CVE-2026-68586: SiYuan Cross-boundary Content Disclosure Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-68586 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.6) cross-boundary content disclosure vulnerability (CWE-862: Missing Authorization) affecting SiYuan libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves cross-boundary content disclosure via getbacklinkdoc/getbackmentiondoc (publish mode): reader-reachable rendered dom of publish-forbidden docs; sibling list endpoints are filtered. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.0.0-20260721014413-f45749a7ef6e.
CVE-2026-68586 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 8.6
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N).
How to Fix CVE-2026-68586
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected SiYuan dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel to 0.0.0-20260721014413-f45749a7ef6e
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-68586, inspect your project dependencies for SiYuan:
inspect dependencies for github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of SiYuan in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.0.0-20260721014413-f45749a7ef6e), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-862: Missing Authorization, where the product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action. In SiYuan, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-68586 Affected SiYuan Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
|
Go |
< 0.0.0-20260721014413-f45749a7ef6e
|
0.0.0-20260721014413-f45749a7ef6e
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-68586?
Which SiYuan versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-68586?
Is github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-68586?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-68586?
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-68586?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-36v8-mpjm-8j5r",
"modified" : "2026-09-03T21:21:20Z",
"published" : "2026-09-03T21:21:19Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-68586" ],
"summary" : "SiYuan: Cross-boundary content disclosure via getBacklinkDoc/getBackmentionDoc (publish mode): reader-reachable rendered DOM of publish-forbidden docs; sibling list endpoints are filtered",
"details" : "**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-68586](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68586).\n\n### Summary\n\nThe backlink API splits into list endpoints (which documents reference a block) and content endpoints (the rendered text of those referencing blocks). The list endpoints apply a publish-access filter, the content endpoints do not. As a result, `/api/ref/getBacklinkDoc` and `/api/ref/getBackmentionDoc` return the rendered DOM of blocks belonging to a publish-forbidden document to an anonymous reader, with no access check.\n\nBoth content endpoints are gated by `CheckAuth` only, reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`.\n\n### Details\n\nThe asymmetry between the list and content sides is the tell that this is an oversight, not intended behavior:\n\n| Endpoint | Returns | Publish-access filter | Route |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `getBacklink` | list (`*Path`) | `FilterPathsByPublishAccess` - present | `CheckAuth` |\n| `getBacklink2` | list (`*Path`) | `FilterPathsByPublishAccess` - present | `CheckAuth` |\n| `getBacklinkDoc` | rendered DOM | none | `CheckAuth` |\n| `getBackmentionDoc` | rendered DOM | none | `CheckAuth` |\n\n`model/backlink.go` contains no publish-access reference anywhere, and `Backlink.DOM` is the rendered HTML of the referencing blocks. `getBacklinkDoc(defID, refTreeID)` returns the rendered content of blocks in `refTreeID` - including a publish-forbidden, publish-disabled, or password-protected document with no access check. The filtered list siblings (`getBacklink`/`getBacklink2`) demonstrate that the publish boundary is meant to apply to this data; the content endpoints simply omit it.\n\nA reader is not limited to the filtered backlink list, they call `getBacklinkDoc` directly with any `refTreeID`. This also yields a reference-existence oracle: the response reveals whether the forbidden document `refTreeID` references the block `defID`.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nReproduced on a local instance (SiYuan running locally, publish mode enabled on port 6808, publish Basic Auth disabled). Setup: a publish-forbidden document `D` (`REFTREEID`) whose body contains the unique marker `SECRET_MARKER_77` and which references a block `DEFID` in a separate known document.\n\n**1. Mark the target document publish-forbidden (admin action, the boundary that should block reads):**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/setPublishAccess\nAuthorization: Token <admin-token>\n{\"id\":\"REFTREEID\",\"visible\":false,\"password\":\"\",\"disable\":true}\n```\n\n**2. Baseline: the list endpoint correctly hides the forbidden doc from the reader (anonymous, port 6808):**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/ref/getBacklink2\n{\"id\":\"DEFID\",\"k\":\"\",\"mk\":\"\"}\n```\nThe returned backlinks do not include the forbidden document `D`, the list side is filtered.\n\n**3. Disclosure: the content endpoint returns the forbidden doc's blocks anyway (anonymous, port 6808):**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/ref/getBacklinkDoc\n{\"defID\":\"DEFID\",\"refTreeID\":\"REFTREEID\",\"keyword\":\"\"}\n```\nReturns HTTP 200; `data.backlinks[].dom` contains `SECRET_MARKER_77`, the rendered content of the publish-forbidden document, returned to an anonymous reader. `getBackmentionDoc` behaves identically for mention-type references.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader`, can read the rendered content of a publish-forbidden document's referencing blocks, defeating a boundary the administrator explicitly configured, and can determine whether a forbidden document references a given block (a reference-existence oracle).\n\n**Precondition (stated honestly):** the request requires `refTreeID` (the forbidden document's ID) and `defID` (a block it references). `defID` may be any published/known block, so if the forbidden document references any public content, `defID` is known and only `refTreeID` need be supplied. Block/document IDs for forbidden documents are also obtainable from other `CheckAuth`-only endpoints that lack the publish-access filter (reported separately). This endpoint alone does not enumerate arbitrary documents; it discloses content once an ID is known.\n\nImpact is confidentiality-only: content disclosure plus a reference-existence oracle, no modification. No admin role, CSRF token, or write permission is required. Encrypted notebooks are out of scope.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nApply the same publish-access check the list siblings use. In `getBacklinkDoc`/`getBackmentionDoc`, filter each `Backlink` by its source document's box/path via `CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore` plus the publish-password cookie check consistent with `FilterPathsByPublishAccess` in `getBacklink`/`getBacklink2`. Any endpoint returning rendered block DOM should enforce the same publish boundary as the corresponding list endpoint.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Go",
"name" : "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "0.0.0-20260721014413-f45749a7ef6e"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-36v8-mpjm-8j5r"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68586"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/f45749a7ef6e385f6e2af6b7dd12429d56d46f32"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-content-disclosure-via-getbacklinkdoc"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-862" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-09-03T21:21:19Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}