CVE-2026-45573: Decidim Push Subscriptions Can Be Abused Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-2g9c-vf8h-prxx
CVSS 6.4
CWE-918
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-45573 is a MODERATE (CVSS 6.4) push subscriptions can be abused vulnerability (CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)) affecting Decidim libraries in the RubyGems ecosystem. The issue involves push subscriptions can be abused for server-side requests. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.30.9, 0.31.5, 0.32.0.

CVE-2026-45573 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-45573
GHSA Identifier GHSA-2g9c-vf8h-prxx
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 6.4
CWE Classification CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Affected Product Decidim
Package Ecosystem RubyGems
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 6.4

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-45573

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Decidim dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

decidim-core fixed: 0.30.9
Upgrade decidim-core to 0.30.9
decidim-core fixed: 0.31.5
Upgrade decidim-core to 0.31.5
decidim-core fixed: 0.32.0
Upgrade decidim-core to 0.32.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for decidim-core

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-45573, inspect your project dependencies for Decidim:

inspect dependencies for decidim-core

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Decidim in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.30.9), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where the web server receives a url or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this url, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination. In Decidim, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Description The push-subscription endpoint stores an attacker-controlled delivery URL, and the notification send path becomes an outbound-request sink when VAPID delivery is enabled. The practical result is an authenticated, stored, mostly blind SSRF primitive to arbitrary HTTPS endpoints reachable from the app server. ## Technical description When VAPID delivery is enabled, the notification subscription flow stores the client-supplied push endpoint without checking that it belongs to an approved push service. The send path later passes that stored URL to `WebPush.payload_send`, turning the subscription into an attacker-controlled outbound request destination. This is the source-to-sink chain: 1. Source: attacker-controlled `subscription.endpoint` in the JSON body posted to `POST /notifications_subscriptions`. 2. Persistence: `params[:endpoint]` is stored under `user.notification_settings["subscriptions"]`. 3. Retrieval: `user.notifications_subscriptions.values` returns that stored endpoint later. 4. Sink: `build_payload` sets `endpoint: subscription["endpoint"]`. 5. Outbound request: `WebPush.payload_send(**payload)` uses the attacker-supplied endpoint as the destination. One spec asserts that the endpoint is persisted exactly as supplied: ```ruby # decidim-core/spec/services/decidim/notifications_subscriptions_persistor_spec.rb expect(user.notifications_subscriptions["auth_code_121"]["endpoint"]).to eq(params[:endpoint]) ``` Another spec asserts that `SendPushNotification` passes the stored endpoint into `WebPush.payload_send`: ```ruby # decidim-core/spec/services/decidim/send_push_notification_spec.rb first_notification_payload = { message:, endpoint: subscriptions["auth_key_1"]["endpoint"], p256dh: subscriptions["auth_key_1"]["p256dh"], auth: subscriptions["auth_key_1"]["auth"], vapid: a_hash_including(...) } expect(WebPush).to receive(:payload_send).with(first_notification_payload) ``` ### Impact - In a configured deployment, an authenticated user can register an attacker-controlled or otherwise unauthorized HTTPS URL. - The server then sends outbound `POST` requests there whenever a notification is pushed. - This is a stored, mostly blind SSRF primitive: useful for outbound interaction with attacker infrastructure and, where routable, internal HTTPS services. - Notification metadata is disclosed to the supplied endpoint through the encrypted web push request path. ### Patches See https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16714. ### Workarounds Disable the push notifications feature by removing the VAPID keys in the server. ### Resource SSRF ### Credits This issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the [Decidim Association](https://decidim.org) and made by [Radically Open Security](https://www.radicallyopensecurity.com/) against Decidim financed by [NGI](https://ngi.eu/).

CVE-2026-45573 Affected Decidim Versions

3 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.30.90.31.50.32.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
decidim-core
RubyGems
< 0.30.9
0.30.9
decidim-core
RubyGems
≥ 0.31.0.rc1
< 0.31.5
0.31.5
decidim-core
RubyGems
≥ 0.32.0.rc1
< 0.32.0
0.32.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-45573?
CVE-2026-45573 is a security vulnerability in Decidim involving Push subscriptions can be abused for server-side requests under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
Which Decidim versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.30.9, 0.31.5, 0.32.0 across affected packages: decidim-core.
What version fixes CVE-2026-45573?
Upgrading to 0.30.9, 0.31.5, 0.32.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is decidim-core affected?
Yes, decidim-core is affected in releases prior to 0.30.9, 0.31.5, 0.32.0. Upgrade your dependency to 0.30.9, 0.31.5, 0.32.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-45573?
CVE-2026-45573 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.4 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-45573?
CVE-2026-45573 is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.).
How can I check RubyGems dependencies for CVE-2026-45573?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for decidim-core'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-2g9c-vf8h-prxx",
  "modified" : "2026-07-13T17:19:17Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-13T17:19:17Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-45573" ],
  "summary" : "Decidim: Push subscriptions can be abused for server-side requests",
  "details" : "## Description\n\nThe push-subscription endpoint stores an attacker-controlled delivery URL, and the notification send path becomes an outbound-request sink when VAPID delivery is enabled. The practical result is an authenticated, stored, mostly blind SSRF primitive to arbitrary HTTPS endpoints reachable from the app server.\n\n## Technical description\n \nWhen VAPID delivery is enabled, the notification subscription flow stores the client-supplied push endpoint without checking that it belongs to an approved push service. The send path later passes that stored URL to `WebPush.payload_send`, turning the subscription into an attacker-controlled outbound request destination.\nThis is the source-to-sink chain:\n\n1. Source: attacker-controlled `subscription.endpoint` in the JSON body posted to `POST /notifications_subscriptions`.\n2. Persistence: `params[:endpoint]` is stored under `user.notification_settings[\"subscriptions\"]`.\n3. Retrieval: `user.notifications_subscriptions.values` returns that stored endpoint later.\n4. Sink: `build_payload` sets `endpoint: subscription[\"endpoint\"]`.\n5. Outbound request: `WebPush.payload_send(**payload)` uses the attacker-supplied endpoint as the\ndestination.\n\nOne spec asserts that the endpoint is persisted exactly as supplied:\n\n```ruby\n# decidim-core/spec/services/decidim/notifications_subscriptions_persistor_spec.rb\nexpect(user.notifications_subscriptions[\"auth_code_121\"][\"endpoint\"]).to eq(params[:endpoint])\n```\n\nAnother spec asserts that `SendPushNotification` passes the stored endpoint into `WebPush.payload_send`:\n\n```ruby\n# decidim-core/spec/services/decidim/send_push_notification_spec.rb\nfirst_notification_payload = {\n  message:,\n  endpoint: subscriptions[\"auth_key_1\"][\"endpoint\"],\n  p256dh: subscriptions[\"auth_key_1\"][\"p256dh\"],\n  auth: subscriptions[\"auth_key_1\"][\"auth\"],\n  vapid: a_hash_including(...)\n}\nexpect(WebPush).to receive(:payload_send).with(first_notification_payload)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n- In a configured deployment, an authenticated user can register an attacker-controlled or otherwise unauthorized HTTPS URL.\n- The server then sends outbound `POST` requests there whenever a notification is pushed.\n- This is a stored, mostly blind SSRF primitive: useful for outbound interaction with attacker infrastructure and, where routable, internal HTTPS services.\n- Notification metadata is disclosed to the supplied endpoint through the encrypted web push request path.\n\n### Patches\n\nSee https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16714.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDisable the push notifications feature by removing the VAPID keys in the server.\n\n### Resource\n\nSSRF\n\n### Credits\n\nThis issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the [Decidim Association](https://decidim.org) and made by [Radically Open Security](https://www.radicallyopensecurity.com/) against Decidim financed by [NGI](https://ngi.eu/).",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "RubyGems",
      "name" : "decidim-core"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.30.9"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "RubyGems",
      "name" : "decidim-core"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0.31.0.rc1"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.31.5"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "RubyGems",
      "name" : "decidim-core"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0.32.0.rc1"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.32.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/decidim/decidim/security/advisories/GHSA-2g9c-vf8h-prxx"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16714"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/decidim/decidim"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-918" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-13T17:19:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}