CVE-2026-68586: SiYuan Cross-boundary Content Disclosure Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-36v8-mpjm-8j5r
CVSS 8.6
CWE-862
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-68586 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.6) cross-boundary content disclosure vulnerability (CWE-862: Missing Authorization) affecting SiYuan libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves cross-boundary content disclosure via getbacklinkdoc/getbackmentiondoc (publish mode): reader-reachable rendered dom of publish-forbidden docs; sibling list endpoints are filtered. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.0.0-20260721014413-f45749a7ef6e.

CVE-2026-68586 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-68586
GHSA Identifier GHSA-36v8-mpjm-8j5r
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.6
CWE Classification CWE-862: Missing Authorization
Affected Product SiYuan
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.6

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-68586

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected SiYuan dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel fixed: 0.0.0-20260721014413-f45749a7ef6e
Upgrade github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel to 0.0.0-20260721014413-f45749a7ef6e
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-68586, inspect your project dependencies for SiYuan:

inspect dependencies for github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of SiYuan in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.0.0-20260721014413-f45749a7ef6e), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-862: Missing Authorization, where the product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action. In SiYuan, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-68586](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68586). ### Summary The backlink API splits into list endpoints (which documents reference a block) and content endpoints (the rendered text of those referencing blocks). The list endpoints apply a publish-access filter, the content endpoints do not. As a result, `/api/ref/getBacklinkDoc` and `/api/ref/getBackmentionDoc` return the rendered DOM of blocks belonging to a publish-forbidden document to an anonymous reader, with no access check. Both content endpoints are gated by `CheckAuth` only, reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. ### Details The asymmetry between the list and content sides is the tell that this is an oversight, not intended behavior: | Endpoint | Returns | Publish-access filter | Route | |---|---|---|---| | `getBacklink` | list (`*Path`) | `FilterPathsByPublishAccess` - present | `CheckAuth` | | `getBacklink2` | list (`*Path`) | `FilterPathsByPublishAccess` - present | `CheckAuth` | | `getBacklinkDoc` | rendered DOM | none | `CheckAuth` | | `getBackmentionDoc` | rendered DOM | none | `CheckAuth` | `model/backlink.go` contains no publish-access reference anywhere, and `Backlink.DOM` is the rendered HTML of the referencing blocks. `getBacklinkDoc(defID, refTreeID)` returns the rendered content of blocks in `refTreeID` - including a publish-forbidden, publish-disabled, or password-protected document with no access check. The filtered list siblings (`getBacklink`/`getBacklink2`) demonstrate that the publish boundary is meant to apply to this data; the content endpoints simply omit it. A reader is not limited to the filtered backlink list, they call `getBacklinkDoc` directly with any `refTreeID`. This also yields a reference-existence oracle: the response reveals whether the forbidden document `refTreeID` references the block `defID`. ### Proof of Concept Reproduced on a local instance (SiYuan running locally, publish mode enabled on port 6808, publish Basic Auth disabled). Setup: a publish-forbidden document `D` (`REFTREEID`) whose body contains the unique marker `SECRET_MARKER_77` and which references a block `DEFID` in a separate known document. **1. Mark the target document publish-forbidden (admin action, the boundary that should block reads):** ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/setPublishAccess Authorization: Token <admin-token> {"id":"REFTREEID","visible":false,"password":"","disable":true} ``` **2. Baseline: the list endpoint correctly hides the forbidden doc from the reader (anonymous, port 6808):** ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/ref/getBacklink2 {"id":"DEFID","k":"","mk":""} ``` The returned backlinks do not include the forbidden document `D`, the list side is filtered. **3. Disclosure: the content endpoint returns the forbidden doc's blocks anyway (anonymous, port 6808):** ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/ref/getBacklinkDoc {"defID":"DEFID","refTreeID":"REFTREEID","keyword":""} ``` Returns HTTP 200; `data.backlinks[].dom` contains `SECRET_MARKER_77`, the rendered content of the publish-forbidden document, returned to an anonymous reader. `getBackmentionDoc` behaves identically for mention-type references. ### Impact An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader`, can read the rendered content of a publish-forbidden document's referencing blocks, defeating a boundary the administrator explicitly configured, and can determine whether a forbidden document references a given block (a reference-existence oracle). **Precondition (stated honestly):** the request requires `refTreeID` (the forbidden document's ID) and `defID` (a block it references). `defID` may be any published/known block, so if the forbidden document references any public content, `defID` is known and only `refTreeID` need be supplied. Block/document IDs for forbidden documents are also obtainable from other `CheckAuth`-only endpoints that lack the publish-access filter (reported separately). This endpoint alone does not enumerate arbitrary documents; it discloses content once an ID is known. Impact is confidentiality-only: content disclosure plus a reference-existence oracle, no modification. No admin role, CSRF token, or write permission is required. Encrypted notebooks are out of scope. ### Suggested fix Apply the same publish-access check the list siblings use. In `getBacklinkDoc`/`getBackmentionDoc`, filter each `Backlink` by its source document's box/path via `CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore` plus the publish-password cookie check consistent with `FilterPathsByPublishAccess` in `getBacklink`/`getBacklink2`. Any endpoint returning rendered block DOM should enforce the same publish boundary as the corresponding list endpoint.

CVE-2026-68586 Affected SiYuan Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.0.0-20260721014413-f45749a7ef6e
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
Go
< 0.0.0-20260721014413-f45749a7ef6e
0.0.0-20260721014413-f45749a7ef6e

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-68586?
CVE-2026-68586 is a security vulnerability in SiYuan involving Cross-boundary content disclosure via getBacklinkDoc/getBackmentionDoc (publish mode): reader-reachable rendered DOM of publish-forbidden docs; sibling list endpoints are filtered under CWE-862: Missing Authorization.
Which SiYuan versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.0.0-20260721014413-f45749a7ef6e across affected packages: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel.
What version fixes CVE-2026-68586?
Upgrading to 0.0.0-20260721014413-f45749a7ef6e (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel affected?
Yes, github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel is affected in releases prior to 0.0.0-20260721014413-f45749a7ef6e. Upgrade your dependency to 0.0.0-20260721014413-f45749a7ef6e or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-68586?
CVE-2026-68586 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.6 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-68586?
CVE-2026-68586 is classified under CWE-862: Missing Authorization (The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-68586?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-36v8-mpjm-8j5r",
  "modified" : "2026-09-03T21:21:20Z",
  "published" : "2026-09-03T21:21:19Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-68586" ],
  "summary" : "SiYuan: Cross-boundary content disclosure via getBacklinkDoc/getBackmentionDoc (publish mode): reader-reachable rendered DOM of publish-forbidden docs; sibling list endpoints are filtered",
  "details" : "**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-68586](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68586).\n\n### Summary\n\nThe backlink API splits into list endpoints (which documents reference a block) and content endpoints (the rendered text of those referencing blocks). The list endpoints apply a publish-access filter, the content endpoints do not. As a result, `/api/ref/getBacklinkDoc` and `/api/ref/getBackmentionDoc` return the rendered DOM of blocks belonging to a publish-forbidden document to an anonymous reader, with no access check.\n\nBoth content endpoints are gated by `CheckAuth` only, reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`.\n\n### Details\n\nThe asymmetry between the list and content sides is the tell that this is an oversight, not intended behavior:\n\n| Endpoint | Returns | Publish-access filter | Route |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `getBacklink` | list (`*Path`) | `FilterPathsByPublishAccess` - present | `CheckAuth` |\n| `getBacklink2` | list (`*Path`) | `FilterPathsByPublishAccess` - present | `CheckAuth` |\n| `getBacklinkDoc` | rendered DOM | none | `CheckAuth` |\n| `getBackmentionDoc` | rendered DOM | none | `CheckAuth` |\n\n`model/backlink.go` contains no publish-access reference anywhere, and `Backlink.DOM` is the rendered HTML of the referencing blocks. `getBacklinkDoc(defID, refTreeID)` returns the rendered content of blocks in `refTreeID` - including a publish-forbidden, publish-disabled, or password-protected document with no access check. The filtered list siblings (`getBacklink`/`getBacklink2`) demonstrate that the publish boundary is meant to apply to this data; the content endpoints simply omit it.\n\nA reader is not limited to the filtered backlink list, they call `getBacklinkDoc` directly with any `refTreeID`. This also yields a reference-existence oracle: the response reveals whether the forbidden document `refTreeID` references the block `defID`.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nReproduced on a local instance (SiYuan running locally, publish mode enabled on port 6808, publish Basic Auth disabled). Setup: a publish-forbidden document `D` (`REFTREEID`) whose body contains the unique marker `SECRET_MARKER_77` and which references a block `DEFID` in a separate known document.\n\n**1. Mark the target document publish-forbidden (admin action, the boundary that should block reads):**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/setPublishAccess\nAuthorization: Token <admin-token>\n{\"id\":\"REFTREEID\",\"visible\":false,\"password\":\"\",\"disable\":true}\n```\n\n**2. Baseline: the list endpoint correctly hides the forbidden doc from the reader (anonymous, port 6808):**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/ref/getBacklink2\n{\"id\":\"DEFID\",\"k\":\"\",\"mk\":\"\"}\n```\nThe returned backlinks do not include the forbidden document `D`, the list side is filtered.\n\n**3. Disclosure: the content endpoint returns the forbidden doc's blocks anyway (anonymous, port 6808):**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/ref/getBacklinkDoc\n{\"defID\":\"DEFID\",\"refTreeID\":\"REFTREEID\",\"keyword\":\"\"}\n```\nReturns HTTP 200; `data.backlinks[].dom` contains `SECRET_MARKER_77`, the rendered content of the publish-forbidden document, returned to an anonymous reader. `getBackmentionDoc` behaves identically for mention-type references.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader`, can read the rendered content of a publish-forbidden document's referencing blocks, defeating a boundary the administrator explicitly configured, and can determine whether a forbidden document references a given block (a reference-existence oracle).\n\n**Precondition (stated honestly):** the request requires `refTreeID` (the forbidden document's ID) and `defID` (a block it references). `defID` may be any published/known block, so if the forbidden document references any public content, `defID` is known and only `refTreeID` need be supplied. Block/document IDs for forbidden documents are also obtainable from other `CheckAuth`-only endpoints that lack the publish-access filter (reported separately). This endpoint alone does not enumerate arbitrary documents; it discloses content once an ID is known.\n\nImpact is confidentiality-only: content disclosure plus a reference-existence oracle, no modification. No admin role, CSRF token, or write permission is required. Encrypted notebooks are out of scope.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nApply the same publish-access check the list siblings use. In `getBacklinkDoc`/`getBackmentionDoc`, filter each `Backlink` by its source document's box/path via `CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore` plus the publish-password cookie check consistent with `FilterPathsByPublishAccess` in `getBacklink`/`getBacklink2`. Any endpoint returning rendered block DOM should enforce the same publish boundary as the corresponding list endpoint.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
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      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.0.0-20260721014413-f45749a7ef6e"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-36v8-mpjm-8j5r"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68586"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/f45749a7ef6e385f6e2af6b7dd12429d56d46f32"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-content-disclosure-via-getbacklinkdoc"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-862" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-09-03T21:21:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}