4 elements of the state: [h0, h1, h2, h3, 0, 0, 0, 0] Run the cryptographic permutation on the state: [p00, p10, p20, p30, p40, p50, p60, p70] Take the next 4 elements to hash and insert into the first 4 elements of the state: [h4, h5, h6, h7, p40, p50, p60, p70] Run the cryptographic permutation: [p01, p11, p21, p31, p41, p51, p61, p71] Repeat the above two steps until all elements of the iterator have been consumed. If the number of elements in the iterator is not a multiple of 4 (say there are 10 elements) then, in the final round, the first 2 elements are overwritten and so our final hash would be of: [h8, h9, p21, p31, p41, p51, p61, p71] This means that the iterators over the elements [h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6, h7, h8, h9] and [h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6, h7, h8, h9, p21] would lead to the same final state of the hasher. ### Impact The impact of this vulnerability is a little difficult to estimate. It is important to note that, in circumstances where the number of elements to be hashed is known and fixed in advance, (as is the case for most STARKS), the method is collision resistant. This vulnerability only applies if a malicious user is able to manipulate the number of elements to be hashed. That being said, there are theoretically situations where this could allow for an amortising of grinding costs (if a prover can manipulate things to get the same hasher state across multiple proofs). ### Patches The fix comes in two parts. The documentation on the current struct `PaddingFreeSponge` has been improved to clarify its intended use case and highlight that it is not collision resistant if an attacker can modify the number of elements being hashed. In addition we add a new struct `Pad10Sponge` which is slightly less efficient but safe in all cases. The padding strategy of the new struct is as follows: If the number of elements in the iterator is not a multiple of the rate, use a 10 padding scheme. If it is a multiple of the rate add 1 to the first secret state element. In the above example, for hashes of length 9, 10, 11, 12, the final state to be permuted would be [h8, 1, 0, 0, p41, p51, p61, p71] [h8, h9, 1, 0, p41, p51, p61, p71] [h8, h9, h10, 1, p41, p51, p61, p71] [h8, h9, h10, h11, p41 + 1, p51, p61, p71] As can be seen, it is now impossible for iterators of different lengths to produce the same "final state" to be hashed which restores collision resistance. (See the following for more details [padding-in-sponge.pdf](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24465342/padding-in-sponge.pdf)) ### Thanks Many thanks to Benedikt Wagner, Dmitry Khovratovich and Bart Mennink for reporting this issue.

GHSA-3g92-f9ch-qjcm Affected Plonky3 Versions

1 component(s)
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
p3-symmetric
crates.io
≤ 0.5.2

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is GHSA-3g92-f9ch-qjcm?
GHSA-3g92-f9ch-qjcm is a security vulnerability in Plonky3 involving The sponge construction used to get a hash function from a cryptographic permutation is not collision resistant for inputs of different lengths under CWE-328: Use of Weak Hash.
Which Plonky3 versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches across affected packages: p3-symmetric.
What version fixes GHSA-3g92-f9ch-qjcm?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is p3-symmetric affected?
Yes, p3-symmetric is affected in releases prior to Latest secure release. Upgrade your dependency to Latest secure release or later.
What CWE is associated with GHSA-3g92-f9ch-qjcm?
GHSA-3g92-f9ch-qjcm is classified under CWE-328: Use of Weak Hash (The product uses an algorithm that produces a digest (output value) that does not meet security expectations for a hash function that allows an adversary to reasonably determine the original input (preimage attack), find another input that can produce the same hash (2nd preimage attack), or find multiple inputs that evaluate to the same hash (birthday attack).).
How can I check crates.io dependencies for GHSA-3g92-f9ch-qjcm?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for p3-symmetric'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-3g92-f9ch-qjcm",
  "modified" : "2026-04-16T22:52:41Z",
  "published" : "2026-04-16T22:52:41Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "Plonky3: The sponge construction used to get a hash function from a cryptographic permutation is not collision resistant for inputs of different lengths",
  "details" : "### Vulnerability\nCurrently, when hashing, if the number of elements to hash is not a multiple of the rate, `hash_iter` pads by elements of\nthe current state. This means that it is possible to create iterators of different lengths which lead to an identical hashed state.\n\nGiven a simple example using a `PaddingFreeSponge` with width 8 and rate 4.\nStart with the zero state: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]\nTake the first 4 elements to hash and insert into the first 4 elements of the state: [h0, h1, h2, h3, 0, 0, 0, 0]\nRun the cryptographic permutation on the state: [p00, p10, p20, p30, p40, p50, p60, p70]\n\nTake the next 4 elements to hash and insert into the first 4 elements of the state: [h4, h5, h6, h7, p40, p50, p60, p70]\nRun the cryptographic permutation: [p01, p11, p21, p31, p41, p51, p61, p71]\n\nRepeat the above two steps until all elements of the iterator have been consumed.\n\nIf the number of elements in the iterator is not a multiple of 4 (say there are 10 elements) then, in the final round,\nthe first 2 elements are overwritten and so our final hash would be of: [h8, h9, p21, p31, p41, p51, p61, p71]\n\nThis means that the iterators over the elements [h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6, h7, h8, h9] and [h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6, h7, h8, h9, p21] would lead to the same final state of the hasher.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe impact of this vulnerability is a little difficult to estimate. It is important to note that, in circumstances where the number of elements to be hashed is known and fixed in advance, (as is the case for most STARKS), the method is collision resistant. This vulnerability only applies if a malicious user is able to manipulate the number of elements to be hashed.\n\nThat being said, there are theoretically situations where this could allow for an amortising of grinding costs (if a prover can manipulate things to get the same hasher state across multiple proofs).\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix comes in two parts. The documentation on the current struct `PaddingFreeSponge` has been improved to clarify its intended use case and highlight that it is not collision resistant if an attacker can modify the number of elements being hashed.\n\nIn addition we add a new struct `Pad10Sponge` which is slightly less efficient but safe in all cases. The padding strategy of the new struct is as follows:\n\nIf the number of elements in the iterator is not a multiple of the rate, use a 10 padding scheme. If it is a multiple of the rate add 1 to the first secret state element. In the above example, for hashes of length 9, 10, 11, 12, the final state to be permuted would be\n[h8, 1, 0, 0, p41, p51, p61, p71]\n[h8, h9, 1, 0, p41, p51, p61, p71]\n[h8, h9, h10, 1, p41, p51, p61, p71]\n[h8, h9, h10, h11, p41 + 1, p51, p61, p71]\n\nAs can be seen, it is now impossible for iterators of different lengths to produce the same \"final state\" to be hashed which restores collision resistance. (See the following for more details [padding-in-sponge.pdf](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24465342/padding-in-sponge.pdf))\n\n### Thanks\nMany thanks to Benedikt Wagner, Dmitry Khovratovich and Bart Mennink for reporting this issue.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "crates.io",
      "name" : "p3-symmetric"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "0.5.2"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3/security/advisories/GHSA-3g92-f9ch-qjcm"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3/commit/5c1dc1d64c0516a8911bbf3ea40f173c21d6ae47"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-328" ],
    "severity" : "LOW",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-16T22:52:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}