CVE-2026-42610: Getgrav/grav Grav Vulnerable To Sensitive Information Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-3f29-pqwf-v4j4
CVSS 6.5
CWE-863
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-42610 is a MODERATE (CVSS 6.5) grav vulnerable to sensitive information vulnerability (CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization) affecting Getgrav/grav libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves grav vulnerable to sensitive information disclosure via accounts service bypass. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.0.0-beta.2.

CVE-2026-42610 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-42610
GHSA Identifier GHSA-3f29-pqwf-v4j4
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 6.5
CWE Classification CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
Affected Product Getgrav/grav
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 6.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-42610

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Getgrav/grav dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

getgrav/grav fixed: 2.0.0-beta.2
Upgrade getgrav/grav to 2.0.0-beta.2
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for getgrav/grav

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-42610, inspect your project dependencies for Getgrav/grav:

inspect dependencies for getgrav/grav

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Getgrav/grav in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.0.0-beta.2), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, where the product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check. In Getgrav/grav, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary Information disclosure exists in `Grav CMS v1.8.0-beta.29`. Despite previous security patches (notably in `v1.8.0-beta.27/28`) aimed at restricting sensitive object access within the Twig environment, the Accounts Service remains exposed. A low-privileged user (EX: Content Editor with only pages.update permissions) can bypass the existing Twig sandbox restrictions by utilizing the `grav['accounts']` service. Attacker can programmatically load administrative user objects and extract sensitive data, including Bcrypt password hashes and the security salt. ## Affected version Grav CMS: `v1.8.0-beta.29` (and earlier 1.8.x beta versions). Note: This vulnerability persists even after the vendor attempted to mitigate similar SSTI vectors in earlier beta releases. ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Create a low-privileged account (MY CASE IS 'editor_chen') with permissions limited to admin.login and basic page management (create, update, list). Ensure all administrative permissions (Configuration, User Accounts, ...) are explicitly Denied. 2. Login to the Admin panel using `editor_chen`. Navigate to Pages and edit the `Home` page. 3. Under the Advanced tab, ensure Process Twig is enabled . 4. In the Content tab, inject the following Twig payload designed to bypass the `isDangerousFunction` filter by accessing the internal service container: ``` --- title: Information Disclosure Test process: twig: true --- # Security Audit Results - Admin Password Hash: {{ grav['accounts'].load('admin').get('hashed_password') }} - Security Salt: {{ grav.config.get('security.salt') }} ``` <img width="1176" height="618" alt="GRAV" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7970216a-2dc6-4d1b-8dfd-b64f3712c9c5" /> 5. Click Save. And navigate to the public page (`http://localhost:8000/home`). Page will render and display the administrator's Bcrypt hash and the system security salt. <img width="1278" height="462" alt="GRAV2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/33b7b894-6ae3-4d29-bd2d-8004e9b343e0" /> ## PoC ``` --- title: Information Disclosure Test process: twig: true --- # Security Audit Results - Admin Password Hash: {{ grav['accounts'].load('admin').get('hashed_password') }} - Security Salt: {{ grav.config.get('security.salt') }} ``` ## Impact Attackers can obtain the password hashes of all registered users, including Super Administrators. Extracted hashes can be subjected to offline brute-force or dictionary attacks (EX: USE Hashcat) ## Video Pls refer to the attached video <video src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/74d5ae41-7911-4099-b2cc-e6c51b27c68c" controls="controls" style="max-width: 100%;"> </video> --- ## Maintainer note — fix applied (2026-04-24) Fixed in Grav core on the `2.0` branch: commit [`d904efc33`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/d904efc33) — will ship in **2.0.0-beta.2**. **What changed:** the HMAC key formerly stored as `security.salt` in `user/config/security.yaml` has moved **out of the Config tree** into `user/config/security-private.php`. On upgrade, the existing salt value is migrated into the new file on first request (preserving CSRF nonces and sessions) and the key is scrubbed from both the live `Config` object and the on-disk YAML — so `{{ grav.config.get('security.salt') }}` from a sandboxed Twig template now returns null. The `.php` extension is blocked from web access by the default `user/*.php` htaccess rule; the file contains only a `return` statement, so direct PHP exec produces no output either. The PoC's password-hash half (`grav['accounts'].load('admin').get('hashed_password')`) was already covered by the new Twig content sandbox in 2.0.0-beta.2 — `UserCollection::load` is not in the sandbox allowlist — see the separate GHSA-58hj-46fw-rcfm advisory. **Files:** - [`system/src/Grav/Common/Security.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/src/Grav/Common/Security.php) — new `Security::getNonceKey()` + migration. - [`system/src/Grav/Common/Utils.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/src/Grav/Common/Utils.php) — `generateNonceString` now uses the new key. - [`system/src/Grav/Common/Service/SessionServiceProvider.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/src/Grav/Common/Service/SessionServiceProvider.php). - [`system/src/Grav/Common/Config/Setup.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/src/Grav/Common/Config/Setup.php) — removed auto-gen of `security.salt`. - [`system/config/security.yaml`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/config/security.yaml) — removed placeholder `salt:`. - [`tests/unit/Grav/Common/Security/NonceKeySecurityTest.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/tests/unit/Grav/Common/Security/NonceKeySecurityTest.php) — migration + generation coverage.

CVE-2026-42610 Affected Getgrav/grav Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
2.0.0-beta.2
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
getgrav/grav
Packagist
< 2.0.0-beta.2
2.0.0-beta.2

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-42610?
CVE-2026-42610 is a security vulnerability in Getgrav/grav involving Grav Vulnerable to Sensitive Information Disclosure via Accounts Service Bypass under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization.
Which Getgrav/grav versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 2.0.0-beta.2 across affected packages: getgrav/grav.
What version fixes CVE-2026-42610?
Upgrading to 2.0.0-beta.2 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is getgrav/grav affected?
Yes, getgrav/grav is affected in releases prior to 2.0.0-beta.2. Upgrade your dependency to 2.0.0-beta.2 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-42610?
CVE-2026-42610 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.5 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-42610?
CVE-2026-42610 is classified under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization (The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-42610?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for getgrav/grav'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-3f29-pqwf-v4j4",
  "modified" : "2026-05-13T13:52:19Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-05T21:26:45Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-42610" ],
  "summary" : "Grav Vulnerable to Sensitive Information Disclosure via Accounts Service Bypass",
  "details" : "## Summary\nInformation disclosure exists in `Grav CMS v1.8.0-beta.29`. Despite previous security patches (notably in `v1.8.0-beta.27/28`) aimed at restricting sensitive object access within the Twig environment, the Accounts Service remains exposed.\n\nA low-privileged user (EX: Content Editor with only pages.update permissions) can bypass the existing Twig sandbox restrictions by utilizing the `grav['accounts']` service. Attacker can programmatically load administrative user objects and extract sensitive data, including Bcrypt password hashes and the security salt.\n\n## Affected version\nGrav CMS: `v1.8.0-beta.29` (and earlier 1.8.x beta versions).\n\nNote: This vulnerability persists even after the vendor attempted to mitigate similar SSTI vectors in earlier beta releases.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Create a low-privileged account (MY CASE IS 'editor_chen') with permissions limited to admin.login and basic page management (create, update, list). Ensure all administrative permissions (Configuration, User Accounts, ...) are explicitly Denied.\n\n2. Login to the Admin panel using  `editor_chen`. Navigate to Pages and edit the `Home` page.\n\n\n3. Under the Advanced tab, ensure Process Twig is enabled .\n\n4. In the Content tab, inject the following Twig payload designed to bypass the `isDangerousFunction` filter by accessing the internal service container:\n```\n---\ntitle: Information Disclosure Test\nprocess:\n    twig: true\n---\n# Security Audit Results\n- Admin Password Hash: {{ grav['accounts'].load('admin').get('hashed_password') }}\n- Security Salt: {{ grav.config.get('security.salt') }}\n```\n<img width=\"1176\" height=\"618\" alt=\"GRAV\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7970216a-2dc6-4d1b-8dfd-b64f3712c9c5\" />\n\n\n5. Click Save. And navigate to the public page (`http://localhost:8000/home`). Page will render and display the administrator's Bcrypt hash and the system security salt.\n<img width=\"1278\" height=\"462\" alt=\"GRAV2\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/33b7b894-6ae3-4d29-bd2d-8004e9b343e0\" />\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n## PoC\n```\n---\ntitle: Information Disclosure Test\nprocess:\n    twig: true\n---\n# Security Audit Results\n- Admin Password Hash: {{ grav['accounts'].load('admin').get('hashed_password') }}\n- Security Salt: {{ grav.config.get('security.salt') }}\n```\n\n## Impact\nAttackers can obtain the password hashes of all registered users, including Super Administrators.\n\nExtracted hashes can be subjected to offline brute-force or dictionary attacks (EX: USE Hashcat)\n\n## Video\nPls refer to the attached video\n<video src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/74d5ae41-7911-4099-b2cc-e6c51b27c68c\" controls=\"controls\" style=\"max-width: 100%;\">\n</video>\n\n\n\n---\n\n## Maintainer note — fix applied (2026-04-24)\n\nFixed in Grav core on the `2.0` branch: commit [`d904efc33`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/d904efc33) — will ship in **2.0.0-beta.2**.\n\n**What changed:** the HMAC key formerly stored as `security.salt` in `user/config/security.yaml` has moved **out of the Config tree** into `user/config/security-private.php`. On upgrade, the existing salt value is migrated into the new file on first request (preserving CSRF nonces and sessions) and the key is scrubbed from both the live `Config` object and the on-disk YAML — so `{{ grav.config.get('security.salt') }}` from a sandboxed Twig template now returns null. The `.php` extension is blocked from web access by the default `user/*.php` htaccess rule; the file contains only a `return` statement, so direct PHP exec produces no output either.\n\nThe PoC's password-hash half (`grav['accounts'].load('admin').get('hashed_password')`) was already covered by the new Twig content sandbox in 2.0.0-beta.2 — `UserCollection::load` is not in the sandbox allowlist — see the separate GHSA-58hj-46fw-rcfm advisory.\n\n**Files:**\n- [`system/src/Grav/Common/Security.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/src/Grav/Common/Security.php) — new `Security::getNonceKey()` + migration.\n- [`system/src/Grav/Common/Utils.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/src/Grav/Common/Utils.php) — `generateNonceString` now uses the new key.\n- [`system/src/Grav/Common/Service/SessionServiceProvider.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/src/Grav/Common/Service/SessionServiceProvider.php).\n- [`system/src/Grav/Common/Config/Setup.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/src/Grav/Common/Config/Setup.php) — removed auto-gen of `security.salt`.\n- [`system/config/security.yaml`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/config/security.yaml) — removed placeholder `salt:`.\n- [`tests/unit/Grav/Common/Security/NonceKeySecurityTest.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/tests/unit/Grav/Common/Security/NonceKeySecurityTest.php) — migration + generation coverage.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "getgrav/grav"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.0.0-beta.2"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-3f29-pqwf-v4j4"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42610"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/c66dfeb5ff679a1667678c6335eb9ff3255dfc47"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-863" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-05T21:26:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-11T16:17:33Z"
  }
}