CVE-2026-91980: Vikunja Any User Can Enumerate Every Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-39p5-2wrr-xh29
CWE-639 CWE-200
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-91980 is a MODERATE any user can enumerate every vulnerability (CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key) affecting Vikunja libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves any user can enumerate every team and its members by attaching arbitrary teams to a throwaway project. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.6.0.

CVE-2026-91980 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-91980
GHSA Identifier GHSA-39p5-2wrr-xh29
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Affected Product Vikunja
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-91980

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Vikunja dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

code.vikunja.io/api fixed: 2.6.0
Upgrade code.vikunja.io/api to 2.6.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for code.vikunja.io/api

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-91980, inspect your project dependencies for Vikunja:

inspect dependencies for code.vikunja.io/api

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Vikunja in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.6.0), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, where the system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data. In Vikunja, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary When you share a project with a team, the API lets you attach any team on the instance, including teams you have nothing to do with, as long as you're an admin of the project. Listing a project's teams then returns each team's full member roster. So any logged-in user can spin up a throwaway project, attach team IDs one by one, and read back the name, description, and complete member list of every team on the instance. Normally you can only see teams you belong to; this path ignores that. ### Details Sharing a project with a team is a two-step flow: you PUT a team to the project, then you GET the project's teams to see them. The share endpoint only enforces that you're an admin of the target project, it doesn't care whether the team you're referencing is one you're allowed to see. Any existing team ID is accepted. The listing endpoint is even more permissive: read access to the project is enough, which you obviously have on a project you created. And its response isn't just a list of team names, it includes each team's description, creator, and a full members array with every member's username, display name, and admin flag. Put together, an attacker who owns a single project can walk the team ID space and pull the roster of every team in the instance, including teams they aren't a member of. This contradicts how team visibility works everywhere else in the product, where you only ever see teams you belong to. Emails are stripped from the roster, so what leaks is identities and org structure rather than contact details. The fix is to require that the caller actually has access to the team they're attaching, not just to the project. ### PoC The attacker needs nothing but an ordinary account. 1. Create a throwaway project you own: 2. Attach team IDs one by one (sweep the range you want): ``` PUT /api/v1/projects/<your_project_id>/teams {<SNIP>, "team_id": <N>, <SNIP>} ``` 3. Read them back with their rosters: ``` GET /api/v1/projects/<your_project_id>/teams ``` Each entry contains the team name, description, creator, and a members array with every member's username, display name, and admin flag, for teams you are not a member of. ### Impact Information disclosure of the instance-wide team directory: team names, descriptions, and full membership, for teams the attacker has no relationship with. This maps out the organisation's group structure and who belongs where, useful for targeting and social engineering. Any authenticated account is enough; no share link, no admin rights, no victim interaction.

CVE-2026-91980 Affected Vikunja Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
2.6.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
code.vikunja.io/api
Go
< 2.6.0
2.6.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-91980?
CVE-2026-91980 is a security vulnerability in Vikunja involving Any user can enumerate every team and its members by attaching arbitrary teams to a throwaway project under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key.
Which Vikunja versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 2.6.0 across affected packages: code.vikunja.io/api.
What version fixes CVE-2026-91980?
Upgrading to 2.6.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is code.vikunja.io/api affected?
Yes, code.vikunja.io/api is affected in releases prior to 2.6.0. Upgrade your dependency to 2.6.0 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-91980?
CVE-2026-91980 is classified under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key (The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-91980?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for code.vikunja.io/api'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-39p5-2wrr-xh29",
  "modified" : "2026-10-09T20:52:27Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-09T20:52:27Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-91980" ],
  "summary" : "Vikunja: Any user can enumerate every team and its members by attaching arbitrary teams to a throwaway project",
  "details" : "### Summary\nWhen you share a project with a team, the API lets you attach any team on the instance, including teams you have nothing to do with, as long as you're an admin of the project. Listing a project's teams then returns each team's full member roster. So any logged-in user can spin up a throwaway project, attach team IDs one by one, and read back the name, description, and complete member list of every team on the instance. Normally you can only see teams you belong to; this path ignores that.\n\n### Details\nSharing a project with a team is a two-step flow: you PUT a team to the project, then you GET the project's teams to see them. The share endpoint only enforces that you're an admin of the target project, it doesn't care whether the team you're referencing is one you're allowed to see. Any existing team ID is accepted.\n\nThe listing endpoint is even more permissive: read access to the project is enough, which you obviously have on a project you created. And its response isn't just a list of team names, it includes each team's description, creator, and a full members array with every member's username, display name, and admin flag.\n\nPut together, an attacker who owns a single project can walk the team ID space and pull the roster of every team in the instance, including teams they aren't a member of. This contradicts how team visibility works everywhere else in the product, where you only ever see teams you belong to. Emails are stripped from the roster, so what leaks is identities and org structure rather than contact details.\n\nThe fix is to require that the caller actually has access to the team they're attaching, not just to the project.\n\n### PoC\nThe attacker needs nothing but an ordinary account.\n\n1. Create a throwaway project you own:\n2. Attach team IDs one by one (sweep the range you want):\n```\nPUT /api/v1/projects/<your_project_id>/teams\n{<SNIP>, \"team_id\": <N>, <SNIP>}\n```\n3. Read them back with their rosters:\n```\nGET /api/v1/projects/<your_project_id>/teams\n```\nEach entry contains the team name, description, creator, and a members array with every member's username, display name, and admin flag, for teams you are not a member of.\n\n### Impact\nInformation disclosure of the instance-wide team directory: team names, descriptions, and full membership, for teams the attacker has no relationship with. This maps out the organisation's group structure and who belongs where, useful for targeting and social engineering. Any authenticated account is enough; no share link, no admin rights, no victim interaction.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "code.vikunja.io/api"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.6.0"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 2.5.0"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-39p5-2wrr-xh29"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91980"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/3688"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.6.0"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vikunja-before-2.6.0-team-enumeration-via-project-share"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-200", "CWE-639" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-09T20:52:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}