CVE-2026-56827: Shopper Authorization Bypass Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-243p-f3cv-c5wh
CVSS 8.1
CWE-862
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-56827 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.1) authorization bypass vulnerability (CWE-862: Missing Authorization) affecting Shopper libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves authorization bypass in filament bulk actions allows browse-only staff to mass-delete attributes/tags and mass-toggle visibility of brands/categories/suppliers. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.9.2.

CVE-2026-56827 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-56827
GHSA Identifier GHSA-243p-f3cv-c5wh
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.1
CWE Classification CWE-862: Missing Authorization
Affected Product Shopper
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.1

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-56827

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Shopper dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

shopper/framework fixed: 2.9.2
Upgrade shopper/framework to 2.9.2
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for shopper/framework

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-56827, inspect your project dependencies for Shopper:

inspect dependencies for shopper/framework

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Shopper in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.9.2), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-862: Missing Authorization, where the product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action. In Shopper, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary Five Filament `groupedBulkActions` blocks across the Shopper admin Livewire pages omit the `->authorize(...)` permission gate, while their per-record sibling actions (and other Shopper Index pages such as `Pages/Settings/Currencies.php`, `Pages/Reviews/Index.php`, `Pages/Collection/Index.php`, and `Pages/Discount/Index.php`) correctly chain `->authorize(...)`. Each affected page's `mount()` only requires the read-only `browse_*` permission, so a low-privilege staff user holding only the read permission can drive the bulk endpoint via the standard Livewire `callTableBulkAction` flow and execute state-mutating operations they were never granted. The vulnerability is the same class as GHSA-f946-9qp6-vgch and GHSA-j328-xmgp-j4q3 (read-only permission gating a write action), just on a different surface (Filament 4 `groupedBulkActions` rather than top-level Livewire methods). A staff user holding only `browse_attributes` can permanently delete every product attribute in the catalog (cascading break of every dependent product variant). A user holding only `browse_tags` can permanently delete every product tag. Users holding `browse_brands`, `browse_categories`, or `browse_suppliers` can flip the visibility (`is_enabled`) of every brand/category/supplier in bulk, sabotaging storefront catalog visibility. CVSS 3.1: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H` = 8.1 High. CWE-285 (Improper Authorization) and CWE-862 (Missing Authorization). The attacker has low privilege (browse-only staff role), no user interaction, network reachable. ## Vulnerable components (paths relative to repo root) All references are HEAD = commit `ac9a760` on `master` (the very commit that closed the previous wave of authorization-drift bugs from GHSA-j328-xmgp-j4q3). ### 1) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Attribute/Browse.php` Mount at line 36–39 requires only `browse_attributes`. - Lines 106–122: `DeleteBulkAction::make()` has NO `->authorize(...)` chain (the surrounding per-record `delete` action at lines 95–104 correctly does `->authorize('delete_attributes')`). - Lines 123–138: `BulkAction::make('enabled')` has NO `->authorize(...)`. - Lines 139–155: `BulkAction::make('disabled')` has NO `->authorize(...)`. Net effect: a `browse_attributes`-only user can **delete every row in the attributes table**, and toggle `is_enabled` on every attribute in one request. Deleting an attribute cascades into every product variant that references it via the `attribute_product` pivot. ### 2) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Tag/Index.php` Mount at line 39 requires only `browse_tags`. - Lines 96–108: `DeleteBulkAction::make()` has NO `->authorize(...)` chain (the per-record `delete` action at lines 79–94 correctly does `->authorize('delete_tags')`). Net effect: a `browse_tags`-only user can delete every `ProductTag` row. ### 3) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Brand/Index.php` Mount at line 37–40 requires only `browse_brands`. - Lines 97–112: `BulkAction::make('enabled')` has NO `->authorize(...)`. - Lines 113–129: `BulkAction::make('disabled')` has NO `->authorize(...)`. Net effect: a `browse_brands`-only user can flip `is_enabled` on every brand. Disabling all brands removes them from the storefront catalog. The per-record edit/delete actions and the `DeleteBulkAction` at lines 130–148 are correctly `->authorize(...)` gated — only the visibility bulk actions were missed. ### 4) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Category/Index.php` Mount at line 38–41 requires only `browse_categories`. - Lines 102–117: `BulkAction::make('enabled')` has NO `->authorize(...)`. - Lines 118–133: `BulkAction::make('disabled')` has NO `->authorize(...)`. Net effect: a `browse_categories`-only user can flip `is_enabled` on every category. Same shape as Brand. ### 5) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Supplier/Index.php` Mount at line 38 requires only `browse_suppliers`. - Lines 93–108: `BulkAction::make('enabled')` has NO `->authorize(...)`. - Lines 109–125: `BulkAction::make('disabled')` has NO `->authorize(...)`. Net effect: a `browse_suppliers`-only user can flip `is_enabled` on every supplier. ## Reference comparison: places that ARE correctly gated For reference, here is what the same pattern looks like in files that DID get the fix: - `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Settings/Currencies.php` lines 90–129: every `BulkAction` chains `->authorize('access_setting')`. - `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Reviews/Index.php` lines 105–119: `DeleteBulkAction` chains `->authorize('delete_reviews')`. - `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Collection/Index.php` lines 109–128: `DeleteBulkAction` chains `->authorize('delete_collections')`. - `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Discount/Index.php` lines 126–145: `DeleteBulkAction` chains `->authorize('delete_discounts')`. The convention is established and applied elsewhere — these five files just missed it. ## Proof of Concept The attached file `tests/Admin/Livewire/Pages/Brand/AuthBypassPocTest.php` (added in this report) contains seven Pest tests, each acting as a `browse_*`-only staff user and invoking the bulk endpoint. All seven pass on master @ `ac9a760`: ``` PASS Tests\Admin\Livewire\Pages\Brand\AuthBypassPocTest ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: read-only viewer can mass-DISABLE all brands via unguarded BulkAction ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: read-only viewer can mass-ENABLE all brands via unguarded BulkAction ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: read-only viewer can mass-DISABLE all categories via unguarded BulkAction ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: read-only viewer can mass-DISABLE all suppliers via unguarded BulkAction ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: read-only viewer can DELETE all attributes via unguarded DeleteBulkAction ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: read-only viewer can mass-DISABLE all attributes via unguarded BulkAction ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: browse_tags viewer can DELETE all product tags via unguarded DeleteBulkAction Tests: 7 passed (32 assertions) ``` Each test seeds three records, signs in a user holding only the corresponding `browse_*` permission, calls `Livewire::test(<Page>::class)->callTableBulkAction(...)`, and asserts the side effect (records flipped or deleted). For example, the attribute mass-delete test: ```php $this->viewer = User::factory()->create(); $this->viewer->givePermissionTo('browse_attributes'); $this->actingAs($this->viewer); Attribute::factory()->count(3)->create(); expect($this->viewer->can('delete_attributes'))->toBeFalse(); Livewire::test(AttributeBrowse::class) ->callTableBulkAction(\Filament\Actions\DeleteBulkAction::class, Attribute::pluck('id')->toArray()) ->assertHasNoErrors(); expect(Attribute::count())->toBe(0); ``` The call uses the same `callTableBulkAction` helper Shopper's own test suite uses everywhere, which in turn drives the same Livewire `update` payload the browser would emit — so this is a faithful HTTP-level reproduction. ## Suggested fix Add `->authorize(<correct_permission>)` to each of the five vulnerable groups, mirroring the pattern already used elsewhere: ```diff // Pages/Attribute/Browse.php ->groupedBulkActions([ DeleteBulkAction::make() + ->authorize('delete_attributes') ->label(__('shopper::forms.actions.delete')) ->requiresConfirmation() ->action(function (Collection $records): void { /* ... */ }), BulkAction::make('enabled') + ->authorize('edit_attributes') ->label(__('shopper::forms.actions.enable')) ->action(function (Collection $records): void { /* ... */ }), BulkAction::make('disabled') + ->authorize('edit_attributes') ->label(__('shopper::forms.actions.disable')) ->action(function (Collection $records): void { /* ... */ }), ]) ``` Apply the equivalent change to `Pages/Tag/Index.php` (`delete_tags`), `Pages/Brand/Index.php` (`edit_brands` for enable/disable), `Pages/Category/Index.php` (`edit_categories`), and `Pages/Supplier/Index.php` (`edit_suppliers`). A regression test for each file (acting as a `browse_*`-only user and expecting `assertHasErrors`/`AuthorizationException`) would lock in the fix, matching the regression tests added for #514. ## Resources - Prior advisories of the same class (read-only permission gating a write action): GHSA-f946-9qp6-vgch, GHSA-j328-xmgp-j4q3 / GHSA-vw82-3966-f9mr. - Same-shape fix: commit `ac9a760` (PR #514). Five Filament bulk-action groups did not receive the corresponding `->authorize(...)` chain. - CWE-285 Improper Authorization, CWE-862 Missing Authorization. ### Credits Reported by Vishal Shukla(@shukla304) using sechub.dev AI Agent ### Support If this disclosure was useful and userswould like to support continued open-source security research and responsible-disclosure work, they can sponsor at https://github.com/sponsors/therawdev — Shopper is thankful for those keeping open source safe.

CVE-2026-56827 Affected Shopper Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
2.9.2
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
shopper/framework
Packagist
< 2.9.2
2.9.2

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-56827?
CVE-2026-56827 is a security vulnerability in Shopper involving Authorization bypass in Filament bulk actions allows browse-only staff to mass-delete attributes/tags and mass-toggle visibility of brands/categories/suppliers under CWE-862: Missing Authorization.
Which Shopper versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 2.9.2 across affected packages: shopper/framework.
What version fixes CVE-2026-56827?
Upgrading to 2.9.2 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is shopper/framework affected?
Yes, shopper/framework is affected in releases prior to 2.9.2. Upgrade your dependency to 2.9.2 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-56827?
CVE-2026-56827 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.1 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-56827?
CVE-2026-56827 is classified under CWE-862: Missing Authorization (The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-56827?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for shopper/framework'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-243p-f3cv-c5wh",
  "modified" : "2026-09-11T20:47:17Z",
  "published" : "2026-09-11T20:47:17Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-56827" ],
  "summary" : "Shopper: Authorization bypass in Filament bulk actions allows browse-only staff to mass-delete attributes/tags and mass-toggle visibility of brands/categories/suppliers",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nFive Filament `groupedBulkActions` blocks across the Shopper admin Livewire pages omit the `->authorize(...)` permission gate, while their per-record sibling actions (and other Shopper Index pages such as `Pages/Settings/Currencies.php`, `Pages/Reviews/Index.php`, `Pages/Collection/Index.php`, and `Pages/Discount/Index.php`) correctly chain `->authorize(...)`. Each affected page's `mount()` only requires the read-only `browse_*` permission, so a low-privilege staff user holding only the read permission can drive the bulk endpoint via the standard Livewire `callTableBulkAction` flow and execute state-mutating operations they were never granted. The vulnerability is the same class as GHSA-f946-9qp6-vgch and GHSA-j328-xmgp-j4q3 (read-only permission gating a write action), just on a different surface (Filament 4 `groupedBulkActions` rather than top-level Livewire methods).\n\nA staff user holding only `browse_attributes` can permanently delete every product attribute in the catalog (cascading break of every dependent product variant). A user holding only `browse_tags` can permanently delete every product tag. Users holding `browse_brands`, `browse_categories`, or `browse_suppliers` can flip the visibility (`is_enabled`) of every brand/category/supplier in bulk, sabotaging storefront catalog visibility.\n\nCVSS 3.1: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H` = 8.1 High. CWE-285 (Improper Authorization) and CWE-862 (Missing Authorization). The attacker has low privilege (browse-only staff role), no user interaction, network reachable.\n\n## Vulnerable components (paths relative to repo root)\n\nAll references are HEAD = commit `ac9a760` on `master` (the very commit that closed the previous wave of authorization-drift bugs from GHSA-j328-xmgp-j4q3).\n\n### 1) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Attribute/Browse.php`\n\nMount at line 36–39 requires only `browse_attributes`.\n\n- Lines 106–122: `DeleteBulkAction::make()` has NO `->authorize(...)` chain (the surrounding per-record `delete` action at lines 95–104 correctly does `->authorize('delete_attributes')`).\n- Lines 123–138: `BulkAction::make('enabled')` has NO `->authorize(...)`.\n- Lines 139–155: `BulkAction::make('disabled')` has NO `->authorize(...)`.\n\nNet effect: a `browse_attributes`-only user can **delete every row in the attributes table**, and toggle `is_enabled` on every attribute in one request. Deleting an attribute cascades into every product variant that references it via the `attribute_product` pivot.\n\n### 2) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Tag/Index.php`\n\nMount at line 39 requires only `browse_tags`.\n\n- Lines 96–108: `DeleteBulkAction::make()` has NO `->authorize(...)` chain (the per-record `delete` action at lines 79–94 correctly does `->authorize('delete_tags')`).\n\nNet effect: a `browse_tags`-only user can delete every `ProductTag` row.\n\n### 3) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Brand/Index.php`\n\nMount at line 37–40 requires only `browse_brands`.\n\n- Lines 97–112: `BulkAction::make('enabled')` has NO `->authorize(...)`.\n- Lines 113–129: `BulkAction::make('disabled')` has NO `->authorize(...)`.\n\nNet effect: a `browse_brands`-only user can flip `is_enabled` on every brand. Disabling all brands removes them from the storefront catalog. The per-record edit/delete actions and the `DeleteBulkAction` at lines 130–148 are correctly `->authorize(...)` gated — only the visibility bulk actions were missed.\n\n### 4) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Category/Index.php`\n\nMount at line 38–41 requires only `browse_categories`.\n\n- Lines 102–117: `BulkAction::make('enabled')` has NO `->authorize(...)`.\n- Lines 118–133: `BulkAction::make('disabled')` has NO `->authorize(...)`.\n\nNet effect: a `browse_categories`-only user can flip `is_enabled` on every category. Same shape as Brand.\n\n### 5) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Supplier/Index.php`\n\nMount at line 38 requires only `browse_suppliers`.\n\n- Lines 93–108: `BulkAction::make('enabled')` has NO `->authorize(...)`.\n- Lines 109–125: `BulkAction::make('disabled')` has NO `->authorize(...)`.\n\nNet effect: a `browse_suppliers`-only user can flip `is_enabled` on every supplier.\n\n## Reference comparison: places that ARE correctly gated\n\nFor reference, here is what the same pattern looks like in files that DID get the fix:\n\n- `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Settings/Currencies.php` lines 90–129: every `BulkAction` chains `->authorize('access_setting')`.\n- `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Reviews/Index.php` lines 105–119: `DeleteBulkAction` chains `->authorize('delete_reviews')`.\n- `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Collection/Index.php` lines 109–128: `DeleteBulkAction` chains `->authorize('delete_collections')`.\n- `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Discount/Index.php` lines 126–145: `DeleteBulkAction` chains `->authorize('delete_discounts')`.\n\nThe convention is established and applied elsewhere — these five files just missed it.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nThe attached file `tests/Admin/Livewire/Pages/Brand/AuthBypassPocTest.php` (added in this report) contains seven Pest tests, each acting as a `browse_*`-only staff user and invoking the bulk endpoint. All seven pass on master @ `ac9a760`:\n\n```\n   PASS  Tests\\Admin\\Livewire\\Pages\\Brand\\AuthBypassPocTest\n  ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: read-only viewer can mass-DISABLE all brands via unguarded BulkAction\n  ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: read-only viewer can mass-ENABLE all brands via unguarded BulkAction\n  ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: read-only viewer can mass-DISABLE all categories via unguarded BulkAction\n  ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: read-only viewer can mass-DISABLE all suppliers via unguarded BulkAction\n  ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: read-only viewer can DELETE all attributes via unguarded DeleteBulkAction\n  ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: read-only viewer can mass-DISABLE all attributes via unguarded BulkAction\n  ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: browse_tags viewer can DELETE all product tags via unguarded DeleteBulkAction\n\n  Tests:    7 passed (32 assertions)\n```\n\nEach test seeds three records, signs in a user holding only the corresponding `browse_*` permission, calls `Livewire::test(<Page>::class)->callTableBulkAction(...)`, and asserts the side effect (records flipped or deleted). For example, the attribute mass-delete test:\n\n```php\n$this->viewer = User::factory()->create();\n$this->viewer->givePermissionTo('browse_attributes');\n$this->actingAs($this->viewer);\n\nAttribute::factory()->count(3)->create();\nexpect($this->viewer->can('delete_attributes'))->toBeFalse();\n\nLivewire::test(AttributeBrowse::class)\n    ->callTableBulkAction(\\Filament\\Actions\\DeleteBulkAction::class, Attribute::pluck('id')->toArray())\n    ->assertHasNoErrors();\n\nexpect(Attribute::count())->toBe(0);\n```\n\nThe call uses the same `callTableBulkAction` helper Shopper's own test suite uses everywhere, which in turn drives the same Livewire `update` payload the browser would emit — so this is a faithful HTTP-level reproduction.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nAdd `->authorize(<correct_permission>)` to each of the five vulnerable groups, mirroring the pattern already used elsewhere:\n\n```diff\n // Pages/Attribute/Browse.php\n ->groupedBulkActions([\n     DeleteBulkAction::make()\n+        ->authorize('delete_attributes')\n         ->label(__('shopper::forms.actions.delete'))\n         ->requiresConfirmation()\n         ->action(function (Collection $records): void { /* ... */ }),\n     BulkAction::make('enabled')\n+        ->authorize('edit_attributes')\n         ->label(__('shopper::forms.actions.enable'))\n         ->action(function (Collection $records): void { /* ... */ }),\n     BulkAction::make('disabled')\n+        ->authorize('edit_attributes')\n         ->label(__('shopper::forms.actions.disable'))\n         ->action(function (Collection $records): void { /* ... */ }),\n ])\n```\n\nApply the equivalent change to `Pages/Tag/Index.php` (`delete_tags`), `Pages/Brand/Index.php` (`edit_brands` for enable/disable), `Pages/Category/Index.php` (`edit_categories`), and `Pages/Supplier/Index.php` (`edit_suppliers`).\n\nA regression test for each file (acting as a `browse_*`-only user and expecting `assertHasErrors`/`AuthorizationException`) would lock in the fix, matching the regression tests added for #514.\n\n## Resources\n\n- Prior advisories of the same class (read-only permission gating a write action): GHSA-f946-9qp6-vgch, GHSA-j328-xmgp-j4q3 / GHSA-vw82-3966-f9mr.\n- Same-shape fix: commit `ac9a760` (PR #514). Five Filament bulk-action groups did not receive the corresponding `->authorize(...)` chain.\n- CWE-285 Improper Authorization, CWE-862 Missing Authorization.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by Vishal Shukla(@shukla304) using sechub.dev AI Agent\n\n### Support\n\nIf this disclosure was useful and userswould like to support continued open-source security research and responsible-disclosure work, they can sponsor at https://github.com/sponsors/therawdev — Shopper is thankful for those keeping open source safe.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "shopper/framework"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.9.2"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper/security/advisories/GHSA-243p-f3cv-c5wh"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-862" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-09-11T20:47:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}