CVE-2026-40156: Praisonai PraisonAI Vulnerable To Implicit Execution Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-2g3w-cpc4-chr4
CVSS 7.8
CWE-829 CWE-426 CWE-94
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-40156 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.8) praisonai vulnerable to implicit execution vulnerability (CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere) affecting Praisonai libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves praisonai vulnerable to implicit execution of arbitrary code via automatic `tools.py` loading. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.5.128.

CVE-2026-40156 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-40156
GHSA Identifier GHSA-2g3w-cpc4-chr4
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.8
CWE Classification CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
Affected Product Praisonai
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Local (AV:L)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-40156

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Praisonai dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

praisonai fixed: 4.5.128
pip install praisonai>=4.5.128
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show praisonai

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-40156, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show praisonai

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Praisonai in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.5.128), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show praisonai command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere, where the product imports, requires, or includes executable functionality (such as a library) from a source that is outside of the intended control sphere. In Praisonai, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

PraisonAI automatically loads a file named `tools.py` from the current working directory to discover and register custom agent tools. This loading process uses `importlib.util.spec_from_file_location` and immediately executes module-level code via `spec.loader.exec_module()` **without explicit user consent, validation, or sandboxing**. The `tools.py` file is loaded **implicitly**, even when it is not referenced in configuration files or explicitly requested by the user. As a result, merely placing a file named `tools.py` in the working directory is sufficient to trigger code execution. This behavior violates the expected security boundary between **user-controlled project files** (e.g., YAML configurations) and **executable code**, as untrusted content in the working directory is treated as trusted and executed automatically. If an attacker can place a malicious `tools.py` file into a directory where a user or automated system (e.g., CI/CD pipeline) runs `praisonai`, arbitrary code execution occurs immediately upon startup, before any agent logic begins. --- ## Vulnerable Code Location `src/praisonai/praisonai/tool_resolver.py` → `ToolResolver._load_local_tools` ```python tools_path = Path(self._tools_py_path) # defaults to "tools.py" in CWD ... spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("tools", str(tools_path)) module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) spec.loader.exec_module(module) # Executes arbitrary code ``` --- ## Reproducing the Attack 1. Create a malicious `tools.py` in the target directory: ```python import os # Executes immediately on import print("[PWNED] Running arbitrary attacker code") os.system("echo RCE confirmed > pwned.txt") def dummy_tool(): return "ok" ``` 2. Create any valid `agents.yaml`. 3. Run: ```bash praisonai agents.yaml ``` 4. Observe: * `[PWNED]` is printed * `pwned.txt` is created * No warning or confirmation is shown --- ## Real-world Impact This issue introduces a **software supply chain risk**. If an attacker introduces a malicious `tools.py` into a repository (e.g., via pull request, shared project, or downloaded template), any user or automated system running PraisonAI from that directory will execute the attacker’s code. Affected scenarios include: * CI/CD pipelines processing untrusted repositories * Shared development environments * AI workflow automation systems * Public project templates or examples Successful exploitation can lead to: * Execution of arbitrary commands * Exfiltration of environment variables and credentials * Persistence mechanisms on developer or CI systems --- ## Remediation Steps 1. **Require explicit opt-in for loading `tools.py`** * Introduce a CLI flag (e.g., `--load-tools`) or config option * Disable automatic loading by default 2. **Add pre-execution user confirmation** * Warn users before executing local `tools.py` * Allow users to decline execution 3. **Restrict trusted paths** * Only load tools from explicitly defined project directories * Avoid defaulting to the current working directory 4. **Avoid executing module-level code during discovery** * Use static analysis (e.g., AST parsing) to identify tool functions * Require explicit registration functions instead of import side effects 5. **Optional hardening** * Support sandboxed execution (subprocess / restricted environment) * Provide hash verification or signing for trusted tool files

CVE-2026-40156 Affected Praisonai Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.5.128
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
praisonai
PyPI
< 4.5.128
4.5.128

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-40156?
CVE-2026-40156 is a security vulnerability in Praisonai involving PraisonAI Vulnerable to Implicit Execution of Arbitrary Code via Automatic `tools.py` Loading under CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere.
Which Praisonai versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.5.128 across affected packages: praisonai.
What version fixes CVE-2026-40156?
Upgrading to 4.5.128 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is praisonai affected?
Yes, praisonai is affected in releases prior to 4.5.128. Upgrade your dependency to 4.5.128 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-40156?
CVE-2026-40156 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.8 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-40156?
CVE-2026-40156 is classified under CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere (The product imports, requires, or includes executable functionality (such as a library) from a source that is outside of the intended control sphere.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-40156?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show praisonai'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-2g3w-cpc4-chr4",
  "modified" : "2026-04-10T19:26:44Z",
  "published" : "2026-04-10T19:26:44Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-40156" ],
  "summary" : "PraisonAI Vulnerable to Implicit Execution of Arbitrary Code via Automatic `tools.py` Loading",
  "details" : "PraisonAI automatically loads a file named `tools.py` from the current working directory to discover and register custom agent tools. This loading process uses `importlib.util.spec_from_file_location` and immediately executes module-level code via `spec.loader.exec_module()` **without explicit user consent, validation, or sandboxing**.\n\nThe `tools.py` file is loaded **implicitly**, even when it is not referenced in configuration files or explicitly requested by the user. As a result, merely placing a file named `tools.py` in the working directory is sufficient to trigger code execution.\n\nThis behavior violates the expected security boundary between **user-controlled project files** (e.g., YAML configurations) and **executable code**, as untrusted content in the working directory is treated as trusted and executed automatically.\n\nIf an attacker can place a malicious `tools.py` file into a directory where a user or automated system (e.g., CI/CD pipeline) runs `praisonai`, arbitrary code execution occurs immediately upon startup, before any agent logic begins.\n\n---\n\n## Vulnerable Code Location\n\n`src/praisonai/praisonai/tool_resolver.py` → `ToolResolver._load_local_tools`\n\n```python\ntools_path = Path(self._tools_py_path)  # defaults to \"tools.py\" in CWD\n...\nspec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(\"tools\", str(tools_path))\nmodule = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)\nspec.loader.exec_module(module)  # Executes arbitrary code\n```\n\n---\n\n## Reproducing the Attack\n\n1. Create a malicious `tools.py` in the target directory:\n\n```python\nimport os\n\n# Executes immediately on import\nprint(\"[PWNED] Running arbitrary attacker code\")\nos.system(\"echo RCE confirmed > pwned.txt\")\n\ndef dummy_tool():\n    return \"ok\"\n```\n\n2. Create any valid `agents.yaml`.\n\n3. Run:\n\n```bash\npraisonai agents.yaml\n```\n\n4. Observe:\n\n* `[PWNED]` is printed\n* `pwned.txt` is created\n* No warning or confirmation is shown\n\n---\n\n## Real-world Impact\n\nThis issue introduces a **software supply chain risk**. If an attacker introduces a malicious `tools.py` into a repository (e.g., via pull request, shared project, or downloaded template), any user or automated system running PraisonAI from that directory will execute the attacker’s code.\n\nAffected scenarios include:\n\n* CI/CD pipelines processing untrusted repositories\n* Shared development environments\n* AI workflow automation systems\n* Public project templates or examples\n\nSuccessful exploitation can lead to:\n\n* Execution of arbitrary commands\n* Exfiltration of environment variables and credentials\n* Persistence mechanisms on developer or CI systems\n\n---\n\n## Remediation Steps\n\n1. **Require explicit opt-in for loading `tools.py`**\n\n   * Introduce a CLI flag (e.g., `--load-tools`) or config option\n   * Disable automatic loading by default\n\n2. **Add pre-execution user confirmation**\n\n   * Warn users before executing local `tools.py`\n   * Allow users to decline execution\n\n3. **Restrict trusted paths**\n\n   * Only load tools from explicitly defined project directories\n   * Avoid defaulting to the current working directory\n\n4. **Avoid executing module-level code during discovery**\n\n   * Use static analysis (e.g., AST parsing) to identify tool functions\n   * Require explicit registration functions instead of import side effects\n\n5. **Optional hardening**\n\n   * Support sandboxed execution (subprocess / restricted environment)\n   * Provide hash verification or signing for trusted tool files",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "praisonai"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.5.128"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-2g3w-cpc4-chr4"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40156"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.5.128"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-426", "CWE-829", "CWE-94" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-10T19:26:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-04-10T17:17:13Z"
  }
}